Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioner's claims were unavailing.After Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The immigration judge (IJ) denied relief. The BIA affirmed and, pursuant to the IJ's order, granted Petitioner voluntary departure. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) Petitioner did not establish that he was eligible for asylum; (2) the resolution of Petitioner's asylum claim also disposed of his withholding of removal claim; and (3) Petitioner's claim related to the denial of his request for CAT protection was waived. View "Zhakira v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of determinations by the immigration judge (IJ) and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's request for withholding of removal and voluntary departure, holding that there was no abuse of discretion or error of law.Petitioner was arrested in Connecticut on criminal charges. When served with a notice to appear in immigration court, Petitioner requested withholding of removal and voluntary departure. The IJ ruled against Petitioner, and Petitioner appealed. Before the IJ made its ruling Petitioner's wife filed an I-130 petition on his behalf. While Petitioner's appeal to the BIA was pending, Petitioner's charges in Connecticut were dropped and his I-130 petition was approved. Based on these developments, Petitioner moved to remand his case to the IJ. The BIA denied Petitioner's appeal and his motion to remand. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) Petitioner's withholding of removal claim failed; (2) the IJ did not err in denying Petitioner's application for voluntary departure; (3) the IJ did not err in denying Petitioner's motion for a continuance; and (4) the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to remand. View "Lee v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the judgment of the immigration judge (IJ) denying Petitioner's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that Petitioner's claims failed.Petitioner, an Ecuadorian national, conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The IJ determined that Petitioner had failed to substantiate any of his three claims and denied relief. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency's findings. View "Loja-Tene v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Appellant's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing Appellant's appeal from the decision of the immigration judge (IJ) denying Appellant's application for asylum, withholding of removal (WOR), and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the conclusions of the IJ and BIA were supported by substantial evidence.Appellant, a Honduran national, filed an application for asylum, WOR, and CAT relief. The IJ denied Appellant's applications and ordered that he be removed to Honduras. The BIA dismissed Appellant's petition for asylum and WOR and denied his application for protection under CAT. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the BIA and IJ's conclusion that Appellant did not show that the government of Honduras was unable or unwilling to protect him was supported by substantial evidence; and (2) Appellant did not establish that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to Honduras. View "Gomez-Medina v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction barring implementation of decisions to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations of Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador. The TPS program is a congressionally created humanitarian program administered by DHS that provides temporary relief to nationals of designated foreign countries that have been stricken by a natural disaster, armed conflict, or other "extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state."The panel held that judicial review of plaintiffs' claim under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is barred by 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(5)(A). Under the TPS statute, the Secretary possesses full and unreviewable discretion as to whether to consider intervening events in making a TPS determination. In this case, plaintiffs' attempt to rely on the APA to invoke justiciability over what would otherwise be an unreviewable challenge to specific TPS determinations, constitutes an impermissible circumvention of section 1254a(b)(5)(A).The panel also held that plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success, or even serious questions, on the merits of their Equal Protection claim. The district court found that the DHS Secretaries were influenced by President Trump and/or the White House in their TPS decisionmaking, and that President Trump had expressed animus against non-white, non-European immigrants. However, without any evidence linking them, the panel concluded that these two factual findings alone cannot support a finding of discriminatory purpose for the TPS terminations. View "Ramos v. Wolf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff represents three certified classes which are defined to include, in relevant part, all current and future individuals who are subject to an immigration detainer issued by an ICE agent located in the Central District of California, excluding individuals with final orders of removal or who are subject to ongoing removal proceedings. The district court entered a judgment and two permanent injunctions in favor of plaintiff and the Probable Cause Subclass on Fourth Amendment claims. The State Authority Injunction enjoins the Government from issuing detainers from the Central District to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in states that lack state law permitting state and local LEAs to make civil immigration arrests based on civil immigration detainers. The Database Injunction enjoins the Government from issuing detainers to class members based solely on searches of electronic databases to make probable cause determinations of removability.The Ninth Circuit first held that plaintiff had Article III standing to seek prospective injunctive relief when he commenced suit; second, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the Probable Cause Subclass pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) with plaintiff as the class representative; third, the panel held that 8 U.S.C. 252(f)(1) does not bar injunctive relief for the claims in this case because the only provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) whose text even refers to immigration detainers is not among the provisions that section 1252(f)(1) encompasses; fourth, the panel reversed and vacated the State Authority Injunction because the presence or absence of probable cause determines whether the Government violates the Fourth Amendment when issuing a detainer, not state law restrictions; fifth, the panel reversed and vacated the Database Injunction because it is premised on legal error and lacks critical factual findings; and finally, the panel reversed summary judgment for the Government on plaintiffs' claim pursuant to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). View "Gonzalez v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction granted to Plaintiffs in this case, holding that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their arguments challenging United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) policy of civilly arresting individuals attending court on official business.In 2018, ICE issued a directive formalizing its policy of arresting allegedly removable noncitizen in and around state courthouses when they appeared for judicial proceedings. Plaintiffs sued ICE, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and three DHS officials (collectively, Defendants), challenging the directive and ICE's policy. The district court determined that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their argument that ICE lacked statutory authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101-1537, to conduct such arrests and preliminarily enjoined ICE from implementing the directive or otherwise civilly arresting individuals attending court on official business anywhere in Massachusetts. The First Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case, holding that Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, and the district court's contrary ruling was based on a material error of law. View "Ryan v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that denied Petitioner's motion to reconsider his motion to reopen removal proceedings, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion.Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was charged with being removable from the United States. The Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the charge of removability and denied Petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) this Court's precedent forecloses the argument that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to issue the order of removal; (2) the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to reconsider its denial of Petitioner's motion to reopen; and (3) the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioner failed to make the requisite prima facie case. View "Franjul-Soto v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordering Petitioner's removal, holding that Petitioner's state drug conviction was an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43); 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, pled guilty to drug possession with the intent to distribute, in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 32A(a). The Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him because his drug conviction constituted an aggravated felony under the INA. An immigration judge ruled that Petitioner was removable. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because the mens rea to convict an accomplice under section 32A(a) is no broader than under the Controlled Substances Act, Petitioner's state drug conviction amounted to illicit trafficking in a controlled substance and thus an aggravated felony under the INA. View "Soto-Vittini v. Barr" on Justia Law

Five foreign nationals who each contributed $500,000 to Mirror Lake, a new commercial enterprise set to construct and operate a senior living facility, sought to obtain lawful permanent resident status under the EB-5 immigrant-investor program. The USCIS denied the EB-5 visa petitions on the stated ground that none had made a qualifying investment.The DC Circuit held that USCIS's denial of the EB-5 immigrant-investor visa petitions were arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to offer a reasoned explanation for its denials. In this case, plaintiffs put their capital at risk because the redemption of their investments is dependent on the success of the business. Therefore, USCIS's decision to deny the visas on the purported ground that the investments are not at risk at all is neither reasonably explained nor supported by agency precedent. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to set aside the denials of the EB-5 petitions. View "Mirror Lake Village, LLC v. Wolf" on Justia Law