Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the decision of a state agency ruling several noncitizen applicants ineligible for all public benefits of the Bridge to Independence program (B2I), holding that the district court did not err in determining that applicants were not eligible for B2I.The applicants in this case were Guatemalan citizens who fled to Nebraska as minors. Each applicant was adjudicated pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) and placed in foster care. The applicants, who had already received special immigration juvenile status, applied to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for B2I. DHHS denied the applications because each applicant failed to meet the citizenship and lawful presence requirements. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that the applicants were not eligible for B2I because the applicants were not "lawfully present" and the legislature did not "affirmatively provide[]" for unlawful applicants to be eligible under the Young Adult Bridge to Independence Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-4501 to 43-4514. View "E.M. v. Nebraska Department of Health & Human Services" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's motion to reopen sua sponte his immigration proceedings, holding that the BIA departed from his settled course of adjudication and that remand was required consistent with this opinion.Petitioner argued that the BIA clearly erred when it determined that he was not entitled to relief from deportation under section 237(a)(2)(A)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (the Pardon Waiver Clause). In making its determination, the BIA concluded that a pardon issued by the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles is "not effective for purposes of establishing entitlement to" a waiver of deportation. The First Circuit held (1) this Court has jurisdiction to review colorable legal and constitutional challenges to denials of motions to reopen sua sponte; and (2) the BIA departed from its settled course of adjudication by deeming a pardon from Connecticut insufficient under the Pardon Waiver Clause. View "Thompson v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge's decision denying Petitioner's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) and ordering Petitioner removed, holding that Petitioner's arguments lacked merit.In finding that Petitioner did not meet his burden to show eligibility for any of the grounds for relief he sought the immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner was not credible for several reasons. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the IJ's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence; (2) the introduction of law enforcement gang database records did not violate Petitioner's due process rights; and (3) even if the BIA erred in applying the wrong legal standard in its analysis of Petitioner's CAT claim, any such error would be harmless. View "Diaz Ortiz v. Barr" on Justia Law

An Immigration Judge with the Board of Immigration Appeals moved sua sponte to reopen Juvenal Reyes-Vargas' removal proceedings. The Board ruled that under 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(1) the Board ruled that this regulation removed the IJ’s jurisdiction to reopen an alien’s removal proceedings after the alien has departed the United States (the regulation’s “post-departure bar”). The Tenth Circuit reviewed the Board's interpretation of its regulation using the framework announced in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), which clarified when and how courts defer to an agency interpreting its own regulations. Under that case, the Tenth Circuit determined it could defer to the Board’s interpretation only if the Court concluded, after rigorously applying all interpretative tools, that the regulation presented a genuine ambiguity and that the agency’s reading was reasonable and entitled to controlling weight. Applying this framework here, the Tenth Circuit concluded the regulation was not genuinely ambiguous on the issue in dispute: whether the post-departure bar eliminated the IJ’s jurisdiction to move sua sponte to reopen removal proceedings. In fact, the regulation’s plain language conclusively answered the question: the post-departure bar applies to a party’s “motion to reopen,” not to the IJ’s own sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings. So the Court did not defer, and granted Reyes-Vargas’s petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the Board had to review the IJ’s conclusory decision that Reyes-Vargas had not shown “exceptional circumstances” as required before an IJ can move sua sponte to reopen removal proceedings. View "Reyes-Vargas v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition seeking review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) denial of her untimely motion to reopen her family's removal proceedings, holding that the BIA's denial of Petitioner's motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Indonesia, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture for her herself, her husband, and her two daughters. An immigration judge denied the application, and the BIA affirmed. Six years later, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen the removal proceedings. The BIA denied the motion as untimely. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA's decision not to reopen the proceedings was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "Sutarsim v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Attorney General imposed conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG), 34 U.S.C.10151, which the primary source of federal criminal justice enforcement funding for state and local governments. The district court granted a preliminary injunction as to conditions that required that state or local officials honor requests to provide federal agents advance notice of the scheduled release of aliens in custody and that state or local correctional facilities give federal agents access to aliens in their custody. The Seventh Circuit upheld a nationwide injunction. The district court granted a permanent injunction and invalidated a condition requiring that state or local governments certify their compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373, which prohibits them from restricting their officials from communicating information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any individual to the INS, was unconstitutional but stayed the injunction to the extent that it applied beyond Chicago.The Seventh Circuit again held that the Attorney General cannot pursue the executive branch's policy objectives through the power of the purse or the arm of local law enforcement, rejecting the Attorney General’s assertion that Congress itself provided that authority in the language of the statutes. Chicago has determined that effective law enforcement requires the cooperation of its undocumented residents; such cooperation cannot be accomplished if those residents fear immigration consequences should they communicate with the police; and, local law enforcement must remain independent from federal immigration enforcement. The Byrne JAG grant was enacted to support the needs of local law enforcement to help fight crime, but “is being used as a hammer to further a completely different policy of the executive branch.” States do not forfeit all autonomy over their own police power merely by accepting federal grants. There is no reason to stay the application of the injunction. View "City of Chicago v. Barr" on Justia Law

The First Circuit held that the requirements for establishing membership in a particular social group in support of a request for asylum or withholding of removal do not categorically preclude applicants from successfully relying on any group defined in material part as women "unable to leave" a domestic relationship.Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner alleged that her former domestic partner and the father of her son abused her in the past, will abuse her in the future, and will remain unfettered by Dominican law enforcement authorities. The immigration judge ruled against Petitioner in part on claimed inadequacy of the tendered social groups. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the BIA's holding that Petitioner's claim necessarily failed because the groups to which she claimed to belong were necessarily deficient was arbitrary and unexamined. View "De Pena-Paniagua v. Barr" on Justia Law

Jose Angel Banuelos-Galviz (Banuelos) entered the United States in 2006. Roughly three years later, he was served with a document labeled “Notice to Appear.” By statute, a notice to appear must include the time of the removal hearing. But Banuelos’s document did not tell him the date or time of the hearing, so the immigration court later sent him a notice of hearing with this information. Banuelos then sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge rejected each request, and Banuelos appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. While the administrative appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Pereira v. Sessions, which held that the stop-time rule was not triggered by a notice to appear that omitted the time of the removal hearing. Because Banuelos’s notice to appear lacked both the date and time, he moved for a remand so that the immigration judge could consider his request for cancellation of removal. To qualify for cancellation of removal, Banuelos needed to show continuous presence in the United States for at least ten years. His ability to satisfy this requirement turned on whether the combination of the deficient notice to appear and notice of hearing had triggered the "stop-time rule." If the stop-time rule had been triggered, Banuelos would have had only about three years of continuous presence. But if the stop-time rule had not been triggered, Banuelos’s continuous presence would have exceeded the ten-year minimum. The Board held that the stop-time rule had been triggered because the combination of the two documents—the incomplete notice to appear and the notice of hearing with the previously omitted information—was the equivalent of a complete notice to appear. Given this application of the rule, the Board found that Banuelos’s period of continuous presence had been too short to qualify for cancellation of removal. So the Board denied his motion to remand. Given the unambiguous language of the pertinent statutes, the Tenth Circuit determined the stop-time rule was not triggered by the combination of an incomplete notice to appear and a notice of hearing. The Court thus granted the petition for review and remanded to the Board for further proceedings. View "Banuelos-Galviz v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Center lodged a FOIA request with the Department of Justice (DOJ) for records of communications between the Attorney General, the Office of the Attorney General and any Office of Immigration Litigation or Office of the Solicitor General lawyers related to 11 certified cases decided in 2002-2009. DOJ produced about 1,000 pages but withheld 4,000 pages, citing FOIA Exemption 5, which allows the withholding of agency memoranda not subject to disclosure in the ordinary course of litigation, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5). Exemption 5 encompasses the attorney work product, attorney-client, and deliberative process privileges. DOJ submitted a Vaughn index describing each document withheld, identifying documents reflecting discussions between attorneys working within different offices of issues related to immigration cases under consideration or on certification for decision by the Attorney General.The Center unsuccessfully argued that the documents contained ex parte communications outside Exemption 5's scope because the DOJ attorneys’ eventual litigation role taints the advice they provide the Attorney General at the certification stage; removal proceedings end in federal court litigation where those same attorneys are opposite the immigrant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Office of Immigration Litigation and Solicitor General attorneys do not hold interests adverse to the noncitizen at the stage at which the Attorney General certifies a case for decision. “ To conclude otherwise would chill the deliberations that department and agency heads like the Attorney General undertake in confidence to execute the weighty responsibilities of their offices.” View "National Immigrant Justice Center v. United States Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner's motion to reopen his immigration case, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to reopen on the grounds that Petitioner did not establish changed country conditions.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala who illegally entered the United States and was later placed in removal proceedings, applied for asylum and withholding of removal on the grounds that he feared gang violence upon his return to Guatemala. The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's applications. The BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal, agreeing with the conclusion of the IJ that Petitioner had not shown that he would more likely than not suffer persecution upon his return to Guatemala. Petitioner later moved the BIA to reopen his case, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that country conditions in Guatemala had substantially changed. The BIA denied Petitioner's motion to reopen. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA did not err in declining to equitably toll the ninety-day statutory filing deadline and in concluding that Petitioner had not demonstrated that country conditions in Guatemala had substantially changed since his hearing. View "Molina v. Barr" on Justia Law