Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

President Trump lawfully exercised the broad discretion granted to him under section 1182(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), to issue Proclamation No. 9645, suspending the entry of aliens into the United States, and the Proclamation does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Proclamation sought to improve vetting procedures for foreign nationals traveling to the United States by identifying ongoing deficiencies in the information needed to assess whether nationals of particular countries present a security threat,and placed entry restrictions on the nationals of foreign states whose systems for managing and sharing information about their nationals the President deemed inadequate.The Supreme Court held that section 1182(f) entrusts to the President the decisions whether and when to suspend entry, whose entry to suspend, for how long, and on what conditions; Trump fulfilled section 1182(f)'s sole prerequisite that the President find that the entry of the covered aliens would be detrimental to the interests of the United States; even assuming that some form of inquiry into the persuasiveness of the President's findings was appropriate, plaintiffs' attacks on the sufficiency of the findings could not be sustained; the Proclamation comports with the remaining textual limits in section 1182(f); plaintiffs failed to identify any conflict between the Proclamation and the immigration scheme reflected in the INA that would implicitly bar the President from addressing deficiencies in the Nation's vetting system; and plaintiffs' argument that the President's entry suspension violates section 1152(a)(1)(A) ignored the basic distinction between admissibility determinations and visa issuance that runs throughout the INA.Finally, the Court applied rational basis review and held that plaintiffs, although they have standing to challenge the exclusion of their relatives, have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause where the Proclamation was expressly premised on legitimate purposes and said nothing about religion. The Court drew a distinction between whether it must consider not only the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the Presidency itself. The Court concluded that the Government has set forth a sufficient national security justification to survive rational basis review. View "Trump v. Hawaii" on Justia Law

Alejandro Lujan Jimenez petitioned for review a final order of removal and an order by the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) declining to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings. Lujan is a native and citizen of Mexico. He first entered the United States as a child sometime in the 1990s. His most recent entry into the United States occurred in May 2004. In January 2007, Lujan pled guilty in Colorado state court to Criminal Trespass of a Motor Vehicle with the Intent to Commit a Crime Therein, and sentenced to 35 days in jail. The Department of Homeland Security filed a notice charging Lujan as removable. He received three continuances of removal proceedings until April 2009 when he conceded removability. Lujan then applied for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal. He obtained four additional continuances of his removal proceedings. Lujan appeared in immigration court on June 5, 2013, and the IJ granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Lujan stated that he was attempting to obtain new counsel, but proceeded pro se at the hearing. The IJ denied relief, concluding that Lujan was ineligible for adjustment of status based on his immigration history and that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude—his criminal trespass offense in Colorado. Lujan appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ’s denial of a continuance violated his right to due process and that his Colorado conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s ruling. Lujan then filed an untimely petition for review, which was dismissed. The Tenth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction over petition number 17-9527: review of the BIA’s decision declining to sua sponte reopen his removal proceedings. The Court has previously held that “we do not have jurisdiction to consider [a] petitioner’s claim that the BIA should have sua sponte reopened the proceedings . . . because there are no standards by which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” View "Lujan-Jimenez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Azael Bedolla-Zarate, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Final Administrative Removal Order (FARO) based upon his having been convicted of an aggravated felony. Bedolla-Zarate was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse of a minor in Wyoming state court in September 2016. He contended that his conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. The Tenth Circuit found a person convicted under the Wyoming sexual abuse of a minor statute necessarily has committed sexual abuse of a minor under the INA, therefore DHS properly issued a FARO against Bedolla-Zarate for committing an aggravated felony under the INA. The Court denied review. View "Bedolla-Zarate v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Washtech, a union representing workers throughout the country in the STEM labor market, challenged DHS's regulations allowing nonimmigrant aliens temporarily admitted to the country as students to remain in the country for up to three years after finishing a STEM degree to pursue work related to their degree. The DC Circuit held that Washtech had standing to bring challenges to the 2016 Rule under the doctrine of competitor standing; affirmed the dismissal of Washtech's challenge to the 1992 Rule as time-barred; reversed the dismissal of Washtech's challenge in Count II (challenging DHS's statutory authority) because the district court abused its discretion in dismissing a plausible claim of relief based on Washtech's inadequate opposition to DHS's motion to dismiss; remanded as to Count II; and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Counts III (alleging procedural deficiencies) and IV (alleging rule was arbitrary and capricious) under Federal Rule of Civil procedure 12(b)(6) because neither stated a plausible claim for relief. View "Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to deny Petitioner’s application for deferral of removal based on the protection to which he claimed he was entitled under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT).Petitioner, a native of Jamaica and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was charged with removability for being convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contended that, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1208.17, he was eligible for deferral of removal under CAT based on the fact that a gang leader in Jamaica with ties to the Jamaican police had threatened to kill him for being an informant. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s claim for deferral of removal. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to show that he was entitled to deferral of removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1208.17(a). View "Morris v. Sessions" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) erred in concluding that Petitioner had not suffered past persecution nor had a well-founded fear of future persecution if he returned to Ecuador on account of his indigenous Quiche ethnicity.The First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying Petitioner’s asylum application. The Court held (1) Petitioner’s case should be analyzed in light of the fact that he was a minor during the time he suffered abuse, harm, and mistreatment in Ecuador; (2) the IJ and BIA erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the child-specific standard for asylum claims; and (3) the case must be remanded for a finding of whether what Petitioner suffered in Ecuador, viewed from a child’s perspective, amounted to severe mistreatment and, if so, whether the the abuse amounted to government inaction, a requisite for a finding of past persecution. View "Santos-Guaman v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the Government for false arrest and false imprisonment under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Plaintiff claimed that she was falsely arrested and imprisoned by Custom and Border Protection (CBP) officers because the officers detained her after she presented them with an Employment Authorization Document (EAD), which in her view conclusively showed entitlement to remain in the United States. The court held that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applied in this case where the officers enforced a removal order. The court reasoned that, what plaintiff insisted was certain from the EAD and removed all discretion was, in reality, sufficiently uncertain as to leave discretion in the hands of the officers. Furthermore, reading the discretionary function exception in conjunction with the law enforcement proviso, the court held that the district court was correct in holding that there was no subject matter jurisdiction. However, the district court did err in dismissing the FTCA claims with prejudice. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded so that the district court may enter a revised order and final judgment that dismisses the suit without prejudice. View "Campos v. United States" on Justia Law

The Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program allocates substantial funds annually to provide for the needs of state and local law enforcement, including personnel, equipment, training. In 2017, the Attorney General tied receipt of the funds to the recipient’s compliance with conditions. Chicago, a “sanctuary city,” argued the conditions were unlawful and unconstitutional. The district court agreed and enjoined, nationwide, the enforcement of a condition mandating advance notice to federal authorities of the release date of persons in state or local custody who are believed to be aliens and a condition requiring the local correctional facility to ensure agents access to such facilities to meet with those persons. Compliance with those conditions would require the allocation of state and local resources, including personnel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that it was not assessing “optimal immigration policies” but enforcing the separation of powers doctrine. The statute precisely describes the formula through which funds should be distributed to states and local governments and imposes precise limits on the extent to which the Attorney General can deviate from that distribution. It “is inconceivable that Congress would have anticipated" that the Attorney General could abrogate the distribution scheme and deny funds to states and localities that would qualify under the Byrne JAG statutory provisions, based on a decision to impose conditions—the putative authority for which is provided in another statute (34 U.S.C. 10102(a)(6)). View "City of Chicago v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Jose Maria Garcia-Martinez was a lawful permanent resident at the time of his convictions, and the BIA found him removable, under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMT), not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. He was granted review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, arguing the BIA erred in concluding that Garcia’s Oregon theft convictions were CIMTs. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Oregon theft offenses for which Garcia was convicted did not require a permanent taking of property. Therefore, the panel concluded that, at the time Garcia committed the offenses, they were not crimes involving moral turpitude because for many decades the BIA had required a permanent intent to deprive in order for a theft offense to be a crime involving moral turpitude. "In short, Garcia’s thefts were not CIMTs, and his removal order must be set aside. ... the BIA has changed or updated or revised its rule for the future. Nevertheless, that rule should not be applied to Garcia, who pled and was convicted while the old rule was extant." View "Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review as to his challenge to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) determination that his motion to reopen was untimely and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as to Petitioner’s challenge to the BIA’s decision to not exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen.The BIA found that Petitioner had submitted his motion to reopen long after the ninety-day limit and that Petitioner did not show that he fit within an exception to that limit. The BIA also determined that sua sponte reopening was unwarranted. The First Circuit held (1) that the BIA did not abuse its discretion as to the first issue; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s challenge as to the second issue. View "Reyes v. Sessions" on Justia Law