Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit remanded this immigration case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) due to its insufficient explanation of why the least culpable conduct prohibited under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, 2 is morally reprehensible, and why the statute’s requirement of “malice,” as construed by Massachusetts courts, qualifies the crime as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT).Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was charged as removable. Petitioner denied his removability and, in the alternative, requested several forms of relief. Petitioner was previously convicted of the crime of Massachusetts arson. The immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner’s Massachusetts crime was categorically a CIMT. The IJ also found Petitioner ineligible for relief from removal on the basis that he failed to prove that his conviction was not an aggravated felony. The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal in an opinion that replicated the IJ’s reasoning. The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s opinion, and remanded for further proceedings for the reasons set forth above. View "Rosa Pena v. Sessions" on Justia Law

This appeal addressed whether immigration detainees housed in a private contract detention facility in Aurora, Colorado could bring claims as a class under: (1) 18 U.S.C. 1589, a provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (the “TVPA”) that prohibits forced labor; and (2) Colorado unjust enrichment law. The GEO Group, Inc. (“GEO”) owned and operated the Aurora Facility under government contract. While there, Appellees rendered mandatory and voluntary services to GEO: cleaning their housing units’ common areas and performed various jobs through a voluntary work program, which paid them $1 a day. The district court certified two separate classes: (1) all detainees housed at the Aurora Facility in the past ten years (the “TVPA class”); and (2) all detainees who participated in the Aurora Facility’s voluntary work program in the past three years (the “unjust enrichment class”). On interlocutory appeal, GEO argues that the district court abused its discretion in certifying each class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It primarily contended Appellees’ TVPA and Colorado unjust enrichment claims both required predominantly individualized determinations, making class treatment inappropriate. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed class certification. View "Menocal v. The GEO Group" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture Act (CAT). In her applications, Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, claimed that she was persecuted, and faced future persecution, at the hands of Salvadorian gang members on account of her family membership. An immigration judge (IJ) credited Petitioner’s testimony as true but nonetheless denied relief. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner could not satisfy her claim for asylum, and therefore, she also could not satisfy her claim for withholding of removal; and (2) Petitioner provided no basis by which the court should reverse the BIA’s decision denying her protection under the CAT. View "Villalta-Martinez v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition for review filed by Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, seeking relief from the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal (WOR) and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In his application, Petitioner claimed that he had experienced past persecution and faced a clear probability of future persecution in Honduras on account of his family membership. The IJ determined that Petitioner failed to establish that he had suffered - or was likely to suffer in the future - harm that was sufficient to constitute persecution and related to his family membership. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that none of Petitioner’s claims warranted relief from the decisions of the IJ and BIA. View "Ruiz-Escobar v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition filed by Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, seeking judicial review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT).At the conclusion of a removal hearing, an immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner was ineligible for either asylum or withholding for removal because she was unable to show that the harm she suffered in Guatemala was on account of a statutorily protected ground. The IJ also concluded that Petitioner did not qualify for CAT protection. After the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision, Petitioner sought judicial review. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, as to Petitioner’s application for asylum and for withholding of removal, the IJ and BIA supportably found that Petitioner failed to establish a nexus between the claimed harm and a statutorily protected ground. View "Perez-Rabanales v. Sessions" on Justia Law

In November 2005, Lee was admitted to the U.S. as a nonimmigrant student's spouse. In March 2006, the Temple sought a nonimmigrant religious worker (R-1) visa for Lee. That petition remained pending in USCIS’s California Service Center (CSC) for almost four years. In October 2009, CSC indicated that USCIS intended to approve the petition and retroactively amend Lee’s status, to give her lawful status June 2006-May 2009 and that the Temple could apply for an extension for the remaining eligibility period, through May 2011. CSC’s approval notice stated that the R‐1 visa was valid through May 2009. CSC later approved an extension, covering May 2010-October 2011, leaving a gap in Lee’s lawful status. A November 2010 I‐360 petition, seeking classification as a special immigrant religious worker, stated that Lee had worked for the Temple since October 2009. CSC denied the application because Lee had worked when she did not have a valid visa. In June 2013, CSC agreed to eliminate the gap; CSC approved the I‐360 petition. In December 2013, Lee sought to adjust her status to lawful permanent resident. The Nebraska Service Center denied Lee’s application, noting a status violation. USCIS indicated its intent to revoke the I‐360 petition for failure to establish that Lee had worked continuously in a qualifying occupation for two years immediately preceding the application. The Temple responded that CSC had unreasonably delayed the initial application. USCIS considered that an admission and revoked the I‐360. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of a petition for judicial review. The revocation at issue is the type of discretionary action that 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars from judicial review. View "Bultasa Buddhist Temple of Chicago v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a complaint challenging the USCIS's denial of jurisdiction over plaintiff's application for an adjustment of his immigration status. The court agreed with the district court that the present action constituted an indirect challenge to an outstanding removal order issued against plaintiff and thus 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(5) precluded subject matter jurisdiction. View "Singh v. USCIS" on Justia Law

The Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced steps to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program by March 2018, concluding that DACA violates the Administrative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of challengers. The government then moved to stay the district court order requiring completion of the administrative record until after resolution of motions to dismiss and for a preliminary injunction. The court stayed its order for one month. The government petitioned the Supreme Court, which vacated. The district court’s order required the government to turn over all “emails, letters, memoranda, notes, media items, opinions and other materials ... actually seen or considered, however briefly, by Acting Secretary ... in connection with the ... decision … all DACA-related materials considered by persons (anywhere in the government) who thereafter provided … written advice or input … all DACA-related materials considered by persons (anywhere in the government) who thereafter provided … verbal input … all comments and questions propounded ... to advisors or subordinates … and their responses, and … all materials directly or indirectly considered by former Secretary of DHS John Kelly leading to his February 2017 memorandum not to rescind DACA. The court should have first resolved the government’s threshold arguments that the decision was unreviewable as “committed to agency discretion,” 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), and that the Immigration and Nationality Act deprives the court of jurisdiction. The court may not compel the government to disclose any document that the government believes is privileged without first providing an opportunity to argue the issue. The Court did not consider the merits of the claims or defenses. View "In Re United States" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed for want of jurisdiction Petitioners’ petition for judicial review of the denial of their applications for voluntary departure to Guatemala and Mexico, holding that this court lacked jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of voluntary departure.The IJ denied Petitioners’ applications on discretionary grounds. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision. Petitioners appealed, asserting several allegations of error. The First Circuit did not reach the merits of Petitioner’s contentions, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to do so because Petitioner’s claims of error were not at least colorable. View "de la Cruz-Orellana v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(U) created a new nonimmigrant visa classification that permits immigrants who are victims of serious crimes and who assist law enforcement to apply for and receive a nonimmigrant visa called a U-visa. There is a statutory cap of 10,000 U-visas each fiscal year. Since 2009, the U-Visa backlog has increased from 21,138 to 177,340 pending applications. Calderon-Ramirez, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the U.S. in 2002 and was the victim of an attack in 2014. He filed a petition for U Nonimmigrant Status in February 2015 and is waiting to be evaluated for the waiting list. In 2016, he sought a writ of mandamus, to compel Homeland Security to adjudicate his petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit. Ramirez did not set forth any facts that differentiate himself from other petitioners waiting ahead of him for adjudication. While there are instances when the government can and will expedite a petition, Ramirez failed to present a situation appropriate to warrant such an action. The court stated that the wait Ramirez faces is not unreasonable. View "Calderon-Ramirez v. McCament" on Justia Law