Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Immigration Law
by
In 2007, removal proceedings were initiated against Petitioner. An immigration judge (IJ), however, deemed Petitioner to be a U.S. citizen. In 2016, Petitioner was convicted of a drug felony, and a second IJ ordered Petitioner removed. The IJ denied Petitioner’s motion to terminate removal proceedings on the basis of the prior IJ’s determination that Petitioner was a U.S. citizen. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, agreeing that res judicata was inapplicable in the context of an administrative proceeding where doing so would “frustrate[] Congressional intent.” The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) the applicability of res judicata becomes immaterial before this Court because of the jurisdictional limitation imposed by the Immigration and Nationality Act; (2) Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that he is a United States citizen; and (3) accordingly, the jurisdictional bar in 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2) (C) applies and precludes judicial review of the final order of removal against Petitioner. View "Miranda v. Sessions" on Justia Law

by
Ulloa, a citizen of Mexico, married Morfin, a U.S. citizen. Morfin sought approval for his permanent residence, but Ulloa was present in the U.S. without authority and was required to return to Mexico to obtain a visa for lawful entry. He applied at the consulate in Juarez. After twice interviewing Ulloa, the State Department denied him a visa, stating that it had reason to believe that he is (or was) involved in drug trafficking. In 2001 Ulloa had been indicted for possessing more than 500 grams of cocaine, with intent to distribute. The U.S. Attorney dismissed the indictment and Ulloa denies the charge, but he lacks a favorable adjudication. The couple sued under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, alleging that the denial was arbitrary and not supported by substantial evidence. The district court found that it lacked jurisdiction because decisions on visa applications are committed to agency discretion and are outside the scope of judicial review under the APA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the APA does not curtail jurisdiction granted by other laws, the consular officer gave a legitimate reason for denying Ulloa’s application. Precedent prevents the judiciary from reweighing the facts and equities. Whether Congress acted wisely in making “reason to believe” some fact sufficient to support the denial of a visa application is not a question open to review by the judiciary. View "Morfin v. Tillerson" on Justia Law

by
After she was charged with removability, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act. An immigration judge (IJ) rejected Petitioner’s application for relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s denial and dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the BIA reopen and reconsider her appeal, contending that the BIA committed three legal errors. The BIA denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen and reconsider. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Petitioner’s motion. View "Cortez Cardona v. Yates" on Justia Law

by
In May 1990, Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, committed a felony under California law. At that time, the immigration laws allowed the Attorney General of the United States, if so inclined, to grant Petitioner a waiver from the full effect of his criminal conduct. In December 1990, Petitioner was convicted. In November 1990, the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) took effect. IMMACT divested the Attorney General of the discretion to grant such a waiver to any person who served five or more years of incarceration for an aggravated felony. In 2014, after Petitioner was released from prison, he was charged with being removable. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that, although Petitioner’s conduct predated IMMACT’s enactment, the fact that his conviction postdated IMMACT’s enactment controlled. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that controlling precedent is in accord with the BIA’s decision, and therefore, the BIA did not apply IMMACT to Petitioner in an improperly retroactive manner. View "Holder v. Lynch" on Justia Law

by
Washington and Minnesota filed suit challenging President Trump's Executive Order 13769 which, among other changes to immigration policies and procedures, bans for 90 days the entry into the United States of individuals from seven countries, suspends for 120 days the United States Refugee Admissions Program, and suspends indefinitely the entry of all Syrian refugees. In this emergency proceeding, the Government moves for an emergency stay of the district court's temporary restraining order while its appeal of that order proceeds. The court noted the extraordinary circumstances of this case and determined that the district court's order possesses the qualities of an appealable preliminary injunction. The court held that the States have made a sufficient showing to support standing, at least at this preliminary stage of the proceedings, where they argued that the Executive Order causes a concrete and particularized injury to their public universities, which the parties do not dispute are branches of the States under state law. The court concluded that there is no precedent to support the Government's position that the President's decisions about immigration policy, particularly when motivated by national security concerns, are unreviewable, even if those actions potentially contravene constitutional rights and protections. The court explained that the Government's claim runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy. Therefore, although courts owe considerable deference to the President's policy determinations with respect to immigration and national security, it is beyond question that the federal judiciary retains the authority to adjudicate constitutional challenges to executive action. The court concluded that the Government has not shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits regarding its argument about, at least, the States' Due Process Clause claim, and the court noted the serious nature of the allegations the States have raised with respect to their religious discrimination claims. The court held that the procedural protections provided by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause are not limited to citizens; rather, they apply to all persons within the United States, including aliens, regardless of whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. Finally, the balance of hardships and the public interest do not favor a stay. Accordingly, the court denied the emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. View "State of Washington v. Trump" on Justia Law

by
Petitioner, a native of China, was charged with being removable. Petitioner filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all of Petitioner’s claims and ordered him removed from the United States, finding that Petitioner was not credible. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) Petitioner’s asylum claim failed, and consequently, Petitioner’s withholding of removal claim necessarily failed as well; and (2) substantial evidence existed to support the BIA’s rejection of Petitioner’s CAT claim. View "Xian Jing v. Lynch" on Justia Law

by
Petitioner, a Honduran nation, conceded removability after being charged for being present in the United States without legal sanction. Petitioner cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his experiences in Honduras. An immigration judge (IJ) denied relief and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that the IJ’s and the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s claim for asylum must stand. View "Rivera-Coca v. Lynch" on Justia Law

by
Split Rail Fence Company, Inc., a Colorado business that sold and installed fencing materials, petitions for review of an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) summary decision. The decision imposed civil penalties on Split Rail for violating the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) by: (1) “hir[ing] for employment in the United States an individual without complying with the requirements of subsection (b)” of 8 U.S.C. 1324a in violation of section 1324a(a)(1)(B) (Count One); and (2) “continu[ing] to employ [an] alien in the United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien” in violation of section 1324a(a)(2) (Count Two). ICE special agents conducted an inspection at Split Rail in 2009 and 2011 to determine its compliance with the IRCA. During the inspection, it examined Split Rail’s I-9 forms. ICE served Split Rail with an Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF), commencing this administrative proceeding against Split Rail. Split Rail management stated it “had absolutely no reason to believe either now or at any time in the past that any of [nine individuals identified as ‘current employees’ in the 2011 Notice of Suspect Documents] are anything but law abiding residents of the United States of America.” Split Rail noted many of them were long-term employees who, along with their families, had been involved in company activities, parties, and picnics. He further stated they each appeared authorized to work in the United States because they had bank accounts, cars, homes, and mortgages. He also noted many had valid driver’s licenses and some had filed successful workers’ compensation claims. He did not, however, state that Split Rail had taken any action regarding the employees’ I-9 forms. In 2012, ICE filed its complaint against Split Rail. The ALJ granted ICE summary decision on both counts. Split Rail timely filed its petition for review, but finding no reversible error as to the ALJ's decision, the Tenth Circuit denied Split Rail’s petition. View "Split Rail Fence Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

by
Here the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services approved an I-130 “immediate relative” visa petition based on an the marriage of Petitioner, a Chinese national, to a United States citizen. In a parallel removal proceeding, the immigration court inquired into the bona fides of the anchoring marriage. The immigration judge (IJ) found that the marriage was a sham, rendering Petitioner’s ineligible to adjust her status. The IJ then ordered Petitioner’s removal to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding (1) the IJ had jurisdiction to examine the bona fides of Petitioner’s marriage; and (2) the record did not compel a conclusion contrary to the “sham marriage” conclusion reached by the IJ and the BIA. View "Chan v. Lynch" on Justia Law

by
Ting Xue, a native and citizen of China, applied to the Tenth Circuit for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order affirming the denial of his petition for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). Xue claimed he was persecuted in his native China for his religious beliefs. He was smuggled to North America, ultimately entering the United States illegally through Mexico in July 2008. The IJ concluded Xue’s treatment at the hands of Chinese authorities before he came to the United States was not sufficiently severe to amount to past persecution. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that the BIA correctly concluded that because Xue failed to show a reasonable possibility of future persecution, he necessarily failed to meet the higher burden required for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Furthermore, the Court found the BIA correctly concluded that Xue failed to show his eligibility for relief under the CAT. With nothing more, the Court denied Xue's petition for review. View "Xue v. Lynch" on Justia Law