Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In January 2017, President Trump signed executive order EO-1, "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry," suspending, for 90 days, entry of foreign nationals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, and suspending the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for 120 days. The Ninth Circuit upheld a nationwide temporary restraining order. The government revoked EO-1. EO-2 issued on March 6, describing conditions in six countries that “demonstrate ... heightened risks to [U.S.] security.” EO–2 section 2(a) directs Homeland Security to determine whether foreign governments provide adequate information about nationals applying for U.S visas and to report those findings to the President within 20 days; nations identified as deficient will have 50 days to alter their practices (2(b)). EO–2 2(c) directs that entry of nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, be suspended for 90 days; section 3(c) provides for case-by-case waivers. Section 6(a) suspends decisions on applications for refugee status and travel of refugees under the USRAP for 120 days; 6(b) suspends refugee entries in excess of 50,000 for this year. The order’s stated effective date is March 16, 2017. The Ninth Circuit again declined to stay a temporary injunction. The Supreme Court stayed the order in part, with respect to sections 2(c), 6(a), and 6(b). An American individual or entity that has a bona fide relationship with a particular person seeking to enter the country can legitimately claim concrete hardship if that person is excluded, even if the 50,000-person cap has been reached. As to these individuals and entities, the Court did not disturb the injunction; as to those lacking any such connection, the balance tips in favor of the government’s compelling interest in security. The Court noted a June 12 Ninth Circuit decision vacating the injunction as to 2(a) and stated that the Executive should conclude its work and provide adequate notice to foreign governments within the 90-day life of 2(c). View "Trump. v. International Refugee Assistance Project" on Justia Law

President Trump, in issuing Executive Order 13780, "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States," exceeded the scope of the authority delegated to him by Congress. After determining that plaintiffs have standing to assert their claims based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of that claim and that the district court's preliminary injunction order could be affirmed in large part based on statutory grounds. The panel declined to reach the Establishment Clause claim to resolve this appeal. The panel held that, in suspending the entry of more than 180 million nationals from six countries, suspending the entry of all refugees, and reducing the cap on the admission of refugees from 110,000 to 50,000 for the 2017 fiscal year, the President did not meet the essential precondition to exercising his delegated authority pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). The President failed to make a sufficient finding that the entry of the excluded classes would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The panel also held that the Order violated other provisions of the INA that prohibit nationality-based discrimination and require the President to follow a specific process when setting the annual cap on the admission of refugees. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in large part; vacated portions of the injunction that prevent the Government from conducting internal reviews and the injunction to the extent that it runs against the President; and remanded with instructions. View "Hawaii v. Trump" on Justia Law

In this immigration case, the First Circuit vacated the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In his petition for review, Petitioner, a native of Guatemala, argued that he presented sufficient evidence to establish both past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution and that he could not reasonably relocate within Guatemala. The First Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) there was significant evidence in the record supporting a conclusion that relocation would be unreasonable; and (2) given the limited analysis on this issue by the IJ and the BIA, remand was proper for the BIA to consider it fully. View "Garcia-Cruz v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed in substantial part the district court's issuance of a nationwide injunction as to Section 2(c) of the challenged Second Executive Order (EO-2), holding that the reasonable observer would likely conclude EO-2's primary purpose was to exclude persons from the United States on the basis of their religious beliefs. Section 2(c) reinstated the ninety-day suspension of entry for nationals from six countries, eliminating Iraq from the list, but retaining Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.Determining that the case was justiciable, the Fourth Circuit held that plaintiffs have more than plausibly alleged that EO-2's stated national security interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for its religious purpose. Because the facially legitimate reason offered by the government was not bona fide, the court no longer deferred to that reason and instead may look behind the challenged action. Applying the test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the court held that the evidence in the record, viewed from the standpoint of the reasonable observer, created a compelling case that EO-2's primary purpose was religious. Then-candidate Trump's campaign statements revealed that on numerous occasions, he expressed anti-Muslim sentiment, as well as his intent, if elected, to ban Muslims from the United States. President Trump and his aides have made statements that suggest EO-2's purpose was to effectuate the promised Muslim ban, and that its changes from the first executive order reflect an effort to help it survive judicial scrutiny, rather than to avoid targeting Muslims for exclusion from the United States. These statements, taken together, provide direct, specific evidence of what motivated both executive orders: President Trump's desire to exclude Muslims from the United States and his intent to effectuate the ban by targeting majority-Muslim nations instead of Muslims explicitly. Because EO-2 likely fails Lemon's purpose prong in violation of the Establishment Clause, the district court did not err in concluding that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. The court also held that plaintiffs will likely suffer irreparable harm; the Government's asserted national security interests do not outweigh the harm to plaintiffs; and the public interest counsels in favor of upholding the preliminary injunction. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a nationwide injunction was necessary to provide complete relief, but erred in issuing an injunction against the President himself. View "International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA affirmed the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ), concluding (1) the level of mistreatment Petitioner suffered did not rise to the level that could qualify as persecution to be entitled to a grant of asylum, and (2) Petitioner could not meet the requirements for withholding of removal and for protection under the CAT. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) Petitioner failed to provide the court with a basis for reversing the BIA’s ruling denying his application for asylum; and (2) Petitioner failed to offer any basis on which to conclude that he could satisfy the requirements for withholding for removal or for protection under the CAT. View "Morales-Morales v. Sessions" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that aliens who are subject to reinstated orders of removal may not apply for asylum, even though they may be entitled to withholding of removal. In reaching this conclusion, the First Circuit ruled that certain provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 did not entitle Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala who was subject to a reinstated order of removal, to seek asylum. The First Circuit affirmed the decisions of the immigration judge (IJ) and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) that determined that Petitioner could not apply for asylum even where the IJ determined that he was entitled to withholding of removal based on the persecution he would face in Guatemala. View "Garcia-Garcia v. Sessions" on Justia Law

In 2007, removal proceedings were initiated against Petitioner. An immigration judge (IJ), however, deemed Petitioner to be a U.S. citizen. In 2016, Petitioner was convicted of a drug felony, and a second IJ ordered Petitioner removed. The IJ denied Petitioner’s motion to terminate removal proceedings on the basis of the prior IJ’s determination that Petitioner was a U.S. citizen. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, agreeing that res judicata was inapplicable in the context of an administrative proceeding where doing so would “frustrate[] Congressional intent.” The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) the applicability of res judicata becomes immaterial before this Court because of the jurisdictional limitation imposed by the Immigration and Nationality Act; (2) Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that he is a United States citizen; and (3) accordingly, the jurisdictional bar in 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2) (C) applies and precludes judicial review of the final order of removal against Petitioner. View "Miranda v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Ulloa, a citizen of Mexico, married Morfin, a U.S. citizen. Morfin sought approval for his permanent residence, but Ulloa was present in the U.S. without authority and was required to return to Mexico to obtain a visa for lawful entry. He applied at the consulate in Juarez. After twice interviewing Ulloa, the State Department denied him a visa, stating that it had reason to believe that he is (or was) involved in drug trafficking. In 2001 Ulloa had been indicted for possessing more than 500 grams of cocaine, with intent to distribute. The U.S. Attorney dismissed the indictment and Ulloa denies the charge, but he lacks a favorable adjudication. The couple sued under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, alleging that the denial was arbitrary and not supported by substantial evidence. The district court found that it lacked jurisdiction because decisions on visa applications are committed to agency discretion and are outside the scope of judicial review under the APA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the APA does not curtail jurisdiction granted by other laws, the consular officer gave a legitimate reason for denying Ulloa’s application. Precedent prevents the judiciary from reweighing the facts and equities. Whether Congress acted wisely in making “reason to believe” some fact sufficient to support the denial of a visa application is not a question open to review by the judiciary. View "Morfin v. Tillerson" on Justia Law

After she was charged with removability, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act. An immigration judge (IJ) rejected Petitioner’s application for relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s denial and dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the BIA reopen and reconsider her appeal, contending that the BIA committed three legal errors. The BIA denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen and reconsider. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Petitioner’s motion. View "Cortez Cardona v. Yates" on Justia Law

In May 1990, Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, committed a felony under California law. At that time, the immigration laws allowed the Attorney General of the United States, if so inclined, to grant Petitioner a waiver from the full effect of his criminal conduct. In December 1990, Petitioner was convicted. In November 1990, the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) took effect. IMMACT divested the Attorney General of the discretion to grant such a waiver to any person who served five or more years of incarceration for an aggravated felony. In 2014, after Petitioner was released from prison, he was charged with being removable. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that, although Petitioner’s conduct predated IMMACT’s enactment, the fact that his conviction postdated IMMACT’s enactment controlled. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that controlling precedent is in accord with the BIA’s decision, and therefore, the BIA did not apply IMMACT to Petitioner in an improperly retroactive manner. View "Holder v. Lynch" on Justia Law