Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Honduran nation, conceded removability after being charged for being present in the United States without legal sanction. Petitioner cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that he had a well-founded fear of persecution based on his experiences in Honduras. An immigration judge (IJ) denied relief and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that the IJ’s and the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s claim for asylum must stand. View "Rivera-Coca v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Split Rail Fence Company, Inc., a Colorado business that sold and installed fencing materials, petitions for review of an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) summary decision. The decision imposed civil penalties on Split Rail for violating the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) by: (1) “hir[ing] for employment in the United States an individual without complying with the requirements of subsection (b)” of 8 U.S.C. 1324a in violation of section 1324a(a)(1)(B) (Count One); and (2) “continu[ing] to employ [an] alien in the United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien” in violation of section 1324a(a)(2) (Count Two). ICE special agents conducted an inspection at Split Rail in 2009 and 2011 to determine its compliance with the IRCA. During the inspection, it examined Split Rail’s I-9 forms. ICE served Split Rail with an Notice of Intent to Fine (NIF), commencing this administrative proceeding against Split Rail. Split Rail management stated it “had absolutely no reason to believe either now or at any time in the past that any of [nine individuals identified as ‘current employees’ in the 2011 Notice of Suspect Documents] are anything but law abiding residents of the United States of America.” Split Rail noted many of them were long-term employees who, along with their families, had been involved in company activities, parties, and picnics. He further stated they each appeared authorized to work in the United States because they had bank accounts, cars, homes, and mortgages. He also noted many had valid driver’s licenses and some had filed successful workers’ compensation claims. He did not, however, state that Split Rail had taken any action regarding the employees’ I-9 forms. In 2012, ICE filed its complaint against Split Rail. The ALJ granted ICE summary decision on both counts. Split Rail timely filed its petition for review, but finding no reversible error as to the ALJ's decision, the Tenth Circuit denied Split Rail’s petition. View "Split Rail Fence Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Here the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services approved an I-130 “immediate relative” visa petition based on an the marriage of Petitioner, a Chinese national, to a United States citizen. In a parallel removal proceeding, the immigration court inquired into the bona fides of the anchoring marriage. The immigration judge (IJ) found that the marriage was a sham, rendering Petitioner’s ineligible to adjust her status. The IJ then ordered Petitioner’s removal to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding (1) the IJ had jurisdiction to examine the bona fides of Petitioner’s marriage; and (2) the record did not compel a conclusion contrary to the “sham marriage” conclusion reached by the IJ and the BIA. View "Chan v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Ting Xue, a native and citizen of China, applied to the Tenth Circuit for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order affirming the denial of his petition for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). Xue claimed he was persecuted in his native China for his religious beliefs. He was smuggled to North America, ultimately entering the United States illegally through Mexico in July 2008. The IJ concluded Xue’s treatment at the hands of Chinese authorities before he came to the United States was not sufficiently severe to amount to past persecution. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that the BIA correctly concluded that because Xue failed to show a reasonable possibility of future persecution, he necessarily failed to meet the higher burden required for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Furthermore, the Court found the BIA correctly concluded that Xue failed to show his eligibility for relief under the CAT. With nothing more, the Court denied Xue's petition for review. View "Xue v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application for a good-faith-marriage waiver of the joint-filing requirement for a Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence (Form I-751 waiver) but made a series of representations to advance her application. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied Petitioner’s Form I-751 waiver application. An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application for review and granted Petitioner voluntary departure, finding that Petitioner’s various misrepresentations to USCIS undermined the credibility of her testimony. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing with the IJ that, in light of Petitioner’s misrepresentations, the evidence was insufficient to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that she had entered into a good-faith marriage. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that nothing Petitioner argued on appeal compelled the Court to reverse the BIA’s decision. View "Quezada-Caraballo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Ugandan national, was subjected to removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum and withholding of removal. An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal, concluding that no changed or extraordinary circumstances could justify Petitioner’s thirteen-year delay in seeking asylum and that Petitioner failed to establish his eligibility for withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner moved to reopen removal proceedings based on newly discovered evidence. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, concluding that Petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements for reopening. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that the BIA did not commit an error of law or exercise its judgment in an arbitrary, capricious, or irrational manner. View "Bbale v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Colombia, was charged as removable. In response, Petitioner sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s claims. Thereafter, Petitioner voluntarily returned to Colombia. Petitioner later re-entered the United States and filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings. The IJ denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen, finding that Petitioner had failed to establish an exception to the time limitations on motions to reopen. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s asylum claim, and therefore, Petitioner’s counterpart claim for withholding also necessarily failed; and (2) Petitioner abandoned her CAT claim. View "Giraldo-Pabon v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center submitted to the Department of Homeland Security a Freedom of Information Act request for information relating to Tier III terrorist organizations. Membership in any tier makes a person inadmissible to the United States, with narrow exceptions. Tier I and Tier II organizations are publicly identified terrorist groups such as ISIS and al‐Qaeda. Tier III organizations are defined in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) as any group that engages in terrorist activity (defined in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)), even if the activity is conducted exclusively against regimes that are enemies of the United States. The government typically does not have good intelligence about Tier III organizations. The Department provided only some of the requested information. The Center filed suit. The district judge granted, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, summary judgment for the government on the ground that the names of the Tier III organizations are protected from disclosure by the Freedom of Information Act’s exemption, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(E), for “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” View "Heartland Alliance National Immigrant Justice Center v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Peruvian national, became a lawful conditional resident of the United States in 2001 at age eleven. The government initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner in 2007. After a serious of mistakes on the part of two lawyers, Petitioner failed to timely appear at his removal proceeding, and the immigration judge (IJ) entered an order of removal in absentia. Petitioner moved to reopen his immigration case, explaining that his first two attorneys had provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that this deficient representation had prevented him from attaining legal permanent resident status. The IJ agreed that Petitioner had received ineffective assistance of counsel but that Petitioner’s failure to be appear could not be attributed to his lawyers’ inadequacies. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen, as the failures of Petitioner’s lawyers, taken together, constituted exceptional circumstances sufficient to grant Petitioner’s motion. View "Murillo-Robles v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1157(a)(2), the President authorized entry of 85,000 refugees for fiscal 2016; at least 10,000 were to come from Syria. Since 2001, all persons seeking to enter the U.S. as refugees are required to undergo screening by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, followed by multiple layers of screening by the federal government, which can take two years. Indiana has an approved refugee resettlement plan (8 U.S.C. 1522) and receives federal funds to contract with private agencies for the provision of services, “without regard to race, religion, nationality, sex, or political opinion.” Indiana’s governor refused to pay for services to any refugee whose “‘country of origin” is Syria. The Seventh Circuit affirmed entry of a preliminary injunction. Regulation of immigration is a federal function. The state’s brief provided no evidence that Syrian terrorists are posing as refugees or have ever committed acts of terrorism in the U.S. The court characterized the governor’s argument as “the equivalent of his saying . . . that he wants to forbid black people to settle in Indiana not because they’re black but because he’s afraid of them, and since race is therefore not his motive he isn’t discriminating.” Indiana is free to withdraw from the refugee assistance program, but withdrawal might not interrupt the flow of Syrian refugees; the Wilson/Fish program distributes federal aid to refugees without the involvement of the state government. View "Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence" on Justia Law