Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a native of Cameroon, pleaded guilty to filing a false healthcare claim, larceny, and attempted larceny, in violation of Massachusetts state law. Appellant paid the full restitution amount and his case was dismissed. In an effort to be granted naturalization, Appellant attempted to revise his criminal record. Although Appellant successfully had his sentence “clarified” to establish the amount of loss to the victim of the crime, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied Appellant’s renewed application for naturalization on the grounds that Appellant had been convicted of an aggravated felony and was therefore ineligible for naturalization. Appellant filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that it had been established that the amount of loss to the victim of the crime of fraud or deceit was less than $10,000, and therefore, his petition for naturalization was improperly denied. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the totality of the circumstances supported USCIS’s finding that the amount of loss to the victim exceeded $10,000. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the USCIS properly discounted “Appellant’s attempts at revisionist history” and properly denied naturalization. View "Nanje v. Chaves" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, applied for withholding of removal, asserting that he suffered past persecution and faced a clear probability of future persecution in Guatemala on account of his political opinion and his membership in a particular group. Despite finding Petitioner credible, an immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s findings and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that any harm he suffered or would likely suffer in the future was serious enough to constitute persecution and related to a statutorily protected ground. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s findings. View "Hernandez-Lima v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, limits who may file a petition for a visa on behalf of an immediate family member who is a foreign national. In 2009, Joel Bremer, who had previously been convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, petitioned for a spousal visa on behalf of his wife, a native and citizen of the Philippines. The USCIS, exercising discretion delegated to it by the Secretary, determined that Mr. Bremer failed to show that he posed no risk to his wife and denied his petition. The Bremers filed a class action suit contending that the manner in which the USCIS makes the no-risk determinations violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(1), and the Constitution. The district court granted in part the Bremers' motion for class certification, dismissed the case, and concluded that the Bremers sought judicial review of determinations that were committed to the “sole and unreviewable discretion” of the Secretary. The court remanded to the district court for further consideration of Count II where the Bremers allege that the Adam Walsh Act no longer applies to Mr. Bremer's petition; the court agreed with the Bremers that whether Mr. Bremer’s petition has already been filed, and if so, whether Clause (viii) is inapplicable, are predicate legal questions over which the district court has jurisdiction; the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., bars judicial review of the Bremers' challenges to how the Secretary has exercised his discretion to make a no-risk determination under the Act; and the court rejected the Bremers' remaining claims. View "Bremer v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Eritrea, filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that she was persecuted in Eritrea because of her Pentecostal faith. An immigration judge (IJ) ordered Petitioner’s removal to Eritrea. Although the IJ refrained from making an explicit adverse credibility finding regarding Petitioner’s credibility, the judge concluded that Petitioner failed to remedy credibility problems in her testimony with persuasive corroborating evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner filed a petition for review, asserting, inter alia, that the IJ and BIA erred in finding material inconsistencies in the evidence she presented and in relying on evidence outside the record. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) a reasonable fact-finder would not be compelled on this record to conclude that Petitioner met her burden to prove past persecution; and (2) Petitioner’s claims for other forms of relief were unavailing. View "Bahta v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Hugo Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for adjustment of status in reliance on the Tenth Circuit's decision in "Padilla-Caldera I" in the period it was valid law. Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for relief during the period after the BIA’s announcement of its contrary interpretation in "Briones" yet before "Padilla-Caldera II" declared "Briones" controlling and "Padilla-Caldera I" effectively overruled. The BIA suggested this factual distinction made all the legal difference. "But we fail to see how. Indeed, the government’s position in this appeal seems to us clearly inconsistent with both the rule and reasoning of De Niz Robles." In 2009 the law expressly gave Gutierrez-Brizuela two options: he could seek an adjustment of status pursuant to "Padilla-Caldera I" or accept a ten-year waiting period outside the country. "Relying on binding circuit precedent, he chose the former path. Yet the BIA now seeks to apply a new law to block that path at a time when it’s too late for Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela to alter his conduct. Meaning that, if we allowed the BIA to apply Briones here, Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela would lose the seven years he could’ve spent complying with the BIA’s ten year waiting period and instead have to start that waiting period now. The due process concerns are obvious: when Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela made his choice, he had no notice of the law the BIA now seeks to apply. And the equal protection problems are obvious too: if the agency were free to change the law retroactively based on shifting political winds, it could use that power to punish politically disfavored groups or individuals for conduct they can no longer alter." This case was remanded back to the BIA for reconsideration of Gutierrez-Brizuela's application based on the law in effect at the time of his application. View "Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was born and raised in Guatemala, entered the United States without inspection. The Government initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner for entering the United States without a valid entry document. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that the threats of a police officer that shot and killed Petitioner’s father constituted persecution based on the social group of Petitioner’s family and demonstrated the likelihood that Petitioner would be tortured or killed if he returned to Guatemala. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of proving he is a refugee. View "Marin-Portillo v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, conceded removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner argued that she had suffered past persecution due to her prior attendance and had an objectively well-founded fear of future persecution due to her prior attendance at an underground Christian church in China. The IJ denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, concluding that she had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA’s decision to affirm the IJ’s denial of Petitioner’s asylum application was supported by substantial evidence. View "Qin v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was charged with removability. Petitioner conceded removability and indicated her intent to seek asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner argued that she had suffered past persecution in El Salvador and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her membership in the particular social group she defined as “Salvadoran women in intimate relationships with partners who view them as property.” The IJ denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish that her proposed social group shared immutable characteristics and had social distinction. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Petitioner failed to show either immutability or social distinction. View "Vega-Ayala v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Musunuru, a citizen of India, was the beneficiary of visa petitions filed by his previous employer, VSG, and by his current employer, Crescent. The priority date assigned to VSG’s petition allowed him to file an application with USCIS for adjustment of status to permanent resident. When an immigrant visa finally became available, USCIS did not adjust his status, but revoked VSG’s petition, invalidating its earlier priority date. Because the date assigned to Crescent’s petition was much later, Musunuru would have to wait several years for adjudication of his application . VSG’s owners had pleaded guilty to the unlawful hiring of an alien and mail fraud, in connection with an unrelated employee; USCIS presumed that all VSG’s visa petitions were fraudulent. Musunuru could have shown that his employment was not fraudulent, but USCIS sent notice to VSG only, even though VSG had gone out of business and Musunuru had changed employers. USCIS concluded that Musunuru lacked standing to challenge the revocation. The district court dismissed his appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed. USCIS applied the notice and challenge regulations inconsistently with the statutory portability provision that allowed Musunuru to change employers. Musunuru’s current employer, Crescent, was entitled to pre-revocation notice and an opportunity to respond and to administratively challenge the decision. View "Musunuru v. Lynch" on Justia Law

AILA submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., requests for disclosure of records related to complaints about the conduct of immigration judges. The government disclosed thousands of pages of records, but redacted information in those records that it believes is either statutorily exempt from disclosure or non-responsive to the request. The district court upheld both categories of redactions. The court concluded that the government's across-the-board approach of redacting the immigration judges’ names from all of the disclosed records cannot be sustained in light of the variety of privacy and public interests that may be at stake in connection with the disclosure of an immigration judge’s name. Therefore, the court remanded for a more individualized inquiry into the propriety of redacting judges’ names. In this case, the government, after determining that records were responsive to AILA’s request, redacted discrete information within the records on the basis of non-responsiveness even if no statutory exemption shielded the information from disclosure. The court concluded that such an approach cannot be squared with the statutory scheme. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that complaint resolutions fall outside the statute’s affirmative disclosure mandate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "American Immigration Lawyers v. Exec. Office for Immigration" on Justia Law