Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Colombia, was charged as removable. In response, Petitioner sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s claims. Thereafter, Petitioner voluntarily returned to Colombia. Petitioner later re-entered the United States and filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings. The IJ denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen, finding that Petitioner had failed to establish an exception to the time limitations on motions to reopen. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s asylum claim, and therefore, Petitioner’s counterpart claim for withholding also necessarily failed; and (2) Petitioner abandoned her CAT claim. View "Giraldo-Pabon v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center submitted to the Department of Homeland Security a Freedom of Information Act request for information relating to Tier III terrorist organizations. Membership in any tier makes a person inadmissible to the United States, with narrow exceptions. Tier I and Tier II organizations are publicly identified terrorist groups such as ISIS and al‐Qaeda. Tier III organizations are defined in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) as any group that engages in terrorist activity (defined in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)), even if the activity is conducted exclusively against regimes that are enemies of the United States. The government typically does not have good intelligence about Tier III organizations. The Department provided only some of the requested information. The Center filed suit. The district judge granted, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, summary judgment for the government on the ground that the names of the Tier III organizations are protected from disclosure by the Freedom of Information Act’s exemption, 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(E), for “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” View "Heartland Alliance National Immigrant Justice Center v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Peruvian national, became a lawful conditional resident of the United States in 2001 at age eleven. The government initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner in 2007. After a serious of mistakes on the part of two lawyers, Petitioner failed to timely appear at his removal proceeding, and the immigration judge (IJ) entered an order of removal in absentia. Petitioner moved to reopen his immigration case, explaining that his first two attorneys had provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that this deficient representation had prevented him from attaining legal permanent resident status. The IJ agreed that Petitioner had received ineffective assistance of counsel but that Petitioner’s failure to be appear could not be attributed to his lawyers’ inadequacies. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen, as the failures of Petitioner’s lawyers, taken together, constituted exceptional circumstances sufficient to grant Petitioner’s motion. View "Murillo-Robles v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1157(a)(2), the President authorized entry of 85,000 refugees for fiscal 2016; at least 10,000 were to come from Syria. Since 2001, all persons seeking to enter the U.S. as refugees are required to undergo screening by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, followed by multiple layers of screening by the federal government, which can take two years. Indiana has an approved refugee resettlement plan (8 U.S.C. 1522) and receives federal funds to contract with private agencies for the provision of services, “without regard to race, religion, nationality, sex, or political opinion.” Indiana’s governor refused to pay for services to any refugee whose “‘country of origin” is Syria. The Seventh Circuit affirmed entry of a preliminary injunction. Regulation of immigration is a federal function. The state’s brief provided no evidence that Syrian terrorists are posing as refugees or have ever committed acts of terrorism in the U.S. The court characterized the governor’s argument as “the equivalent of his saying . . . that he wants to forbid black people to settle in Indiana not because they’re black but because he’s afraid of them, and since race is therefore not his motive he isn’t discriminating.” Indiana is free to withdraw from the refugee assistance program, but withdrawal might not interrupt the flow of Syrian refugees; the Wilson/Fish program distributes federal aid to refugees without the involvement of the state government. View "Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Haiti, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). In his asylum application, Petitioner claimed that he had suffered past persecution and feared future persecution because of his work as a grassroots leader in a Haitian political party. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s claims for relief, finding that Petitioner’s testimony lacked credibility and, thus, Petitioner was unable to establish eligibility for relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the agency’s asylum determination; and (2) Petitioner waived his withholding of removal and CAT claims. View "Legal v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Brayan Alexis Osuna-Gutierrez was arrested in Kansas. He was a passenger in a rental vehicle on a cross-country trip. The police found approximately seven grams of marijuana belonging to Gutierrez that he had legally purchased in Colorado. Police also found approximately three kilograms of methamphetamine in the rear portion of the car. The government charged Gutierrez and his co-defendants with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Gutierrez ultimately pled guilty to “Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute" (the government dropped the methamphetamine charges). The district court sentenced him to time served, approximately seven months. After leaving jail, Gutierrez was immediately transferred to immigration custody and served with Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Removal Order (the expedited removal process). During the removal process, an officer within DHS concluded that Gutierrez was not a legal permanent resident, having come to the United States from Mexico with his mother when he was one year old without being legally admitted. Further, Gutierrez had pled guilty to an aggravated felony. Gutierrez timely petitioned for review of his removal and was deported back to Mexico. Gutierrez argued his deportation was improper because: (1) the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) expedited removal process is illegal; and (2) in any event, it was improper for DHS to use the expedited removal process on Gutierrez because he pled guilty to a misdemeanor, not a felony. The Tenth Circuit found Gutierrez was wrong on both counts, and denied Gutierrez's petition for review. View "Osuna-Gutierrez v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, was charged as removable based on allegations that Petitioner had misrepresented himself as a Japanese citizen and national. An Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the charge of removability. After a flurry of procedural activity, a second IJ found that Petitioner was removable as charged. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that Petitioner procured an immigration benefit through willful misrepresentation. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the finding that Petitioner deliberately and voluntarily used a fraudulent Japanese passport to gain entry into the United States. View "Li v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Appellant, a native of Cameroon, pleaded guilty to filing a false healthcare claim, larceny, and attempted larceny, in violation of Massachusetts state law. Appellant paid the full restitution amount and his case was dismissed. In an effort to be granted naturalization, Appellant attempted to revise his criminal record. Although Appellant successfully had his sentence “clarified” to establish the amount of loss to the victim of the crime, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied Appellant’s renewed application for naturalization on the grounds that Appellant had been convicted of an aggravated felony and was therefore ineligible for naturalization. Appellant filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that it had been established that the amount of loss to the victim of the crime of fraud or deceit was less than $10,000, and therefore, his petition for naturalization was improperly denied. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the totality of the circumstances supported USCIS’s finding that the amount of loss to the victim exceeded $10,000. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the USCIS properly discounted “Appellant’s attempts at revisionist history” and properly denied naturalization. View "Nanje v. Chaves" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, applied for withholding of removal, asserting that he suffered past persecution and faced a clear probability of future persecution in Guatemala on account of his political opinion and his membership in a particular group. Despite finding Petitioner credible, an immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s findings and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that any harm he suffered or would likely suffer in the future was serious enough to constitute persecution and related to a statutorily protected ground. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s findings. View "Hernandez-Lima v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587, limits who may file a petition for a visa on behalf of an immediate family member who is a foreign national. In 2009, Joel Bremer, who had previously been convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, petitioned for a spousal visa on behalf of his wife, a native and citizen of the Philippines. The USCIS, exercising discretion delegated to it by the Secretary, determined that Mr. Bremer failed to show that he posed no risk to his wife and denied his petition. The Bremers filed a class action suit contending that the manner in which the USCIS makes the no-risk determinations violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(1), and the Constitution. The district court granted in part the Bremers' motion for class certification, dismissed the case, and concluded that the Bremers sought judicial review of determinations that were committed to the “sole and unreviewable discretion” of the Secretary. The court remanded to the district court for further consideration of Count II where the Bremers allege that the Adam Walsh Act no longer applies to Mr. Bremer's petition; the court agreed with the Bremers that whether Mr. Bremer’s petition has already been filed, and if so, whether Clause (viii) is inapplicable, are predicate legal questions over which the district court has jurisdiction; the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., bars judicial review of the Bremers' challenges to how the Secretary has exercised his discretion to make a no-risk determination under the Act; and the court rejected the Bremers' remaining claims. View "Bremer v. Johnson" on Justia Law