Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was charged with removability. Petitioner conceded removability and indicated her intent to seek asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Before the immigration judge (IJ), Petitioner argued that she had suffered past persecution in El Salvador and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her membership in the particular social group she defined as “Salvadoran women in intimate relationships with partners who view them as property.” The IJ denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish that her proposed social group shared immutable characteristics and had social distinction. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Petitioner failed to show either immutability or social distinction. View "Vega-Ayala v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Musunuru, a citizen of India, was the beneficiary of visa petitions filed by his previous employer, VSG, and by his current employer, Crescent. The priority date assigned to VSG’s petition allowed him to file an application with USCIS for adjustment of status to permanent resident. When an immigrant visa finally became available, USCIS did not adjust his status, but revoked VSG’s petition, invalidating its earlier priority date. Because the date assigned to Crescent’s petition was much later, Musunuru would have to wait several years for adjudication of his application . VSG’s owners had pleaded guilty to the unlawful hiring of an alien and mail fraud, in connection with an unrelated employee; USCIS presumed that all VSG’s visa petitions were fraudulent. Musunuru could have shown that his employment was not fraudulent, but USCIS sent notice to VSG only, even though VSG had gone out of business and Musunuru had changed employers. USCIS concluded that Musunuru lacked standing to challenge the revocation. The district court dismissed his appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed. USCIS applied the notice and challenge regulations inconsistently with the statutory portability provision that allowed Musunuru to change employers. Musunuru’s current employer, Crescent, was entitled to pre-revocation notice and an opportunity to respond and to administratively challenge the decision. View "Musunuru v. Lynch" on Justia Law

AILA submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., requests for disclosure of records related to complaints about the conduct of immigration judges. The government disclosed thousands of pages of records, but redacted information in those records that it believes is either statutorily exempt from disclosure or non-responsive to the request. The district court upheld both categories of redactions. The court concluded that the government's across-the-board approach of redacting the immigration judges’ names from all of the disclosed records cannot be sustained in light of the variety of privacy and public interests that may be at stake in connection with the disclosure of an immigration judge’s name. Therefore, the court remanded for a more individualized inquiry into the propriety of redacting judges’ names. In this case, the government, after determining that records were responsive to AILA’s request, redacted discrete information within the records on the basis of non-responsiveness even if no statutory exemption shielded the information from disclosure. The court concluded that such an approach cannot be squared with the statutory scheme. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that complaint resolutions fall outside the statute’s affirmative disclosure mandate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "American Immigration Lawyers v. Exec. Office for Immigration" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States and was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner cross-applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming both past persecution and fear of future persecution due to his anti-gang political opinion and his membership in a particular social group. An immigration judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that there was no error in the BIA’s determinations and that the BIA's determinations were supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Alvizures-Gomes v. Lynch" on Justia Law

When Thomas was a child, he was lawfully admitted to the United States for six months, but he and his parents remained in the country beyond that date. Thomas’s mother later became a naturalized United States citizen and, three days later, Thomas turned eighteen years old. Thomas did not apply to become a lawful permanent resident thereafter but, instead continued living in the United States without a lawful admission for permanent residence. Thomas was subsequently convicted in a Massachusetts state court for armed robbery. An Immigration Judge ordered Thomas removed, finding that Thomas was removable as an alien who had been convicted of an aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Thomas filed a petition for review, arguing that he satisfied the applicable statutory criteria for obtaining derivative citizenship in consequence of his mother’s naturalization. The First Circuit denied the petition, holding that Thomas did not satisfy the criteria set forth in the derivative citizenship statute that was in effect at the time he was still a minor. View "Thomas v. Lynch" on Justia Law

An equally divided Court affirmed, by per curiam opinion, the judgment of the appeals court below. That court had temporarily halted implementation of the federal government's Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program ("DAPA") on the grounds that the policy likely violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The case will go back to the federal district court to determine whether DAPA should be permanently enjoined. View "United States v. Texas" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador with multiple convictions, was placed in removal proceedings. An Immigration Judge (IJ) rejected Petitioner’s application for Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) special rule cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. A Massachusetts district court later vacated Petitioner’s convictions, and the charges were subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, the BIA vacated its prior decision and remanded the case to the IJ for reconsideration. The IJ acknowledged that Petitioner was eligible for relief from removal under NACARA but exercised its discretion by declining to grant relief. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner did not deserve a favorable exercise of discretion. View "Lima v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1999, Hosseini’s wife was granted asylum. Hosseini lawfully entered the U.S. as a derivative asylee in 2000. Hosseini sought to obtain permanent resident status, 8 U.S.C. 1159. No action was taken on Hosseini’s application for 12 years. In 2013, the district court ordered USCIS to adjudicate Hosseini’s application within 60 days. USCIS sent Hosseini a Notice of Intent to Deny his application based on it determination that he had engaged in terrorist activities as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd). Hosseini denied ties to terrorism, but acknowledged affiliation with a political organization called Fedaeian from 1979-1982 in Iran and that he had distributed literature for Fadayeen Khalq (FeK) and Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) until 1985. USCIS denied his application, finding that Fek and MeK fell within the definition of undesignated terrorist organizations. Hosseini’s asylum status was not revoked; no removal proceedings were instituted. Hosseini challenged USCIS’s decision, stating that he could not be “inadmissible” because he was admitted as a derivative asylee. The court rejected the government’s jurisdictional arguments, but dismissed, holding that the denial was not a “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the denial was a final agency action, given that no removal action is pending. View "Hosseini v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, overstayed her visa and was subjected to removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for special rule cancellation of removal for battered spouses, a relief provision enacted pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). An immigration judge (IJ) denied the application on the ground that Petitioner’s testimony was unreliable and non-credible with respect to her abuse. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed on the basis that a good faith marriage must be shown before an applicant may be eligible for VAWA special rule cancellation of removal. The First Circuit vacated the denial of Petitioner’s application for VAWA special-rule cancellation of removal, holding that the BIA’s failure to adequately explain its decision that the operative statute requires an alien to prove a good faith marriage as an eligibility requirement for VAWA special rule cancellation of removal precluded meaningful judicial review in this case. Remanded. View "Tillery v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2009, an Immigration Judge (IJ) entered an order of removal of Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic. In 2012, Petitioner reentered the United States unlawfully. Thereafter, Petitioner was charged with criminal unlawful reentry. In 2013, Petitioner moved to reopen, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during the 2009 removal proceedings. The IJ denied the motion to reopen, concluding (1) the motion was time and number barred, and (2) the ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not comply with the requirements enumerated in Matter of Lozada. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the BIA denied. Petitioner then petitioned for judicial review. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for judicial review in part for want of jurisdiction and otherwise denied it, holding (1) because Petitioner never filed a timely petition for judicial review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review that portion of Petitioner’s motion; and (2) the BIA did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to reconsider. View "Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law