Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, was ordered removed in 2002. After Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider, which the BIA rejected. More than a decade later, Petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider. The BIA denied that motion as well. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s second motion to reconsider, holding that the BIA did not err in concluding that the circumstances of Petitioner’s case were not sufficiently extraordinary to warrant an equitable exception to the time and number bars applicable to Petitioner’s motion. View "Omar v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States without inspection. Petitioner was issued a notice to appear and conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, concluding (1) Petitioner failed to carry his burden to show either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and (2) Petitioner had not established that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured upon his return to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioner failed to establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Chen v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Elena Granada-Rubio and two of her sons illegally entered the United States. Granada-Rubio applied for asylum for herself and her two sons, as well as withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Granada-Rubio’s application for relief and ordered her and her sons removed to El Salvador. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Granada-Rubio’s petition for review, holding (1) the IJ and the BIA were warranted in finding that Granada-Rubio had not been persecuted based on her membership in a legally cognizable particular social group; (2) because Granada-Rubio did not qualify for asylum, she also did not qualify for withholding of removal; and (3) Granada-Rubio’s claim for protection under the CAT failed as well. View "Granada-Rubio v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1996, Petitioner, a citizen and native of the Dominican Republic, obtained permanent resident status after marrying an American citizen. In 2008, Petitioner and his wife divorced. In 2011, Petitioner was served with a notice to appear. Petitioner sought relief from removal in the form of an adjustment of status from conditional permanent resident to permanent resident. In addition, Petitioner asked for a waiver of the usual requirement to present his status-change request jointly with his spouse. The Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Petitioner removed, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish that he had entered into his marriage in good faith. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s decision in its entirety. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA concluding that Petitioner failed to carry his burden of proof that he married in good faith. View "Valdez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

M&K Engineering, Inc. filed an I-140 Immigration Petition for Alien Worker for its employee. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) initially approved the visa petition. The Director of the USCIS Texas Service Center subsequently revoked the approval of the visa petition. M&K’s owner Henry Bernardo administratively appealed the revocation decision. The USCIS Administrative Appeals Office affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal. Bernardo, as owner of M&K, then filed a complaint in the Massachusetts federal district court challenging the revocation of the visa petition approval. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that 8 U.S.C. 1252(1)(2)(B)(ii), which bars judicial review of the Attorney General’s and the Secretary of Homeland Security’s discretionary decisions under Title 8, Chapter 12, Subchapter II, applies to the revocation of visa petition approvals under 8 U.S.C. 1155. View "Bernardo v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Octavio Gutierrez-Orozco (Gutierrez), a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States illegally. Gutierrez insisted he entered the United States in March 1996. He remembered that date because his wife, who remained in Mexico, was pregnant with the second of their four children, who was born in September 1996. He claimed to have lived in the United States continuously since then, except for a brief, two-month trip back to Mexico in mid-1999 when his wife was ill, after which border patrol twice hindered his reentry. His wife joined him here sometime in 2000. Gutierrez’s immigration troubles began in February 2008, when a domestic violence incident with his teenage son led to a simple assault conviction. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Gutierrez conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal or, in the alternative, voluntary departure. The IJ conducted a hearing and concluded Gutierrez was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he did not demonstrate a ten-year continuous physical presence in the United States from April 1, 1998, to April 1, 2008; good moral character for that time period; and an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ also denied voluntary departure because Gutierrez failed to maintain good moral character during the relevant time frame and, alternatively, as an exercise of discretion. Gutierrez appealed to the BIA for relief from the IJ’s decision. The BIA denied relief, agreeing with the IJ. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Gutierrez-Orozco v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, was issued a notice to appear. Petitioner conceded removability and sought withholding of removal based on race, nationality, and membership in a particular social group. As to his claim regarding membership in a particular social group, Petitioner wrote that he would be harassed by gang members to join them if he returned to Honduras. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal and Petitioner’s subsequent motion to reconsider. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that because the new arguments raised in Petitioner’s motion to reconsider were previously available but not previously asserted, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reconsider. View "Hurtado v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The government initiated deportation proceedings against Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident who was convicted of a removable offense. Petitioner filed an N-600 application for citizenship with U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) claiming that he derived citizenship from his father’s naturalization and therefore could not be deported. USCIS denied the application. An immigration judge upheld the decision and ordered Petitioner removed to Jamaica. Petitioner appealed, arguing that his parents were common law spouses in Jamaica and legally separated within the meaning of former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act when they ceased cohabitating, and therefore, Petitioner, as a child, had derived citizenship from the naturalization of his father. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the removal order, determining that Petitioner had not proven that Jamaica recognized common-law marriage at the time of his birth and that the cessation of cohabitation did not qualify as a legal separation. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Petitioner’s claim of citizenship under former section 321(a)(3) failed because he could not prove his parents were in a legally recognized relationship from which they could legally separate. View "Thompson v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1991, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) placed Petitioner in deportation proceedings. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took action in Petitioner’s case. By that time, Congress had replaced deportation with removal, and DHS mistakenly regarded Petitioner as being in removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner’s conviction for aggravated identity theft was a “particularly serious crime” rendering her ineligible for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 2131(b). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s determination and ordered Petitioner deported. Without reaching the merits of Petitioner’s petition for review, the First Circuit remanded Petitioner’s case to the BIA to interpret and apply the correct law, former 8 U.S.C. 1253(h), holding that while the BIA acknowledged that Petitioner was in deportation proceedings governed by section 1253, the BIA incorrectly stated that the law governing the two proceedings was the same and improperly omitted any reference to section 1253(h)(3) in its review of Petitioner’s application. View "Valerio-Ramirez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1999, Petitioner, a citizen of Jamaica, was convicted of third-degree assault under a Connecticut statute. The Department of Homeland Security later placed Petitioner in removal proceedings. Permanent resident non-citizens such as Petitioner are removable if they are convicted of an “aggravated felony,” which includes any offense defined as a “crime of violence.” An immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner removable as charged, concluding that third-degree assault under Connecticut law qualified as a “crime of violence.” Reviewing the IJ’s legal conclusions de novo, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered Petitioner’s removal, reasoning that the Connecticut offense was categorically a crime of violence and thus was necessarily an “aggravated felony.” The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the removal order, holding (1) third-degree assault as defined by Connecticut law does not require proof of all of the required elements of a “crime of violence”; and (2) therefore, Petitioner’s conviction for third-degree assault, standing by itself, does not constitute proof that he has been convicted of an aggravated felony requiring his removal. Remanded. View "Whyte v. Lynch" on Justia Law