Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador with multiple convictions, was placed in removal proceedings. An Immigration Judge (IJ) rejected Petitioner’s application for Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) special rule cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. A Massachusetts district court later vacated Petitioner’s convictions, and the charges were subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, the BIA vacated its prior decision and remanded the case to the IJ for reconsideration. The IJ acknowledged that Petitioner was eligible for relief from removal under NACARA but exercised its discretion by declining to grant relief. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner did not deserve a favorable exercise of discretion. View "Lima v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1999, Hosseini’s wife was granted asylum. Hosseini lawfully entered the U.S. as a derivative asylee in 2000. Hosseini sought to obtain permanent resident status, 8 U.S.C. 1159. No action was taken on Hosseini’s application for 12 years. In 2013, the district court ordered USCIS to adjudicate Hosseini’s application within 60 days. USCIS sent Hosseini a Notice of Intent to Deny his application based on it determination that he had engaged in terrorist activities as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd). Hosseini denied ties to terrorism, but acknowledged affiliation with a political organization called Fedaeian from 1979-1982 in Iran and that he had distributed literature for Fadayeen Khalq (FeK) and Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) until 1985. USCIS denied his application, finding that Fek and MeK fell within the definition of undesignated terrorist organizations. Hosseini’s asylum status was not revoked; no removal proceedings were instituted. Hosseini challenged USCIS’s decision, stating that he could not be “inadmissible” because he was admitted as a derivative asylee. The court rejected the government’s jurisdictional arguments, but dismissed, holding that the denial was not a “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that the denial was a final agency action, given that no removal action is pending. View "Hosseini v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, overstayed her visa and was subjected to removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for special rule cancellation of removal for battered spouses, a relief provision enacted pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). An immigration judge (IJ) denied the application on the ground that Petitioner’s testimony was unreliable and non-credible with respect to her abuse. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed on the basis that a good faith marriage must be shown before an applicant may be eligible for VAWA special rule cancellation of removal. The First Circuit vacated the denial of Petitioner’s application for VAWA special-rule cancellation of removal, holding that the BIA’s failure to adequately explain its decision that the operative statute requires an alien to prove a good faith marriage as an eligibility requirement for VAWA special rule cancellation of removal precluded meaningful judicial review in this case. Remanded. View "Tillery v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 2009, an Immigration Judge (IJ) entered an order of removal of Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic. In 2012, Petitioner reentered the United States unlawfully. Thereafter, Petitioner was charged with criminal unlawful reentry. In 2013, Petitioner moved to reopen, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during the 2009 removal proceedings. The IJ denied the motion to reopen, concluding (1) the motion was time and number barred, and (2) the ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not comply with the requirements enumerated in Matter of Lozada. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the BIA denied. Petitioner then petitioned for judicial review. The First Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for judicial review in part for want of jurisdiction and otherwise denied it, holding (1) because Petitioner never filed a timely petition for judicial review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review that portion of Petitioner’s motion; and (2) the BIA did not err in denying Petitioner’s motion to reconsider. View "Garcia v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Colombia, sought to register permanent residence or adjust status. In support of his application, he submitted evidence, including a visa and Form I-94, that he was legally admitted to the United States when he was thirteen years old. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied his application on the basis that the documents were fraudulent. Petitioner was then placed in removal proceedings. Emphasizing his young age at the time of his alleged admission, Petitioner asserted that he did not know that his documents were fraudulent. An immigration judge (IJ) determined that Petitioner had failed to establish that he was lawfully present in the United States following a prior admission. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) the courts below did not err in their determinations that Petitioner’s testimony before the IJ was not credible; and (2) the BIA did not err by summarily affirming the IJ’s decision to give no weight to Petitioner’s favorable polygraph test. View "Acosta v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United States illegally, conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal. An immigration judge held that Petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his Maine assault conviction was not a “crime of domestic violence.” The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit initially denied Petitioner’s petition for review. Petitioner then petitioned for rehearing, presenting a developed argument based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder. The First Circuit granted the petition, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded, holding that Moncrieffe controls in this case and that, in accordance with Moncrieffe, Petitioner was not convicted of a “crime of violence.” View "Sauceda v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1994, Petitioner crossed the U.S.-Mexican border in violation of United States law. The day after he entered the country, Petitioner was served an Order to Show Cause charging him as being deportable. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Petitioner deportable. Petitioner later filed a second motion to reopen the deportation proceedings. The motion was granted. In 2014, Petitioner applied for suspension of deportation and voluntary departure, arguing that he was eligible for suspension of deportation because the law in effect in 1994 required a noncitizen to be continuously physically present in the United States for seven years before applying for suspension of deportation and that he easily met this requirement. An IJ concluded that the so-called “stop-time” rule applied retroactively to Petitioner because his deportation proceedings remained pending on the date the stop-time rule went into effect and that the stop-time rule cut off Petitioner’s physical presence after one day, rendering him ineligible for suspension of deportation. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA’s interpretation of the stop-time rule was reasonable and that the BIA properly applied the stop-time rule to Petitioner. View "Santos-Quiroa v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, was ordered removed in 2002. After Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider, which the BIA rejected. More than a decade later, Petitioner filed a second motion to reconsider. The BIA denied that motion as well. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s second motion to reconsider, holding that the BIA did not err in concluding that the circumstances of Petitioner’s case were not sufficiently extraordinary to warrant an equitable exception to the time and number bars applicable to Petitioner’s motion. View "Omar v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, entered the United States without inspection. Petitioner was issued a notice to appear and conceded removability but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, concluding (1) Petitioner failed to carry his burden to show either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, and (2) Petitioner had not established that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured upon his return to China. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioner failed to establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Chen v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Elena Granada-Rubio and two of her sons illegally entered the United States. Granada-Rubio applied for asylum for herself and her two sons, as well as withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Granada-Rubio’s application for relief and ordered her and her sons removed to El Salvador. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Granada-Rubio’s petition for review, holding (1) the IJ and the BIA were warranted in finding that Granada-Rubio had not been persecuted based on her membership in a legally cognizable particular social group; (2) because Granada-Rubio did not qualify for asylum, she also did not qualify for withholding of removal; and (3) Granada-Rubio’s claim for protection under the CAT failed as well. View "Granada-Rubio v. Lynch" on Justia Law