Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Octavio Gutierrez-Orozco (Gutierrez), a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States illegally. Gutierrez insisted he entered the United States in March 1996. He remembered that date because his wife, who remained in Mexico, was pregnant with the second of their four children, who was born in September 1996. He claimed to have lived in the United States continuously since then, except for a brief, two-month trip back to Mexico in mid-1999 when his wife was ill, after which border patrol twice hindered his reentry. His wife joined him here sometime in 2000. Gutierrez’s immigration troubles began in February 2008, when a domestic violence incident with his teenage son led to a simple assault conviction. Shortly thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Gutierrez conceded removability but requested cancellation of removal or, in the alternative, voluntary departure. The IJ conducted a hearing and concluded Gutierrez was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he did not demonstrate a ten-year continuous physical presence in the United States from April 1, 1998, to April 1, 2008; good moral character for that time period; and an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ also denied voluntary departure because Gutierrez failed to maintain good moral character during the relevant time frame and, alternatively, as an exercise of discretion. Gutierrez appealed to the BIA for relief from the IJ’s decision. The BIA denied relief, agreeing with the IJ. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Gutierrez-Orozco v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, was issued a notice to appear. Petitioner conceded removability and sought withholding of removal based on race, nationality, and membership in a particular social group. As to his claim regarding membership in a particular social group, Petitioner wrote that he would be harassed by gang members to join them if he returned to Honduras. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal and Petitioner’s subsequent motion to reconsider. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that because the new arguments raised in Petitioner’s motion to reconsider were previously available but not previously asserted, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reconsider. View "Hurtado v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The government initiated deportation proceedings against Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident who was convicted of a removable offense. Petitioner filed an N-600 application for citizenship with U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) claiming that he derived citizenship from his father’s naturalization and therefore could not be deported. USCIS denied the application. An immigration judge upheld the decision and ordered Petitioner removed to Jamaica. Petitioner appealed, arguing that his parents were common law spouses in Jamaica and legally separated within the meaning of former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act when they ceased cohabitating, and therefore, Petitioner, as a child, had derived citizenship from the naturalization of his father. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the removal order, determining that Petitioner had not proven that Jamaica recognized common-law marriage at the time of his birth and that the cessation of cohabitation did not qualify as a legal separation. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Petitioner’s claim of citizenship under former section 321(a)(3) failed because he could not prove his parents were in a legally recognized relationship from which they could legally separate. View "Thompson v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1991, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) placed Petitioner in deportation proceedings. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took action in Petitioner’s case. By that time, Congress had replaced deportation with removal, and DHS mistakenly regarded Petitioner as being in removal proceedings. The Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner’s conviction for aggravated identity theft was a “particularly serious crime” rendering her ineligible for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 2131(b). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ’s determination and ordered Petitioner deported. Without reaching the merits of Petitioner’s petition for review, the First Circuit remanded Petitioner’s case to the BIA to interpret and apply the correct law, former 8 U.S.C. 1253(h), holding that while the BIA acknowledged that Petitioner was in deportation proceedings governed by section 1253, the BIA incorrectly stated that the law governing the two proceedings was the same and improperly omitted any reference to section 1253(h)(3) in its review of Petitioner’s application. View "Valerio-Ramirez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

In 1999, Petitioner, a citizen of Jamaica, was convicted of third-degree assault under a Connecticut statute. The Department of Homeland Security later placed Petitioner in removal proceedings. Permanent resident non-citizens such as Petitioner are removable if they are convicted of an “aggravated felony,” which includes any offense defined as a “crime of violence.” An immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner removable as charged, concluding that third-degree assault under Connecticut law qualified as a “crime of violence.” Reviewing the IJ’s legal conclusions de novo, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered Petitioner’s removal, reasoning that the Connecticut offense was categorically a crime of violence and thus was necessarily an “aggravated felony.” The First Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the removal order, holding (1) third-degree assault as defined by Connecticut law does not require proof of all of the required elements of a “crime of violence”; and (2) therefore, Petitioner’s conviction for third-degree assault, standing by itself, does not constitute proof that he has been convicted of an aggravated felony requiring his removal. Remanded. View "Whyte v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents were acting on an alleged tip that undocumented aliens were employed at the Michael Bianco, Inc. factory in New Bedford, Massachusetts when they raided the factory. Petitioner was detained during the raid and was subsequently arrested and detained. During Petitioner’s detention, an ICE agent interviewed Petitioner. The substance of that interview was memorialized in an I-213 form. Petitioner was later served with a Notice to Appear in removal proceedings. Petitioner denied removability and moved to suppress the I-213, arguing that the statements contained therein were obtained in violation of her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. On remand, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the motion, concluding the government’s introduction of Petitioner’s birth certificate independently established Petitioner’s identity and alienage whether she established egregious misconduct by ICE officers that would warrant suppression of her I-213 form. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, primarily on the ground that Petitioner had failed to show egregious violations of her constitutional rights. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Petitioner’s birth certificate was not tainted by any alleged constitutional violations and was sufficient to prove her alienage. View "Garcia-Aguilar v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Guatemalan national, entered the United States without inspection. Two years later, federal authorities instituted removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and cross-applied for withholding of removal and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s cross-applications and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Petitioner’s appeal. More than one year later, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, concluding that the motion was untimely and, in any event, Petitioner failed to make a sufficient showing to warrant reopening the removal proceedings. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. View "Mejia-Ramaja v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Bulgarian native Vladimir Vladimirov petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order of removal based on marriage fraud. Much of the government’s evidence came from written reports prepared by immigration officers and other written materials contained in the agency’s files. Vladimirov claimed the BIA’s reliance on such materials denied him due process of law and without the disputed evidence the government failed to make its case. After consideration of the process due in immigration cases, particularly as it applied to the consideration of evidence that might be excluded in other contexts, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error in this case and denied the petition for review. View "Vladimirov v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, married a U.S. citizen and acquired status as a conditional lawful permanent resident. Petitioner and her spouse subsequently filed an I-751 joint petition (“joint petition”) seeking to remove the conditional nature of Petitioner’s residency status. The Immigration and Naturalization Service denied the petition based on a finding of marriage fraud. Petitioner and her spouse later divorced, and Petitioner was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner then filed another I-751 petition (“waiver petition”) seeking a waiver of the joint petition requirements and arguing that she had entered into her marriage in good faith. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied the petition, relying on the previous finding of marriage fraud. An immigration judge (IJ) upheld the denial of the waiver petition and found that Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding (1) the IJ did not erroneously review the waiver petition instead of the joint petition; and (2) the BIA did not err in declaring Petitioner statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Cabrera v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who legally entered the United States on a visitor visa, adjusted his status to that of a conditional permanent resident based on his marriage to Nadine Woodley Davis (“Woodley”), a United States citizen. This status terminated upon the denial of Petitioner’s request for a waiver of the requirement that he file a joint petition with Woodley to remove the conditional status. Petitioner was subsequently charged with removability. Petitioner conceded removability but requested termination of proceedings, adjustment of status, and a review of the waiver application. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief, finding that Petitioner did not enter into his marriage in good faith but rather for the sole purpose of circumventing immigration laws. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and refused to remand the proceedings to the IJ given Petitioner’s recent marriage to another United States citizen. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the IJ’s and the BIA’s conclusions that Petitioner’s marriage to Woodley was not entered into in good faith; and (2) the BIA did not abuse its discretion in deciding to deny Petitioner’s motion to reopen. View "Davis v. Holder" on Justia Law