Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Kenyan national, married a U.S. citizen, who filed an I-130 visa petition seeking to classify Petitioner as a spouse of a U.S. citizen. Thereafter, Petitioner applied for adjustment of his immigration status. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied the I-130 petition on the ground of marriage fraud. Removal proceedings were subsequently brought against Petitioner. Petitioner sought relief from removal under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The USCIS approved Petitioner’s VAWA petition. Petitioner then asked the immigration judge (IJ) to adjust his immigration status. The IJ denied the requested relief and ordered Petitioner removed, finding that, although Petitioner was statutorily eligible for adjustment of status based on his approved VAWA petition, he had engaged in marriage fraud. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. While Petitioner’s petition for judicial review was pending, the USCIS revoked Petitioner’s VAWA petition. At issue before the First Circuit was whether it could consider the USCIS’s revocation of the VAWA petition, an action that took place outside the confines of the administrative record. The Court concluded that it could. Remanded to the BIA to determine whether the revocation of the VAWA was lawfully accomplished, and if, so, whether the BIA decision is now moot. View "Manguriu v. Holder" on Justia Law

After his arrest on state charges, Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner filed an adjustment of statute application and also applied for a waiver, claiming hardship to his lawfully admitted parents and citizen wife and step-daughter. An immigration judge (IJ) concluded that a favorable exercise of discretion was warranted and granted Petitioner’s waiver and adjustment of status applications. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) disagreed with the IJ, concluding that Petitioner was not entitled to a discretionary waiver. Petitioner did not seek review of that decision. Petitioner later petitioned the BIA to reopen the proceedings based on new evidence. The BIA denied the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion. View "Mazariegos v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of a felony requiring his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed an order that Petitioner be removed. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that because Padilla v. Kentucky described deportation as a “penalty,” his removal violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment or related constitutional protections unless a court conducted an individual assessment to determine whether his order of removal was a proportional punishment relative to his underlying criminal conviction. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that Padilla has not signaled a break from long-settled law that removal operates simply as “a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want,” not as a punishment within the meaning of the Constitution intended to acutely sanction a noncitizen for his underlying criminal conviction. View "Hinds v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner unlawfully entered the United States, was detained at the Arizona border, and failed to attend his deportation hearing. An immigration judge (IJ) ordered Appellant to be removed from the country. Petitioner asked an IJ to reopen the removal proceedings, arguing that he never received notice that his removal hearing had been scheduled. The IJ denied the motion to reopen, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA’s decision, holding that the IJ applied the wrong legal standard in reviewing Petitioner’s motion, and the BIA abused its discretion by affirming the IJ based on that incorrect legal principle. Remanded. View "Renaut v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, twenty-six states, filed suit challenging the government's Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program (“DAPA”) as violative of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. 553, and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The district court temporarily enjoined the implementation program and the government appealed, moving for a stay of the injunction. The court concluded that the government is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the states lack standing. In this case, at least one state - Texas - is likely to satisfy all three requirements of Article III standing. Further, the government has not made a strong showing that the interests that the states seek to protect fall outside the zone of interests of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1252; that judicial review is precluded in this case; that DAPA does not require notice and comment; and that the remaining factors also favor the states. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for stay and the request to narrow the scope of the injunction. View "State of Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection and without valid entry documents. The Government subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner conceded her removability but sought relief from removal in the form of asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The immigration judge concluded that Petitioner had not established her eligibility for asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the order of the BIA, holding that Petitioner had established her eligibility for asylum. Remanded. View "Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador living in the United States, was charged with removability. Petitioner sought relief from removal by requesting review of an earlier denial of his application for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) under 8 U.S.C. 1254a, which affords undocumented immigrants protection from removal upon a determination that conditions in the individual’s home country prevent his safe return. A non-citizen is ineligible for TPS, however, if he has been convicted of an “aggravated felony.” The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application for TPS on the ground that he had a 2006 conviction for third-degree assault under Connecticut law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s ruling. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that the BIA erred in finding that his 2006 conviction constituted a “crime of violence” and therefore an “aggravated felony.” The First Circuit vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded, holding that Petitioner’s conviction did not render him ineligible for TPS. Remanded. View "Villanueva v. Holder" on Justia Law

Ashton LeBlanc, a Louisiana resident, had a son, Robert, who was born in Nigeria in 1970. In 2001, Robert and Ashton decided to file the appropriate paperwork to have Robert declared a United States citizen. Ashton completed and submitted to his attorney a Form N-600, an application for certificate of citizenship, but the attorney instead filed a Form I-130, a petition for an adjustment of status for an alien relative. The I-130 was denied in 2007. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the appeal. In 2011, Ashton contacted a second attorney to check on the status of Robert’s citizenship and was assured that the process was moving forward. Ashton subsequently hired his current counsel, who discovered Ashton’s previous attorney’s deficient performance. Current counsel moved to reopen the denial of the I-130 petition on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that Ashton failed to show due diligence after contacting the second attorney. The Fourth Circuit dismissed Ashton’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction because the petition was from Ashton’s denied motion to reopen his visa petition, not an order of removal against Robert, and because transfer to an appropriate district court was not in the interests of justice. View "LeBlanc v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2007, Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was convicted of petit larceny. In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), The immigration judge pretermitted Petitioner’s application and ordered her removed to El Salvador, concluding that her petit-larceny conviction rendered her ineligible for relief because it was a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the BIA’s decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of section 1229b(b)(1)(C).The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA’s reading of section 1229b(b)(1)(C) was a permissible interpretation of the statute, entitling the BIA’s decision to Chevron deference. View "Hernandez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants are several Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents and deportation officers (collectively, "Agents") and the State of Mississippi. They filed this suit against the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the directors of departments within that agency (collectively, "DHS"), in their official capacities, challenging DHS's 2012 directive, which required its officials to use "deferred action" as to a certain class of aliens in immigration removal proceedings. The Agents alleged that exercising deferred action violated federal law, because the law required them to detain all illegal aliens for the purpose of placing the aliens in removal proceedings. The State of Mississippi alleged that the deferred action has caused additional aliens to remain in the state and, thus, causes the state to spend money on providing social services. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After review, the Fifth Circuit concluded that neither the Agents nor the State of Mississippi demonstrated the concrete and particularized injury required to give them standing to maintain this suit. Therefore the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Crane v. Johnson" on Justia Law