Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection and without valid entry documents. The Government subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner conceded her removability but sought relief from removal in the form of asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The immigration judge concluded that Petitioner had not established her eligibility for asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the order of the BIA, holding that Petitioner had established her eligibility for asylum. Remanded. View "Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador living in the United States, was charged with removability. Petitioner sought relief from removal by requesting review of an earlier denial of his application for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) under 8 U.S.C. 1254a, which affords undocumented immigrants protection from removal upon a determination that conditions in the individual’s home country prevent his safe return. A non-citizen is ineligible for TPS, however, if he has been convicted of an “aggravated felony.” The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s application for TPS on the ground that he had a 2006 conviction for third-degree assault under Connecticut law. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s ruling. Petitioner petitioned for review, arguing that the BIA erred in finding that his 2006 conviction constituted a “crime of violence” and therefore an “aggravated felony.” The First Circuit vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded, holding that Petitioner’s conviction did not render him ineligible for TPS. Remanded. View "Villanueva v. Holder" on Justia Law

Ashton LeBlanc, a Louisiana resident, had a son, Robert, who was born in Nigeria in 1970. In 2001, Robert and Ashton decided to file the appropriate paperwork to have Robert declared a United States citizen. Ashton completed and submitted to his attorney a Form N-600, an application for certificate of citizenship, but the attorney instead filed a Form I-130, a petition for an adjustment of status for an alien relative. The I-130 was denied in 2007. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the appeal. In 2011, Ashton contacted a second attorney to check on the status of Robert’s citizenship and was assured that the process was moving forward. Ashton subsequently hired his current counsel, who discovered Ashton’s previous attorney’s deficient performance. Current counsel moved to reopen the denial of the I-130 petition on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that Ashton failed to show due diligence after contacting the second attorney. The Fourth Circuit dismissed Ashton’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction because the petition was from Ashton’s denied motion to reopen his visa petition, not an order of removal against Robert, and because transfer to an appropriate district court was not in the interests of justice. View "LeBlanc v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2007, Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was convicted of petit larceny. In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), The immigration judge pretermitted Petitioner’s application and ordered her removed to El Salvador, concluding that her petit-larceny conviction rendered her ineligible for relief because it was a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the BIA’s decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of section 1229b(b)(1)(C).The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA’s reading of section 1229b(b)(1)(C) was a permissible interpretation of the statute, entitling the BIA’s decision to Chevron deference. View "Hernandez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants are several Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents and deportation officers (collectively, "Agents") and the State of Mississippi. They filed this suit against the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the directors of departments within that agency (collectively, "DHS"), in their official capacities, challenging DHS's 2012 directive, which required its officials to use "deferred action" as to a certain class of aliens in immigration removal proceedings. The Agents alleged that exercising deferred action violated federal law, because the law required them to detain all illegal aliens for the purpose of placing the aliens in removal proceedings. The State of Mississippi alleged that the deferred action has caused additional aliens to remain in the state and, thus, causes the state to spend money on providing social services. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After review, the Fifth Circuit concluded that neither the Agents nor the State of Mississippi demonstrated the concrete and particularized injury required to give them standing to maintain this suit. Therefore the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Crane v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Bulgaria, was found by an immigration judge (IJ) to be removable under the alien smuggling provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act by easing or facilitating what Petitioner knew to be an attempted illegal entry by an alien into the United States. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and ordered Petitioner removed to Bulgaria. The First Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review, holding that there was sufficient evidence on the record to establish that Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily assisted her friends as they attempted to cross illegally from Canada into the United States. View "Dimova v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Immigration and Nationality Act limits the number of annual visas, 8 U.S.C. 1101, creates categories for which visas may be granted, and imposes country-based limits. The category at issue, “Skilled workers, professionals, and other workers” (EB-3) has a general limit of about 40,000 visas annually in three subcategories. Xie fits within the subcategory EW for workers in occupations that require less than two years of training, education, or experience, and for which qualified workers are not available in the U.S. The subcategory is subject to a separate cap of 5,000. The government indicated that the current annual EW limit for China is 319. Under a complicated system of cut-off dates, Xie has waited for over eight years. She argued that widely differing cutoff dates for Chinese EW applicants, other Chinese EB-3 applicants, and EW applicants from other countries violate section 203’s temporal priority mandate. The district court dismissed, stating that Xie failed “to identify any discrete agency action that DOS is required to take” and failed to point to any authority requiring that action. The D.C. Circuit reversed. Xie specifically sought application of 8 U.S.C. 1153(e)(1), which directs State to process applications in the order of their filing. While varying lengths of wait among categories may comply with the mandate, Xie is entitled to have her claim assessed. View "Xie v. Kerry" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jose Manuel Rodriguez-Avalos appealed a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision. Rodriguez was a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without having been admitted or paroled. In January 2011, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inspection revealed that Rodriguez was one of fourteen employees of an Omaha, Nebraska grocery store against whom identity-theft complaints had been filed with the Federal Trade Commission. A DHS agent interviewed Rodriguez, who admitted his identity to the DHS agent and admitted that he had no documentation allowing him to enter or work in the United States. Rodriguez was then placed under arrest for administrative immigration violations. Rodriguez was subsequently indicted and charged with, inter alia, falsely and willfully representing himself to be a United States citizen. The BIA dismissed his appeal after an Immigration Judge’s denied of his application for relief from removal. The BIA held that the prison sentence Rodriguez served following his conviction for falsely and willfully representing himself as a United States citizen barred him from demonstrating the “good moral character” necessary to be statutorily eligible for relief from removal. Finding no reversible error in the BIA's decision, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. View "Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican national, pled guilty to illegal entry, a misdemeanor offense. After Petitioner had served his 181-day sentence and was released, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) commenced removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional hardship to his three citizen children, especially his ten-year-old autistic son. The immigration judge (IJ) dismissed Petitioner’s application, concluding that Petitioner was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(7) precludes an alien from establishing good moral character when his offense resulted in 180 days or more of confinement. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that the applicability of section 1101(f)(&) does not depend upon the type of offense, but rather, the length of incarceration. The Fourth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) this was not one of those “exceptionally rare” instances in which the literal application of a Congressional enactment produces truly absurd results; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim that he was not precluded from establishing good moral character. View "Tiscareno-Garcia v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner Benjamin Rodas-Orellana entered the United States without inspection to escape gang recruitment in El Salvador. He applied for asylum and withholding of removal. An Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeal's (BIA) denied petitioner's application because he failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution on account of membership in a particular social group. The proposed group, "Salvadorans who resisted gang recruitment" lacked "social visibility" and therefore did not constitute a "particular social group." After the BIA issued its final order in this case, it issued decisions in two other cases that modified the social visibility requirement to be one of "social distinction." In light of these decisions, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the BIA denied. In his petition to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, petitioner contested both the final order of removal by the BIA and the Board's denial of his motion to reconsider. Finding no reversible error after review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BIA. View "Rodas-Orellana v. Holder" on Justia Law