Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was convicted of unlawfully transferring a firearm around the same time that the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. An immigration judge found that Petitioner's conviction constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(C) and pretermitted Petitioner's previously filed application for cancellation of removal. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed, finding that Defendnat's delivery of a firearm to a purchaser constituted "trafficking in firearms" under the statute. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA's definition of "trafficking in firearms" as encompassing any commercial exchange was reasonable and consistent with the statute. View "Soto-Hernandez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Ghanaian national who entered the United States without inspection, conceded removability after immigration authorities initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner sought adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255(i) and also applied for non-lawful permanent resident (LPR) cancellation of removal, alleging that his U.S. citizen child would suffer if he were moved. The agency found Petitioner was ineligible for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal and also denied Petitioner's motion to reconsider and reopen. The agency based its decision on the finding that Petitioner had misrepresented to immigration officials the circumstances of his marriage. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the agency did not err in concluding that Petitioner was inadmissible, and thus ineligible, for adjustment of status and cancellation of removal; and (2) Petitioner's additional evidence about the hardship of his family members would not have remedied the agency's finding of ineligibility for both cancellation and adjustment due to Petitioner's material misrepresentations. View "Agyei v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 1996, Congress passed a statute known as the "stop-time rule," which provides that a noncitizen's years of physical presence are cut off when he is served with notice of the commencement of removal proceedings. Petitioner, a national of Columbia, entered the United States without inspection in 1986. In 1987, Petitioner was placed into deportation proceedings. In 2007, Petitioner applied for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner applied for suspension of deportation, which required him to show he had accrued seven years of continuous physical presence in the United States since his arrival. Because Petitioner arrived in the United States in 1986, and his proceedings began in 1987, the immigration judge concluded that, under the stop-time rule, Petitioner had not accrued the necessary years of physical presence. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied in part and dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the stop-time rule applied retroactively to Petitioner; and (2) Petitioner's remaining argument was not exhausted before the agency. View "Aguirre v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Immigration and Nationality Act establishes that an individual "who entered the United States as a crewman" after 1964 is ineligible for cancellation of removal. Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the United States in 1998 on a C-1/D visa. Petitioner remained in the United States and eventually married a United States citizen. Petitioner subsequently applied for an adjustment of status, which was denied. Petitioner was then placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) found Petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had last entered the United States as a crewman. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, concluding that, even though Petitioner's visa was annotated "C-1" and he had not been employed as a crewman since his arrival, he had entered the United States as a crewman. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the record supported the BIA's finding that Petitioner entered the United States intending to work as a crewman and pursuing employment as such. View "Guerrero v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in 2000. Petitioner later admitted removability but sought cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), alleging that he was a child "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" by a parent who acquired lawful permanent resident status under the NACARA. An immigration judge found Petitioner was not "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" and therefore decided Petitioner was not eligible for special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Because Petitioner did not raise any legal or constitutional issue on appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Castro v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, sought asylum and withholding of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) denied relief and ordered Petitioner removed to China. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision. About eight years later, Petitioner filed a motion with the BIA to reopen her case, claiming that she had converted to Christianity and that because conditions related to treatment of Christians in China had significantly worsened, she fell within the "changed country conditions" exception to the rule that a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. The BIA denied the motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioner did not establish "changed conditions" in China for Christians practicing in unregistered churches. View "Liu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, conceded the charges of removability for entering the United States by fraud and for remaining in the United States beyond the period of his authorized stay. The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's applications for waivers of inadmissibility relating to fraud and unlawful presence and denied his application for permission to reapply for admission. The IJ then granted voluntary departure. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the BIA did not err in finding Petitioner was removable due to having gained admission to the United States by fraud; and (2) the Court did not have jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's arguments that the IJ did not properly analyze the facts in denying Petitioner's applications for waivers of inadmissibility and permission to reapply for admission. View "Urizar-Carrascoza v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal in which he also sought protection under the Convention Against Torture, alleging he was eligible for relief because he had and would suffer persecution because of his anti-Taliban political opinion and membership in a particular social group. An immigration judge denied Khan's application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err (1) in concluding that there was no government connection to support a finding of past or future persecution, and (2) in concluding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Khan v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed suit claiming that the USCIS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and the Due Process Clause, by denying the husband's I-130 petition without affording them the opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff's ex-husband regarding his statement that their marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that there was no statutory right of cross-examination in I-130 visa adjudications. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs' due process rights were violated where the immediate relative status for an alien spouse was a right to which citizen applicants were entitled and that protected interest was entitled to the protections of due process; plaintiffs' showed sufficient prejudice; and additional process was due in this case pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the due process claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ching v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

In 2006, Shearson, the executive director of the Cleveland chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, was stopped by U.S. Customs and Borders Protection as she and her daughter were returning from Canada, removed her from her car, handcuffed her, and detained her for about 2-1/2 hours. Shearson claims that an officer swiped her passport and an “armed and dangerous” warning came up. After being allowed to enter the U.S., Shearson filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act for documents related to her detention. Following a suit, she obtained documents indicating that her name returned “an Armed and Dangerous” designation in Customs’ terrorist database and was a positive match to the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File. The FBI declined to discuss the matter and recommended that Shearson use an administrative remedy, the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, 49 U.S.C. 44926. Shearson did not seek redress through that Program, but filed suit claiming due process, First Amendment, Privacy Act, Administrative Procedures Act, and equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Shearson v. Holder" on Justia Law