Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, filed an asylum application in 1997. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal in 2000. In 2012, Petitioner, who allegedly converted to Christianity in 2011, filed a motion with the BIA to reopen proceedings, claiming that, since the time of his hearing in 1998, circumstances surrounding the practice of Christianity had changed insofar as persecution of unregistered Christian groups had increased. The BIA determined that Petitioner had failed to establish changed circumstances in China and so his untimely motion did not qualify for an exception to the statutory deadline for a motion to reopen. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner failed to demonstrate changed country circumstances, and therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny his motion to reopen. View "Zhao-Cheng v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Kenya, married a U.S. citizen in 2002. The couple divorced in 2006. Later, Petitioner Petitioner filed a Form I-751 petition to remove the conditions on his residency. Petitioner did not file the petition with his ex-wife but argued that he was entitled to a removal of the conditions despite his marriage to a U.S. citizen ending in divorce. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied the petition. Petitioner was later charged with being removable. Petitioner conceded removability but requested relief in the form of a review of his petition for removal of conditions. The immigration judge (IJ) found that Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of showing that his marriage had been in good faith, therefore concluding that Petitioner's I-751 petition had to be denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the IJ's decision to deny Petitioner's I-751 petition. View "Kinisu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Senegal and a citizen of Guinea, filed an application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application and ordered him removed to Guinea. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner appealed, arguing, among other things, that the IJ and BIA erred in failing to consider whether the threat of forced genital mutilation to his daughters, should they return with him, constituted a threat of direct persecution to him in the form of psychological injury. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the determination that Petitioner faced neither past persecution nor a likelihood of future persecution; and (2) Petitioner did not establish that his removal would result in his daughters' accompanying him to Guinea, and Petitioner's theory of direct persecution of him based on the possible risk to his daughters was foreclosed by the BIA, in a reasonable interpretation of the relevant statute, and by circuit precedent. View "Camara v. Holder" on Justia Law

The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of two Hazleton ordinances that attempt to prohibit employment of unauthorized aliens and preclude them from renting housing within the city. The Third Circuit affirmed in 2010. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded for reconsideration in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, S. Ct. 1968 (2011). The Court later decided Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.2492 (2012). Both address the extent to which federal immigration law preempts state laws pertaining to the treatment of unauthorized aliens. On remand, the Third Circuit again concluded that both the employment and housing provisions of the Hazleton ordinances are preempted by federal immigration law. The employment provisions in the ordinance are distinguishable from the Arizona law upheld in Whiting. The lack of minimal procedural protections in Hazleton’s ordinance conflicts with express congressional objective of minimizing undue burdens on, and harassment of, employers. The rental registration scheme serves no discernible purpose other than to register the immigration status of a subset of the city’s population. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Whiting and Arizona does not undermine a conclusion that both the employment and housing provisions are preempted. View "Lozano v. City of Hazleton" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner sought filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, seeking relief. An immigration judge granted Petitioner's asylum application, finding that Petitioner had a reasonable fear in being subject to, at a minimum, having a forced intrauterine device (IUD) insertion and possibly sterilization in order to prevent her giving birth to future children. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err in concluding that Petitioner did not face an objectively reasonable risk of having implanted an IUD by Chinese authorities through persecutory means or of suffering persecutory harm if she were to refuse to have an IUD implanted. View "Lin v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guinea, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his claim for asylum based on the untimeliness of his application. The court concluded that the BIA did not commit legal error because it did not require petitioner to show both "changed circumstances" and "extraordinary circumstances" to excuse his untimeliness. Instead, the BIA independently analyzed both exceptions and agreed with the IJ that petitioner met neither of them. Further, the issue of whether a "material" change in circumstances affected petitioner's eligibility for asylum was not a reviewable question of law. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition because it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination that the application for asylum was untimely. View "Goromou v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States without inspection. After the United State initiated removal proceedings against him, Petitioner applied for relief in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), alleging that he feared torture by guerrilla forces in Guatemala due to his father's military service and work in the civil patrol. The immigration judge (IJ) concluded that Petitioner failed to establish a threshold case for relief. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed. Nine years later, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen his application for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA denied Petitioner's motion, finding that he failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions and failed to establish a prima facie case for asylum. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA (1) properly concluded that Petitioner failed to establish a material change in country conditions necessary to reopen removal proceedings; and (2) did not err in finding Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for asylum. View "Jutus v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner was admitted to the United States as a permanent resident on a conditional basis based on her marriage to a United States citizen. After she divorced, Petitioner's status as a conditional permanent resident was terminated. Petitioner filed two applications for relief six months past the deadline. The immigration judge (IJ) denied the applications, finding, among other things, that Petitioner had abandoned her applications by failing to file them by the deadline. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed on the grounds of abandonment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the IJ acted within her discretion in finding that Petitioner had abandoned her applications for relief by missing the filing deadline; and (2) because the BIA's and IJ's findings as to abandonment was not an abuse of discretion, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by failing to address Petitioner's other arguments on appeal. View "Moreta v. Holder" on Justia Law

Sunarto Ang and his wife Tuti Erlina, citizens of Indonesia, overstayed their visas and applied to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for asylum. The DHS subsequently charged And and Erlina with removability. Ang and Erlina renewed their application for asylum and applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The immigration judge (IJ) rejected the application for asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Ang and Erlina's appeal, finding that Ang and Erlina did not suffer past persecution or have a well-founded fear of future persecution. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Ang and Erlina's petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the conclusion of the IJ and the BIA that Ang and Erlina were not entitled to asylum. View "Ang v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a citizen and native of Jamaica who entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident. A decade later, Petitioner pleaded guilty to second-degree larceny in the state of Connecticut. The Department of Homeland Security subsequently initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner, alleging that Petitioner was removable because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony, specifically, a theft offense. Petitioner filed an application for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed, concluding, among other things, that Connecticut second-degree larceny qualifies as a theft offense. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err in concluding that larceny in the second degree under Connecticut law qualifies as a theft offense aggravated felony. View "Lecky v. Holder" on Justia Law