Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States illegally in 2000. Petitioner later admitted removability but sought cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), alleging that he was a child "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" by a parent who acquired lawful permanent resident status under the NACARA. An immigration judge found Petitioner was not "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" and therefore decided Petitioner was not eligible for special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Because Petitioner did not raise any legal or constitutional issue on appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Castro v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, sought asylum and withholding of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) denied relief and ordered Petitioner removed to China. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision. About eight years later, Petitioner filed a motion with the BIA to reopen her case, claiming that she had converted to Christianity and that because conditions related to treatment of Christians in China had significantly worsened, she fell within the "changed country conditions" exception to the rule that a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. The BIA denied the motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioner did not establish "changed conditions" in China for Christians practicing in unregistered churches. View "Liu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, conceded the charges of removability for entering the United States by fraud and for remaining in the United States beyond the period of his authorized stay. The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's applications for waivers of inadmissibility relating to fraud and unlawful presence and denied his application for permission to reapply for admission. The IJ then granted voluntary departure. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) the BIA did not err in finding Petitioner was removable due to having gained admission to the United States by fraud; and (2) the Court did not have jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's arguments that the IJ did not properly analyze the facts in denying Petitioner's applications for waivers of inadmissibility and permission to reapply for admission. View "Urizar-Carrascoza v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Pakistan, filed an application for asylum and withholding of removal in which he also sought protection under the Convention Against Torture, alleging he was eligible for relief because he had and would suffer persecution because of his anti-Taliban political opinion and membership in a particular social group. An immigration judge denied Khan's application, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err (1) in concluding that there was no government connection to support a finding of past or future persecution, and (2) in concluding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. View "Khan v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her husband (collectively, "plaintiffs") filed suit claiming that the USCIS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and the Due Process Clause, by denying the husband's I-130 petition without affording them the opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff's ex-husband regarding his statement that their marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that there was no statutory right of cross-examination in I-130 visa adjudications. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs' due process rights were violated where the immediate relative status for an alien spouse was a right to which citizen applicants were entitled and that protected interest was entitled to the protections of due process; plaintiffs' showed sufficient prejudice; and additional process was due in this case pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the due process claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ching v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

In 2006, Shearson, the executive director of the Cleveland chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, was stopped by U.S. Customs and Borders Protection as she and her daughter were returning from Canada, removed her from her car, handcuffed her, and detained her for about 2-1/2 hours. Shearson claims that an officer swiped her passport and an “armed and dangerous” warning came up. After being allowed to enter the U.S., Shearson filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act for documents related to her detention. Following a suit, she obtained documents indicating that her name returned “an Armed and Dangerous” designation in Customs’ terrorist database and was a positive match to the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File. The FBI declined to discuss the matter and recommended that Shearson use an administrative remedy, the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, 49 U.S.C. 44926. Shearson did not seek redress through that Program, but filed suit claiming due process, First Amendment, Privacy Act, Administrative Procedures Act, and equal protection violations. The district court dismissed, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Shearson v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, filed an asylum application in 1997. An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal in 2000. In 2012, Petitioner, who allegedly converted to Christianity in 2011, filed a motion with the BIA to reopen proceedings, claiming that, since the time of his hearing in 1998, circumstances surrounding the practice of Christianity had changed insofar as persecution of unregistered Christian groups had increased. The BIA determined that Petitioner had failed to establish changed circumstances in China and so his untimely motion did not qualify for an exception to the statutory deadline for a motion to reopen. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner failed to demonstrate changed country circumstances, and therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny his motion to reopen. View "Zhao-Cheng v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Kenya, married a U.S. citizen in 2002. The couple divorced in 2006. Later, Petitioner Petitioner filed a Form I-751 petition to remove the conditions on his residency. Petitioner did not file the petition with his ex-wife but argued that he was entitled to a removal of the conditions despite his marriage to a U.S. citizen ending in divorce. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied the petition. Petitioner was later charged with being removable. Petitioner conceded removability but requested relief in the form of a review of his petition for removal of conditions. The immigration judge (IJ) found that Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of showing that his marriage had been in good faith, therefore concluding that Petitioner's I-751 petition had to be denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the IJ's decision to deny Petitioner's I-751 petition. View "Kinisu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Senegal and a citizen of Guinea, filed an application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application and ordered him removed to Guinea. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner appealed, arguing, among other things, that the IJ and BIA erred in failing to consider whether the threat of forced genital mutilation to his daughters, should they return with him, constituted a threat of direct persecution to him in the form of psychological injury. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the determination that Petitioner faced neither past persecution nor a likelihood of future persecution; and (2) Petitioner did not establish that his removal would result in his daughters' accompanying him to Guinea, and Petitioner's theory of direct persecution of him based on the possible risk to his daughters was foreclosed by the BIA, in a reasonable interpretation of the relevant statute, and by circuit precedent. View "Camara v. Holder" on Justia Law

The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of two Hazleton ordinances that attempt to prohibit employment of unauthorized aliens and preclude them from renting housing within the city. The Third Circuit affirmed in 2010. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded for reconsideration in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, S. Ct. 1968 (2011). The Court later decided Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.2492 (2012). Both address the extent to which federal immigration law preempts state laws pertaining to the treatment of unauthorized aliens. On remand, the Third Circuit again concluded that both the employment and housing provisions of the Hazleton ordinances are preempted by federal immigration law. The employment provisions in the ordinance are distinguishable from the Arizona law upheld in Whiting. The lack of minimal procedural protections in Hazleton’s ordinance conflicts with express congressional objective of minimizing undue burdens on, and harassment of, employers. The rental registration scheme serves no discernible purpose other than to register the immigration status of a subset of the city’s population. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Whiting and Arizona does not undermine a conclusion that both the employment and housing provisions are preempted. View "Lozano v. City of Hazleton" on Justia Law