Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) against Petitioner. The notice asserted that Petitioner was removable on three separate grounds - child abuse, crime of violence, and sexual abuse of a minor. An immigration judge (IJ) ruled that Petitioner was removable on all three grounds asserted by DHS, and that, as an aggravated felon, Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. At issue was whether the endangerment offense to which Petitioner pled nolo contendere comprised an aggravated felony sexual abuse offense for purposes of the INA. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the BIA's ruling insofar as it held that Petitioner was removable on the grounds that he was convicted of aggravated felony sexual abuse and that he was therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal, as Petitioner could not be held to have pled to an offense that fell within the sexual abuse rubric under the INA. View "Campbell v. Holder" on Justia Law

This opinion sets out a procedure for all immigration cases pending in this Court that will enable an interested petition and the Government to evaluate whether remand to the BIA, according to terms specified, is appropriate. View "In the Matter of Immigration" on Justia Law

Klene, a citizen of the Philippines, applied for U.S. citizenship. USCIS denied the application after concluding that Klene’s marriage to a U.S. citizen had been fraudulent. Klene asked a district court for relief under 8 U.S.C.1421(c), which allows a judge to make an independent decision about an alien’s entitlement to be naturalized. USCIS opened removal proceedings. The court dismissed Klene’s suit, based 8 U.S.C. 1429, which provides: “[N]o application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this chapter or any other Act.” USCIS acts as the Attorney General’s surrogate. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. While a court cannot order the Attorney General to naturalize an alien, it can enter a declaratory judgment of entitlement to citizenship without violating section. A judgment declaring that Klene’s marriage was bona fide would bring the removal proceeding to a prompt close. This approach preserves the alien’s entitlement under section1421(c) to an independent judicial decision while respecting the limit that section 1429 places on the Attorney General’s powers. View "Klene v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

Petitioner Muhammad Saleem Sheikh, a native and citizen of Pakistan, sought review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The order came after the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal of an immigration judge's denial of a continuance in his removal proceedings. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the decision to deny the motion for continuance under the standards set forth in Matter of Hashmi; and (2) Petitioner's hopes for immigration reform did not warrant forbearance in his removal proceedings. View "Sheikh v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner Efren Neri-Garcia sought review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his applications for restriction on removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and for relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (the CAT). Years ago he was mistreated by government actors because of his homosexuality. At issue was whether conditions in Mexico, with respect to the treatment of gay men, changed sufficiently to overcome the presumption that he would be at risk were he to return. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BIA: the IJ determined there had been fundamental changes with respect to the treatment of gays in Mexico such that Petitioner's life or freedom would not be threatened if removed to that country. The BIA appropriately considered whether the evidence of new incidents of violence against gay men was sufficient to justify a remand. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to remand. View "Neri-Garcia v. Holder" on Justia Law

This case required the First Circuit Court of Appeals to decide, for the first time, whether section 1101(a)(42)(B), a statute enacted to pave the way for asylum for victims of China's coercive population control policies, extends automatically to a spouse of a person forced to undergo an abortion. Petitioner, a Chinese national, petitioned for asylum, seeking to remain in the United States because of, among other things, his wife's forced abortion. Petitioner argued he was entitled to per se refugee status under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(B) "as a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy." The immigration judge rejected this argument, and the board of immigration appeals affirmed. The First Circuit Court denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review after joining several of its sister circuits in holding that, given the language of the relevant statute and the Attorney General's reasonable interpretation of it, the agency did not err in refusing to grant Petitioner's per se refugee status on the basis that the Chinese government had compelled his wife to undergo a forced abortion. View "Dong v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Venezuela, sought review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The order upheld both an immigration judge's (IJ) determination that Petitioner's asylum application was time-barred and the IJ's denial of his application for withholding of removal on the merits. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) dismissed as to the asylum claim, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review that decision, as the Court is without jurisdiction to review agency findings regarding timeliness of an asylum application unless the petitioner challenges the decision on constitutional or legal grounds; and (2) denied as to the claim for withholding of removal, as substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination. View "Cabas v. Holder" on Justia Law

On January 4, 2010, an immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the Convention Against Torture. The board of immigration appeals (BIA) affirmed this denial on September 8, 2011. Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's decision. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that the IJ and BIA did not err by (1) concluding that Petitioner's past treatment on Ukraine did not rise to the level of persecution; and (2) concluding that Petitioner had failed to establish the requisite objective basis that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution. View "Rebenko v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner Baltazar Sosa-Valenzuela illegally entered the United States from Mexico in 1981 at the age of three, and became a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 1994, when he was sixteen, he shot and seriously injured a gang member. He pled guilty to attempted murder in the second degree and to unlawful possession of a firearm by a juvenile. After a successful post-conviction ineffectiveness of counsel petition, the state district court amended Petitioner's guilty plea to first degree assault and crime of violence with a deadly weapon. In 1996, while Petitioner was in juvenile detention, the Immigration and Naturalization Service issued a show cause order, charging Petitioner as deportable because of his criminal conviction. The immigration proceedings were then delayed for several years, while Petitioner was released and successfully completed his parole. Petitioner conceded deportability but requested a section 212 waiver which was then available as a form of discretionary relief under federal law and an adjustment of status. Both forms of relief were granted by the IJ and then denied by the BIA. Petitioner appealed the BIA's decision and order of deportation on three grounds: (1) the procedural regularity of the BIA decision as a collateral attack on the IJ's waiver decision; (2) the merits of the BIA's decision to reverse the IJ's waiver, arguing that it conflicted with the Supreme Court's decision in "Judulang v. Holder," (132 S. Ct. 476 (2011)); and (3) the BIA abused its discretion in denying him an adjustment of status based on his marriage to an American citizen. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found the BIA was not precluded from reviewing the IJ's waiver decision, but we must remand to the BIA so that it may evaluate its decision in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in "Judulang." The Court affirmed the BIA's discretionary denial of adjustment of status. View "Sosa-Valenzuela v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant Armando Ramos attacked the legal validity of his sentence for receipt of child pornography. Defendant was indicted by a federal grand jury in Kansas on two counts relating to the receipt and possession of child pornography. The charges arose out of an investigation that began with a tip from German authorities who were "policing the [e]Donkey peer-to-peer file sharing network and observed a known child pornography file available for download" at an IP address that was later traced by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to Defendant. ICE executed a search warrant at Defendant's home, seizing multiple computers, hard drives, DVDs, and CDs containing thousands of images and videos of child pornography. During the search, an investigator interviewed Defendant who then admitted to being the sole user of the computers in his home, and to using eMule, the "specific program that . . . access[es] the [e]Donkey network," as a vehicle for obtaining child pornography. On appeal, Defendant raised multiple objections to his presentencing report (PSR). He also raised an issue that the mandatory-minimum provision of 18 USC 2252(b)(1) was unconstitutional. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenge to the sentence he received, and concluded that that he could not establish that his sentence was affected by application of the mandatory minimum of 18 USC 2252(b)(1). View "United States v. Ramos" on Justia Law