Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) granted Petitioner's asylum application in 1996. In 2003, the INS ceased to exist, and its functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. One of the Department's agencies is the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). In 2004, the USCIS sent Petitioner a termination notice informing him that his asylum status had been terminated by the USCIS and that he was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner moved to terminate the removal proceedings on the ground that his asylum status had not properly been terminated. The immigration judge (IJ) concluded she lacked jurisdiction to review an asylum officer's termination of asylum status and ordered Petitioner removed to India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's petition for review of the BIA's orders of removal, holding (1) asylum status can only terminate through the Attorney General; and (2) the regulations pursuant to which the Department of Homeland Security terminates asylum status are ultra vires because the governing statute confers that authority exclusively on the the Attorney General. Remanded.

Petitioner was born in Czechoslovakia and was admitted as a permanent resident in the United States. After Defendant was convicted of racketeering, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal and applied for a waiver of inadmissibility. An immigration judge found Petitioner eligible for both of these forms of relief, denied Petitioner a waiver of inadmissibility, and granted Petitioner cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held Petitioner to be ineligible for both a cancellation of removal and a waiver of inadmissibility. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the BIA did not err in finding (1) Petitioner's racketeering conviction was an aggravated felony and that he was therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal; and (2) Petitioner was ineligible for a waiver because he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time of his admission, and therefore, his aggravated felony disqualified him from seeking a waiver of inadmissibility.

Defendant Alfredo Huizar pled guilty to reentering the United States illegally after an earlier deportation. The district court held that Defendant's 1995 California conviction for residential burglary qualified as a "crime of violence," triggering a sixteen-level enhancement. On appeal, Defendant argued the enhancement wasn't legally authorized and his sentence should have been reconsidered. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court erred in calculating Defendant's sentence. Accordingly, the Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

John Doe (Father) is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States illegally in 2003. In mid-2007, he married Jane Doe (Mother) in Payette, Idaho. After they were married, Father was arrested in Ontario, Oregon, when he attempted to open a bank account with a false social security number. He served three months in jail, and was then transferred to a jail in Portland to be held for deportation. He agreed to voluntarily leave the United States and did so, returning to his parents’ home in Salamanca, Guanajuato, Mexico. Mother also went to Mexico, but she returned to the United States after she became pregnant. Their child (Daughter) was born in the United States in November 2008. Mother also had a four-year-old son by another man. In March 2009, Father reentered the United States illegally in an attempt to be with his wife and Daughter, but he was caught in Arizona and returned to Mexico. In March, 2009, Mother was living in Middleton, Idaho, with her boyfriend, who had a son who was about seven years old. Mother and her boyfriend took his son to the hospital regarding severe bruising on his head. Because Mother and her boyfriend gave conflicting accounts of how the boy was injured, the medical personnel notified law enforcement. The investigation disclosed Mother’s son had struck her boyfriend’s son several times with a hairbrush. Daughter and the boyfriend’s son were taken into custody by law enforcement, and on the same day the county prosecuting attorney filed a petition under the Child Protective Act with respect to those children. The petition alleged that the name of Daughter’s father was unknown and that he was in Mexico at an unknown address. Father spoke by telephone from Mexico with the Department’s caseworker that he would like to be involved in Daughter’s life and to be reunited with Mother and her son. He also said he would like Mother to begin the process that would allow him to come into the United States lawfully. In August, the Department’s caseworker told Father she would present a home study to the court if it was received in time. On September 15, 2010, the Mexican consulate emailed the report to the caseworker. The termination hearing was held on September 29. At that hearing, the Department did not present the study to the court. The caseworker testified that she disregarded the report because the Department had decided to terminate Father’s parental rights. Thus, default was entered against Father, even though he had clearly not been properly served with process regarding the termination proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the magistrate court and remanded this case with instructions for the court to order the Department to take all reasonable steps to promptly place Daughter with Father in Mexico.

Defendant Agapito Franco-Lopez appealed his conviction on one count of transporting an illegal alien. Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal because the government did not present evidence that the transported alien illegally "entered" the United States. In support, Defendant relied on the definition of "entry" used in the context of civil immigration law or in illegal reentry cases charged under 8 U.S.C. 1325 and 1326. As to this element of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), the Tenth Circuit concluded the government needed only prove that the transported alien was present in the United States in violation of the law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court.

Petitioner Yonis Ahmed Ali, a native and citizen of Somalia, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's applications, basing its denial of relief on its conclusion on an adverse credibility finding. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review of the BIA order, holding that the IJ's adverse credibility determination, affirmed by the BIA, was supported by the record, and thus Petitioner could not prevail on his challenges to the decisions of the IJ and BIA.

The government commenced removal proceedings against Defendant, who was born in Guatemala. Defendant submitted an application for asylum or withholding of removal, basing his asylum application on his membership in a particular social group, which he defined as "Guatemalans returning from the United States who are perceived as wealthy." The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that Defendant did not meet his burden of showing past persecution or a reasonable probability of future persecution, that he did not show the government of Guatemala was unable or unwilling to control alleged persecutors, and that there was little evidence that his social group would be perceived as a group by society or subject to a higher incident of crime than the population. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Defendant's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err in finding that the group "Guatemalans returning from the United States who are perceived as wealthy" was not a particular social group within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The district court entered a preliminary injunction concerning four provisions of Arizona S. B. 1070, enacted in 2010: Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; 5(C)makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in Arizona; 6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed any offense that makes the person removable from the U.S.; and 2(B) requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to attempt, in some circumstances, to verify immigration status. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 preempted. Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, in which Congress has left no room for even complementary state laws. Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty is an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or employ unauthorized workers, 8 U. S. C. 1324a(a)(1)(A),(a)(2); requires employers to verify prospective employees' status; and imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers, but only imposes civil penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment. Congress decided against criminal penalties on unauthorized employees. Section 6 creates an obstacle to federal law by attempting to provide state officers with additional arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the federal government. Generally, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the U.S. It was improper to enjoin section 2(B) before state courts construed it and without some showing that its enforcement actually conflicts with federal law. The mandatory nature of the status checks does not interfere with the federal scheme. Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. It is not clear yet that 2(B), in practice, will require state officers to delay release of detainees for no reason other than to verify immigration status. That would raise constitutional concerns and would disrupt the federal framework, but the section could be read to avoid these concerns.

Appellant, a Jewish American by birth who has lived in Israel as an Israeli national for over a decade, sought a Certificate of Loss of Nationality (CLN) from the Department of State, claiming that he was entitled to the CLN under two provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court affirmed the District Court's judgment only insofar as it upheld that Department's decision that appellant was not eligible for CLN under Section 2 of the INA. The court reversed and remanded, however, the district court's judgment dismissing appellant's challenge to the Department decision denying his request for a CLN under Section 1. The agency's statutory interpretation of Section 1, as rendered in the Betancourt Letter, was not entitled to Chevron deference. And, because the Department failed to provide any coherent explanation for its decision regarding the applicability of Section 1, the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious for want of reasoned decisionmaking.

Petitioner, a Peruvian citizen, sought review of the decision of the BIA that he was not eligible for special rule cancellation of removal under Section 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2). The BIA denied the petition because petitioner failed to show that he was "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" by his American citizen spouse. The court concluded that the BIA had discretion to make this determination, and therefore lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision that petitioner was not a battered spouse.