Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Emmanuel Huitron-Guizar entered a conditional guilty plea to being an illegal alien in possession of firearms transported or shipped in interstate commerce, and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. Defendant was to be delivered upon release to an immigration official for deportation. On appeal, he argued that 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(5)(a) was unconstitutional and that the district court committed various sentencing errors in applying the Sentencing Guidelines. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found the applicable statute constitutional, and that the district court committed no errors in arriving at Defendant's sentence.

Petitioner and his wife, natives and citizens of China, petitioned for review of the denial of their third motion to reopen removal proceedings. After the Board denied their motion, petitioners had 30 days to file their petition for review in the court but they filed their petition one day late. Petitioners urged the court to rule that their petition was timely because they paid a commercial parcel service to provide overnight delivery 29 days after the Board issued its decision and, but for a delay caused by inclement weather, the petition would have reached the court on the day it was due. The government argued that the Board did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners' third motion to reopen. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an untimely petition for review and the court was accessible on the day the petition was due, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The City appealed the district court's summary judgment enjoining it from implementing a purported housing ordinance that required all adults living in rental housing within the City to obtain an occupancy license conditioned upon the occupant's citizenship or lawful immigration status. The court concluded that the ordinance's sole purpose was not to regulate housing but to exclude undocumented aliens, specifically Latinos, from the City and that it was an impermissible regulation of immigration. The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional and presented an obstacle to federal authority on immigration and the conduct of foreign affairs. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant-Appellant Salvador Mendoza-Lopez appeals his sentence, arguing the district court denied him his right of allocution. Mendoza-Lopez pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful re-entry after removal. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a sentence of seventy months. Defendant filed motions for departure and variance, seeking a forty-month sentence. He argued he qualified for a downward departure under the Guidelines because his criminal history category over-represented the seriousness of his prior record. At sentencing, Defendant's counsel reiterated at length his arguments for a departure and variance. The district court, in a lengthy statement from the bench, denied both motions and accepted the PSR's recommended Guidelines range of seventy to eighty-seven months. Immediately thereafter the court said: "[i]t's the Court['s] intention to sentence within that Guideline range." It then invited both Defendant's counsel, and Defendant himself to address "where within that range this Court should sentence." The court assured defense counsel it had taken into account the Guidelines' factors and would continue to do so when it imposed sentence. At his opportunity to speak, Defendant said: "I would simply like to say that I apologize, I’m sorry for having come back. I’d like you to know that I have small children in Mexico who need me to support them by working. That’s really all." The district court sentenced Defendant to seventy months, stating that it was "sympathetic with the fact that the defendant has a wife and two small children that very much need him back home." Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing the district court violated his right of allocution by definitively announcing its intention to impose a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range before inviting him to speak. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred by inviting Defendant to speak with respect to where within the Guidelines range the court should sentence him. This error, however, did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and the Court affirmed Defendant's sentence.

Ghana-born Petitioner James Turkson asked an immigration judge (IJ) to defer his removal from the United States because he believed that he would be tortured if returned to his native Ghana. The IJ ruled that Petitioner would likely face torture in Ghana, and therefore deferred his removal. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed the IJ's ruling. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed all aspects of the IJ's decision, but erred in its review of the IJ's factual findings: the BIA reviewed the case under the de novo standard of review instead of under the "clearly erroneous standard" prescribed by its governing regulations. The Fourth Circuit therefore granted Petitioner's petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In August 2010, Defendant Byron Ventura-Perez pled guilty in Colorado to illegal reentry after having been deported subsequent to an aggravated-felony conviction. Defendant raised two issues on appeal: (1) he contended the district court miscalculated his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) he contended that when the court imposed his sentence, it improperly refused to consider sentencing disparities created by fast-track programs in other districts. Finding no error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence.

This case concerned the BIA's policy for deciding when resident aliens could apply to the Attorney General for relief from deportation under a now-repealed provision of the immigration law. The Court held that the BIA's policy for applying section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), in deportation cases was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). The Court concluded that the BIA's comparable-grounds rule was unmoored from the purposes and concerns of the immigration laws. It allowed an irrelevant comparison between statutory provisions to govern a matter of the utmost importance -whether lawful resident aliens with longstanding ties to this country could stay here. And contrary to the Government's protestations, it was not supported by text or practice or cost considerations. Therefore, the BIA's approach could not pass muster under ordinary principles of administrative law.

The Madison County Board of Commissioners filed an appropriation action against Greg and Marcia Bell. The common pleas court entered judgment in favor of the Board. The court of appeals affirmed. The Bells then filed a civil action against various Defendants, including the Board and the common pleas court judge. The common pleas court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. Greg Bell subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court judge that presided over the earlier action, a magistrate, and certain attorneys and entities, from proceeding in the case. The court of appeals denied Bell's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Bell could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of prohibition.

Petitioner left Syria because of fears relating to indebtedness and was admitted to the U.S. as a nonimmigrant in 2000. He became acquainted with men involved in the September 11 attacks and later voluntarily provided the FBI with information. In October 2001 the INS issued a Notice to Appear charging petitioner as removable. He sought asylum and withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture and was transferred to FBI custody on a material witness warrant. The IJ granted the application for asylum (8 U.S.C. 1158), withholding of removal (8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A)), and withholding of removal pursuant to the CAT, finding that he belonged to the social group of "hopeless debtors," persecuted in Syria. Three years later, ICE indicated that his application might have been fraudulent and that petitioner might pose a threat to national security. The BIA reopened "sua sponte" and remanded. The district court dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Stay of Removal Proceedings." The Third Circuit reversed concluding that, under these unusual circumstances, the district court has jurisdiction to review the BIA decision to reopen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701.

Petitioner Zhi Wei Pang illegally entered the United States in 1993 from the People's Republic of China. Months after he arrived, he unsuccessfully applied for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner claimed he suffered economic and emotional persecution due to his resistance to Chinese population control policies. But because the economic penalties imposed on Petitioner did not rise to the level of past persecution, the Board of Immigration Appeals recommended Petitioner's removal. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and denied Petitioner's petition for review.