Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Yonis Ahmed Ali, a native and citizen of Somalia, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). An immigration judge (IJ) denied Petitioner's applications, basing its denial of relief on its conclusion on an adverse credibility finding. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's petition for review of the BIA order, holding that the IJ's adverse credibility determination, affirmed by the BIA, was supported by the record, and thus Petitioner could not prevail on his challenges to the decisions of the IJ and BIA.

The government commenced removal proceedings against Defendant, who was born in Guatemala. Defendant submitted an application for asylum or withholding of removal, basing his asylum application on his membership in a particular social group, which he defined as "Guatemalans returning from the United States who are perceived as wealthy." The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that Defendant did not meet his burden of showing past persecution or a reasonable probability of future persecution, that he did not show the government of Guatemala was unable or unwilling to control alleged persecutors, and that there was little evidence that his social group would be perceived as a group by society or subject to a higher incident of crime than the population. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Defendant's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not err in finding that the group "Guatemalans returning from the United States who are perceived as wealthy" was not a particular social group within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The district court entered a preliminary injunction concerning four provisions of Arizona S. B. 1070, enacted in 2010: Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; 5(C)makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in Arizona; 6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed any offense that makes the person removable from the U.S.; and 2(B) requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to attempt, in some circumstances, to verify immigration status. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 preempted. Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, in which Congress has left no room for even complementary state laws. Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty is an obstacle to the federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 makes it illegal for employers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or employ unauthorized workers, 8 U. S. C. 1324a(a)(1)(A),(a)(2); requires employers to verify prospective employees' status; and imposes criminal and civil penalties on employers, but only imposes civil penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment. Congress decided against criminal penalties on unauthorized employees. Section 6 creates an obstacle to federal law by attempting to provide state officers with additional arrest authority, which they could exercise with no instruction from the federal government. Generally, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the U.S. It was improper to enjoin section 2(B) before state courts construed it and without some showing that its enforcement actually conflicts with federal law. The mandatory nature of the status checks does not interfere with the federal scheme. Consultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system. It is not clear yet that 2(B), in practice, will require state officers to delay release of detainees for no reason other than to verify immigration status. That would raise constitutional concerns and would disrupt the federal framework, but the section could be read to avoid these concerns.

Appellant, a Jewish American by birth who has lived in Israel as an Israeli national for over a decade, sought a Certificate of Loss of Nationality (CLN) from the Department of State, claiming that he was entitled to the CLN under two provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court affirmed the District Court's judgment only insofar as it upheld that Department's decision that appellant was not eligible for CLN under Section 2 of the INA. The court reversed and remanded, however, the district court's judgment dismissing appellant's challenge to the Department decision denying his request for a CLN under Section 1. The agency's statutory interpretation of Section 1, as rendered in the Betancourt Letter, was not entitled to Chevron deference. And, because the Department failed to provide any coherent explanation for its decision regarding the applicability of Section 1, the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious for want of reasoned decisionmaking.

Petitioner, a Peruvian citizen, sought review of the decision of the BIA that he was not eligible for special rule cancellation of removal under Section 240A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2). The BIA denied the petition because petitioner failed to show that he was "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty" by his American citizen spouse. The court concluded that the BIA had discretion to make this determination, and therefore lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision that petitioner was not a battered spouse.

Defendant-Appellant Emmanuel Huitron-Guizar entered a conditional guilty plea to being an illegal alien in possession of firearms transported or shipped in interstate commerce, and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. Defendant was to be delivered upon release to an immigration official for deportation. On appeal, he argued that 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(5)(a) was unconstitutional and that the district court committed various sentencing errors in applying the Sentencing Guidelines. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found the applicable statute constitutional, and that the district court committed no errors in arriving at Defendant's sentence.

Petitioner and his wife, natives and citizens of China, petitioned for review of the denial of their third motion to reopen removal proceedings. After the Board denied their motion, petitioners had 30 days to file their petition for review in the court but they filed their petition one day late. Petitioners urged the court to rule that their petition was timely because they paid a commercial parcel service to provide overnight delivery 29 days after the Board issued its decision and, but for a delay caused by inclement weather, the petition would have reached the court on the day it was due. The government argued that the Board did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners' third motion to reopen. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an untimely petition for review and the court was accessible on the day the petition was due, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The City appealed the district court's summary judgment enjoining it from implementing a purported housing ordinance that required all adults living in rental housing within the City to obtain an occupancy license conditioned upon the occupant's citizenship or lawful immigration status. The court concluded that the ordinance's sole purpose was not to regulate housing but to exclude undocumented aliens, specifically Latinos, from the City and that it was an impermissible regulation of immigration. The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional and presented an obstacle to federal authority on immigration and the conduct of foreign affairs. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant-Appellant Salvador Mendoza-Lopez appeals his sentence, arguing the district court denied him his right of allocution. Mendoza-Lopez pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful re-entry after removal. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a sentence of seventy months. Defendant filed motions for departure and variance, seeking a forty-month sentence. He argued he qualified for a downward departure under the Guidelines because his criminal history category over-represented the seriousness of his prior record. At sentencing, Defendant's counsel reiterated at length his arguments for a departure and variance. The district court, in a lengthy statement from the bench, denied both motions and accepted the PSR's recommended Guidelines range of seventy to eighty-seven months. Immediately thereafter the court said: "[i]t's the Court['s] intention to sentence within that Guideline range." It then invited both Defendant's counsel, and Defendant himself to address "where within that range this Court should sentence." The court assured defense counsel it had taken into account the Guidelines' factors and would continue to do so when it imposed sentence. At his opportunity to speak, Defendant said: "I would simply like to say that I apologize, I’m sorry for having come back. I’d like you to know that I have small children in Mexico who need me to support them by working. That’s really all." The district court sentenced Defendant to seventy months, stating that it was "sympathetic with the fact that the defendant has a wife and two small children that very much need him back home." Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing the district court violated his right of allocution by definitively announcing its intention to impose a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range before inviting him to speak. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred by inviting Defendant to speak with respect to where within the Guidelines range the court should sentence him. This error, however, did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and the Court affirmed Defendant's sentence.

Ghana-born Petitioner James Turkson asked an immigration judge (IJ) to defer his removal from the United States because he believed that he would be tortured if returned to his native Ghana. The IJ ruled that Petitioner would likely face torture in Ghana, and therefore deferred his removal. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed the IJ's ruling. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed all aspects of the IJ's decision, but erred in its review of the IJ's factual findings: the BIA reviewed the case under the de novo standard of review instead of under the "clearly erroneous standard" prescribed by its governing regulations. The Fourth Circuit therefore granted Petitioner's petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.