Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding Mother sole legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child and making some of Mother's requested findings to support an application to obtain special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status for the child under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, holding that there was no abuse of discretion.Mother and Father were married in Mexico and had one child, Max. The parties later moved to Nebraska, where they separated. Mother filed a complaint for dissolution, requesting sole legal and physical custody of Max. The district court dissolved the marriage and awarded Mother custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by refusing to make all the SIJ findings that Mother requested; and (2) Mother's second assignment of error was without merit. View "Hernandez v. Dorantes" on Justia Law

For over four decades, immigration judges employed by the Executive Office for Immigration Review have collectively bargained through a certified union. Four years ago, that office asked the Federal Labor Relations Authority to determine that immigration judges are management officials barred from inclusion in a bargaining unit. The Authority agreed. Following an unsuccessful reconsideration motion, and with a second reconsideration motion still pending before the Authority, the union petitioned this court for review of both the Authority’s initial decision and its decision denying reconsideration. The union contends that, in issuing those decisions, the Authority violated the union’s substantive and procedural due process rights.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition. The court explained that the Union’s petition for review was incurably premature—including with respect to the Initial Order—even though the Union’s second reconsideration motion sought reconsideration of only the First Reconsideration Order, not the Initial Order. The court wrote that a contrary conclusion would disserve the central purpose of the incurable prematurity doctrine. “There is good reason to prohibit any litigant from pressing its cause concurrently upon both the judicial and the administrative fronts: a favorable decision from the agency might yet obviate the need for review by the court.” And here, as in Tennessee Gas, a favorable agency decision on the second reconsideration motion pending before it could have obviated the need for judicial review of both the order initially denying reconsideration and the underlying order. View "National Association of Immigration Judges v. FLRA" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied the petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) brought by Petitioners, several Peruvian nationals who were ordered removed from the United States, holding that Petitioners were not entitled to relief on their claims.Petitioners brought claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection pursuant to the regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture, contending that, if returned to Peru, they feared being seriously physically harmed or killed due to their former involvement with the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) political party. An immigration judge (IJ) ordered Petitioners removed, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit denied Petitioners' petition for review, holding that substantial evidence supported the agency's ruling that Petitioners had failed to make the requisite showing regarding government involvement. View "Vila-Castro v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7), holding that the BIA neither committed a material error of law nor acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or irrationally.Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was charged as removable for being present in the United States without having been admitted. Petitioner conceded the charge and sought asylum. An immigration judge (IJ) denied the asylum application because Petitioner failed to establish that he was targeted based on a protected ground. The BIA affirmed. Petitioner subsequently filed an untimely motion to reopen, asserting that the applicable time limit should be equitably tolled due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The BIA denied the motion. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's untimely motion to reopen and declining to equitably toll the deadline. View "Yoc Esteban v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit granted Petitioner's petition seeking to have her removal proceedings reopened and vacated the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals rejecting her motion to reopen her removal proceedings pursuant to the Board's sua sponte authority, holding that remand was required.At the age of nine, Petitioner entered the United States from El Salvador without inspection to join her mother, who entered without inspection four years earlier. An immigration judge found Petitioner deportable and granted her a five-month period of voluntary departure. The Board affirmed. Thereafter, Congress enacted the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-100. Petitioner later sought to have her removal proceedings reopened so that her request for suspension of deportation could be adjudicated according to the substantive NACARA standards. The Board ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to reopen the proceeding after construing Petitioner's filing as a motion seeking relief under NACARA. The First Circuit granted relief, holding (1) there is no reason why NACARA should not be read as implicitly divesting the Board of its discretion to sua sponte reopen a proceeding; and (2) Petitioner's petition was not time barred. View "Mancia v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision affirming the judgment of the immigration judge (IJ) rejecting Petitioner's application for deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that the BIA's denial of CAT protection was supported by substantial evidence.After Petitioner, a Haitian national, pleaded guilty in a Massachusetts state court with carrying a firearm without a license the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. An IJ denied Petitioner's application for deferral of removal under the CAT, and the BIA dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The First Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for judicial review, holding (1) the agency's finding that generalized danger and violence endemic in Haitian society will pose no particularized threat to Petitioner was supported by substantial evidence; (2) judicial venue was proper in the First Circuit; and (3) substantial evidence supported the agency's denial of CAT protection. View "Bazile v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dennis Arostegui-Maldonado, a citizen of Costa Rica and El Salvador, was removed from the United States in 2008. In 2021, he reentered. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reinstated his removal order. Arostegui-Maldonado told an asylum officer that he feared persecution or torture in Costa Rica and El Salvador. The officer referred his case to an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) for “withholding-only proceedings” to decide whether to forbid his removal to those countries. The IJ denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. Arostegui-Maldonado challenged the agency’s rulings on the merits, arguing: (1) the IJ misapplied the “under color of law” element to his Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) claim; (2) the BIA ignored his CAT claim; (3) the IJ failed to fully develop the record; and (4) the IJ and the BIA violated his due process rights. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Arostegui-Maldonado that the IJ misapplied “under color of law” to his CAT claim, and granted the petition on that ground. The Court otherwise denied the petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Arostegui-Maldonado v. Garland" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioners' petition for review of their asylum and withholding of removal claims and concluded that Petitioners waived any argument regarding relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), holding that substantial evidence supported the immigration judge's (IJ) factual determinations and that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) committed no errors of law.In their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief, Petitioners argued that they experiences in El Salvador established persecution and that they belonged to two separate particular social groups that were threatened by gang members. The IJ denied relief, concluding that Petitioners failed to establish persecution and did not meet their burden as to the two separate particular social groups they claimed. The BIA affirmed. The First Circuit denied review, holding that the BIA and IJ did not err when they concluded that Petitioners did not meet their burden with respect to persecution on account of a protected group and withholding of removal. View "Sanchez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The H-1B visa program allows foreign nationals to work in the United States in specialized positions for sponsoring employers. By regulation, any such employer must file amended paperwork with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services whenever it makes a “material change” in the terms of covered employment. In Simeio Solutions, LLC, 26 I & N Dec. 542 (AAO 2015), USCIS interpreted that phrase to include a change in the place of employment. And in an ensuing guidance document, USCIS memorialized this interpretation and exercised discretion to limit its retroactive enforcement. ITServe Alliance, Inc., a trade association representing employers, seeks a declaratory judgment that Simeio and the guidance document are unlawful. ITServe contends that Simeio was a procedurally defective rulemaking and that USCIS lacks statutory authority to require the amended filings.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that ITServe has Article III standing to raise these arguments, but the court rejected them on the merits. The court explained that because USCIS may consider LCA-related issues in exercising its own authority to approve, disapprove, or revoke H-1B petitions, it may require new or amended petitions corresponding to changes in the place of employment that necessitate the filing of new LCAs. View "ITServe Alliance, Inc. v. DHS" on Justia Law

In 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law that prioritize the arrest and removal from the U.S. of noncitizens who are suspected terrorists or dangerous criminals or who have unlawfully entered the country only recently. Texas and Louisiana claimed that the Guidelines contravened federal statutes that require the arrest of certain noncitizens upon their release from prison (8 U.S.C. 1226(c)) or entry of a final order of removal (1231(a)(2)). The district court found that the states had standing, citing costs they would incur, then found the Guidelines unlawful. The Fifth Circuit declined to stay the judgment.The Supreme Court reversed. Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact caused by the defendant and redressable by a court order. The alleged injury must “be legally and judicially cognizable.” There is no precedent, history, or tradition of federal courts entertaining lawsuits of this kind; a plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a suit “when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” Such lawsuits implicate the Executive’s Article II authority to decide how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law, which extends to the immigration context. The Court stated that the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions and that policies governing the continued detention of noncitizens who have been arrested arguably might raise different standing questions. View "United States v. Texas" on Justia Law