Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Injury Law
Platt v. Kansas State Univ.
Plaintiff’s probationary employment was terminated by Kansas State University. Plaintiff sued the University, arguing that her employment termination was in retaliation for her potential claims under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act. The district court granted the University’s motion to dismiss, determining that Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies because Plaintiff was required under the Kansas Judicial Review Act (KJRA) to first present her retaliatory discharge claim to the University for determination. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were not governed by the KJRA and, therefore, jurisdiction was proper in the district court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s tort claim was not governed by the KJRA. Remanded. View "Platt v. Kansas State Univ." on Justia Law
Vasquez v. Dillard’s Inc.
Jonnie Vasquez, a Dillard's store employee, injured her neck and shoulder as she lifted shoe boxes while working. She filed claims for benefits under Dillard's Opt-Out plan, which were ultimately denied. The employer sought removal to federal court on grounds that the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The United States District Court for the Western District disagreed and remanded the case to the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Commission found that the Opt Out Act: (1) constituted an unconstitutional special law; (2) denied equal protection to Oklahoma's injured workers; and (3) denied injured workers the constitutionally protected right of access to courts. Dillard's appealed. At issue was a challenge to the constitutionality of the Opt Out Act. After review, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that the core provision of the Opt Out Act, created impermissible, unequal, disparate treatment of a select group of injured workers. Therefore, the Court held that the Oklahoma Employee Benefit Injury Act was an unconstitutional special law under the Oklahoma Constitution, art. 2, section 59.3. View "Vasquez v. Dillard's Inc." on Justia Law
Jordan v. Dean Foods
At issue in this case was a decision of the Industrial Commission (the Commission) finding that Edward Jordan failed to prove entitlement to additional benefits for accidents that occurred during his employment. Jordan served over twenty-one years in the Navy, retiring in 2003. While in the Navy, Jordan was never assessed with a service-related disability involving his cervical area.1 After retiring from the Navy, Jordan and his wife moved to Boise, and he started working for Dean Foods as a milk delivery driver. On May 16, 2006, Jordan suffered an injury while trying to move a stack of milk containers (the 2006 accident). Jordan testified he experienced a sudden onset of pain in his neck and shoulders along with numbness extending down his arms. He notified a supervisor after he dropped a gallon of milk due to the numbness. Jordan sought treatment for neck, cervical, and radiculopathy symptoms. Jordan would document complaints about his neck to his employer over the next five years. Jordan underwent surgery in 2012. Jordan recovered from the surgery without complication, but Dr. Doerr imposed lifting restrictions. As a result of the restrictions, Dean Foods terminated Jordan’s employment after it determined that it was unable to make reasonable accommodations which would allow Jordan to accomplish his essential job functions. The Commission chose not to adopt the referee’s recommendation although it also decided Jordan’s claims in favor of Employer/Surety. The Commission’s decision differed from the referee’s recommendation because the Commission decided to address the merits of Jordan’s claim related to the 2006 accident rather than holding that he abandoned those claims. After review of the Commission record, the Supreme Court concluded there was no reversible error and affirmed. View "Jordan v. Dean Foods" on Justia Law
Brown v. Perez
Plaintiffs-Appellants Blake Brown, Dean Biggs, Jacqueline Deherrera, Ruth Ann Head, Marlene Mason, Roxanne McFall, Richard Medlock, and Bernadette Smith appealed a summary judgment order upholding Defendants-Appellees Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, and the Office of Workers Compensation’s (“OWC”) (collectively, “the agency”) redactions to documents they provided to Plaintiffs pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, (“FOIA”). Plaintiffs were former federal civilian employees eligible to receive federal workers compensation benefits. If there was a disagreement between a worker’s treating physician and the second-opinion physician hired by the OWC, an impartial “referee” physician was selected to resolve the conflict. The referee’s opinion was frequently dispositive of the benefits decision. To ensure impartiality, it is the OWC’s official policy to use a software program to schedule referee appointments on a rotational basis from a list of Board-certified physicians. Plaintiffs suspected that the OWC did not adhere to its official policy, but instead always hired the same “select few” referee physicians, who were financially beholden (and presumably sympathetic) to the agency. To investigate their suspicions, Plaintiffs filed FOIA requests for agency records pertaining to the referee selection process. Because the Tenth Circuit found that the FOIA exemptions invoked by the agency raise genuine disputes of material fact, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brown v. Perez" on Justia Law
Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc.
Williams Alaska Petroleum owned the North Pole refinery until 2004. Williams knew that the then-unregulated chemical sulfolane was present in refinery property groundwater, but it did not know that the sulfolane had migrated off the refinery property via underground water flow. Flint Hills Resources Alaska bought the North Pole refinery from Williams in 2004 pursuant to a contract that contained detailed terms regarding environmental liabilities, indemnification, and damages caps. Almost immediately the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation informed Flint Hills that sulfolane was to be a regulated chemical and that Flint Hills needed to find the source of the sulfolane in the groundwater. The Department contacted Flint Hills again in 2006. Flint Hills’s environmental contractor repeatedly warned Flint Hills that sulfolane could be leaving the refinery property and that more work was necessary to ascertain the extent of the problem. In 2008, Flint Hills drilled perimeter wells and discovered the sulfolane was migrating beyond its property and had contaminated drinking water in North Pole. A North Pole resident sued Flint Hills and Williams, and Flint Hills cross-claimed against Williams for indemnification. After extensive motion practice the superior court dismissed all of Flint Hills’s claims against Williams as time-barred. Flint Hills appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court correctly applied the contract’s damages cap provision, but concluded that the court erred in finding Flint Hills’s contractual indemnification claims and part of its statutory claims were time-barred. The Court also affirmed the court’s dismissal of Flint Hills’s equitable claims. View "Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law
Crider v. DeSoto County Convention & Visitors Bureau
While visiting the DeSoto County Civic Center, Cynthia Crider stepped in a hole that was obscured by grass. She was attending a high-school graduation at the Civic Center, operated by the DeSoto County Convention and Visitors Bureau. At the ceremony’s conclusion, Crider exited the Civic Center and proceeded across a grassy area to her car. As she crossed, Crider stepped in a hole obscured by overgrown grass. She fell and broke her ankle. Crider sued the Bureau, alleging that it failed to maintain the grassy area in a safe condition. The Bureau moved for summary judgment, claiming it enjoyed Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(v)’s immunity from certain premises-liability claims. In granting summary judgment, the trial judge reasoned that the Bureau enjoyed discretionary-function immunity because no statute mandated that it operate a civic center and because Crider failed to show any “laws or regulations . . . which would remove the Defendants’ particular acts (or inaction) from the ‘umbrella of discretionary function immunity.’” Crider appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crider v. DeSoto County Convention & Visitors Bureau" on Justia Law
Ex parte Town of Mosses.
The Town of Mosses and its chief of police Jimmy Harris, separately petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Lowndes Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Geraldine Grant Bryson. The Court consolidated their petitions for the purpose of writing one opinion. At the time of the events giving rise to this action, Bryson operated an entertainment venue known as "The Spot." Bryson described "The Spot" as a "community center for all activities." Bryson requested that the Town grant her a liquor license, but the Town's council denied her request. In 2010, Bryson rented "The Spot" to a deejay, who planned to host a "beer bash" on its premises. Approximately 200 people turned out for the event even though the entertainment portion of the event was ultimately canceled by the deejay. Although Bryson, who was at "The Spot" on the night of the event, testified that she did not see anyone consuming alcoholic beverages at the event, she acknowledged that the deejay hosting the event had brought alcohol that he planned to "give ... away [to] the community for showing support for the center." The mayor saw one of the deejay's flyers promoting the event. The mayor, in turn, notified Harris. Harris saw one of the flyers, organized a task force of officers from multiple law-enforcement agencies, and entered "The Spot," observing alcohol being consumed. Bryson was ultimately arrested for selling alcohol without a license. The charges against Bryson were later dismissed because the Town was unable to produce a witness who could testify to paying an admission to "The Spot" and drinking alcohol on the premises. Bryson sued the Town and Harris asserting claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and slander. When the trial court denied the Town and Harris' motions to dismiss, they sought mandamus relief. The Alabama Supreme Court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Harris's summary-judgment motion as to the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims and to enter a summary-judgment for Harris on those grounds. To the extent Harris sought mandamus review of intentional infliction of emotional distress, harassment, libel, and slander, the petition was denied. The trial court was further directed to vacate its order denying the Town's summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment for the Town as to each claim asserted against it. View "Ex parte Town of Mosses." on Justia Law
Sea "B" Mining Co. v. Addison
An ALJ found that Jerry Addison was entitled to benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901-944, because he had established the existence of clinical and legal pneumoconiosis that resulted in a total respiratory disability. Sea-B, Addison's former employer, filed a petition for review of the ALJ's decision. The court concluded that the ALJ’s decision to exclude the additional CT scan evidence was not harmless. This error affects the determination of both clinical and legal pneumoconiosis and impacts the ALJ’s consideration of the other evidence in this case. The omitted CT scan evidence is unquestionably probative of the central issue in dispute: whether Addison suffered from pneumoconiosis. Furthermore, the court could not determine from the ALJ’s sparse explanation how, or if, he weighed the x-ray readings in light of the readers’ qualifications. Finally, because the proffered explanation for elevating Dr. Forehand’s diagnosis is not supported, the ALJ must reevaluate that opinion to determine the proper weight it should be given. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sea "B" Mining Co. v. Addison" on Justia Law
Doe v. United States
Plaintiffs, eight female alien detainees, filed suit alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., as well as several state law claims, after a male CCA officer, Donald Dunn, sexually assaulted them. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim against CCA and Evelyn Hernandez, the former CCA facility administrator, or in granting summary judgment for Dunn. The CCA defendants, in housing alien detainees according to ICE specifications, were performing a federal function, rather than operating the detention center under color of state law. Williamson County had almost no involvement in the detention center’s day-to-day operations. The court also concluded that summary judgment for Williamson County was proper where the county is not directly responsible for CCA’s failure to follow policy, and the county did not otherwise act with deliberate indifference in monitoring the detention center. Furthermore, plaintiffs have not plausibly asserted that ICE officials acted with deliberate indifference and the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' FTCA claims against the United States. The court affirmed as to the federal claims, but reversed the dismissal of the remaining state claims and remanded. View "Doe v. United States" on Justia Law
Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties
Plaintiffs, victims of terrorist acts linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran, contend that they are entitled to enforce unsatisfied money judgments against defendants under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602 et seq., and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), 28 U.S.C. 1610 note. The court concluded that defendants in this case do not equate to the “foreign state” of Iran for purposes of the FSIA or the TRIA; defendants cannot be deemed “agencies or instrumentalities” of Iran under the FSIA, but defendants’ status as “agencies or instrumentalities” of Iran under the TRIA and their properties’ status as “blocked assets” under that statute is not foreclosed as a matter of law; but, nonetheless, the court identified questions of fact that prevent either of these TRIA questions from being decided on summary judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated the award of summary judgment for plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties" on Justia Law