Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal centered on the second of two qui tam actions filed by former New Mexico Education Retirement Board ("ERB") Chief Investment Officer Frank Foy and his wife Suzanne ("Foys"), attacking the management of the investment portfolios of the ERB and of the New Mexico State Investment Council ("SIC"). The Foys "allege that Defendants, who include Wall Street firms and investment advisors, as well as high-ranking state officials, executed fraudulent schemes that led to the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars at the expense of the [SIC] and the [ERB]. Specifically, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the retroactive application of the Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 44-9-1 to -14 (2007) ("FATA") violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that FATA was constitutional. The treble damages under FATA were predominantly compensatory and could be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date. The Court declined to resolve the issue of whether the civil penalties awarded under FATA were punitive and violated ex post facto principles until there was a definitive amount awarded. View "New Mexico ex rel. Foy v. Austin Capital Mgmt., Ltd." on Justia Law

The State of Idaho appealed a district court judgment denying its motion to vacate portions of a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award entered by an arbitration panel. This case stemmed from the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, wherein certain cigarette manufacturers entered into an agreement with the State to pay damages for the cost of treating smoking-related illnesses. A dispute arose between the parties as to the amount owed in 2003 and the district court entered an order compelling arbitration. The arbitration panel entered a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award in March of 2013. In June of 2013, the State moved the district court to vacate, modify, or correct the award. The district court concluded the State did not have standing to move to vacate or modify the award. The State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Philip Morris, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were five women who were formerly incarcerated at the Hillside Community Corrections Center in Oklahoma City. They filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against multiple defendants, alleging they were sexually abused and harassed in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs’ complaint named fifteen defendants, including Defendant-Appellant Charlotte Day and Defendant-Appellant Mary Pavliska, both of whom were guards at Hillside during the relevant period. Plaintiffs alleged Day and Pavliska were aware of the abuse and did nothing to prevent it. The claims against several defendants were dismissed without prejudice. The remaining defendants (except the alleged perpetrator Anthony Bobelu) moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to all movants except Day and Pavliska. The district ruled a jury could conclude from the evidence presented that Day and Pavliska were deliberately indifferent to a known substantial risk of serious harm to the Plaintiffs. In an interlocutory appeal, Day and Pavliska argued to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that the district court erred by ruling they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Day’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the denial of qualified immunity as to Pavliska. View "Castillo v. Day" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether defendant lifeguard's failure to intervene in the deceased's drowning was "the proximate cause" of his death. While governmental agencies and their employees are generally immune from tort liability under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1407(2)(c) provided an exception to this general rule when a governmental employee's conduct is both (1) grossly negligent and (2) "the proximate cause" of an injury, which the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted to mean the "most immediate, efficient, and direct cause". Plaintiff sued defendant, a governmental employee, arguing that governmental immunity did not apply because defendant's grossly negligent behavior while lifeguarding and resulting failure to rescue plaintiff's drowning son was the proximate cause of his death. Subsequently, defendant moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds, but the trial court denied defendant's motion. The Court of Appeals, in a split opinion, affirmed, concluding that a jury could reasonably find that defendant's failure to intervene constituted the proximate cause of the deceased's death. The Court of Appeals dissent instead concluded that defendant was immune from liability. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by denying summary judgment to defendant, because the exception to governmental immunity articulated in MCL 691.1407(2) was inapplicable in this case. View "Beals v. Michigan" on Justia Law

This premises-liability case arose from the drowning deaths of a young father and his twin daughters at a man-made beach. The mother and surviving spouse of the decedents (Plaintiff) filed suit against the City of Texas City alleging that the deaths resulted from a peculiar risk of harm created by a confluence of artificial and natural conditions at the beach and that the the City was grossly negligent in failing to warn or protect the public against those dangers. In bringing suit against Texas City, Plaintiff averred that governmental immunity was waived. The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting that Plaintiff’s pleadings and evidence were insufficient to support jurisdiction. The trial court denied the jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed the claims for want of jurisdiction. At issue on appeal was whether there was evidence of the City’s liability to invoke the Texas Tort Claims Act’s waiver of governmental immunity, as limited by the recreational use statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to invoke the Texas Tort Claims Act’s waiver of immunity from suit. View "Suarez v. City of Texas City" on Justia Law

A licensed social worker informed the Department of Public Health and Human Services that Mother was psychologically abusing her two girls. After investigating the report, the Department removed the girls from Mother’s custody and placed them into foster care. The Department later returned the girls to Mother’s care. Mother sued the State, alleging that the Department failed adequately to investigate the social worker’s report before removing her children from her care, and as a result, she was wrongfully charged with and arrested for criminal contempt in Wisconsin, was denied custody and visitation with her children, and suffered emotional distress. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was statutorily immune from suit. The district court denied the motion The district court later summary judgment for the State, concluding that the State qualified for statutory immunity. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s earlier decision and order and affirmed the district court’s later judgment in favor of the State, holding that the State was entitled as a matter of law to statutory immunity from Mother’s claims because Mother failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact to support her claim that the State employees involved in the investigation were grossly negligent or knowingly provided false information. View "Weber v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit stemming from the workers' compensation benefits owed to class members under the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651 et seq., for injuries suffered while working for United States government contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Members of the class suffered lost limbs in massive explosions, suffered traumatic brain injuries from “concussive blasts, mortars, rockets, and bombs,” and developed post-traumatic stress disorder after witnessing “gruesome scenes of carnage.” The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ class-wide tort claims in light of Hall v. C&P Telephone Company as well their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-68, claims because plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under the statute and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-950, claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; however, this dismissal does not preclude any individual plaintiff from bringing independent claims outside of the Base Act’s statutory scheme; with respect to the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., claims brought by three individual plaintiffs, the court remanded to the district court to reconsider and explain its denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Brink v. Continental Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Albuquerque police sergeant Adam Casaus had ended his shift when he drove home in his squad car, lights flashing and going at a high rate of speed. He ran a red light, hitting Ashley Browder's car. Browder died, and her sister Lindsay suffered serious injuries. Casaus was ultimately charged with reckless vehicular homicide in state court. Lindsay and her parents filed a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages. Casaus moved to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied relief, and Casaus appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "Browder v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law

In 2005, Merwin Carlson was injured in a traffic accident while hauling freight as a trucker under a contract with GMR. In 2006, Carlson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI"), stating GMR was his employer. In response, GMR submitted a WSI form with employer information claiming Carlson was not its employee, but was an independent contractor. WSI issued a notice of decision finding Carlson was an employee of GMR at the time of the accident and awarded him benefits. GMR, through out-of-state attorneys who were neither licensed to practice law in North Dakota nor admitted pro hac vice at the time, requested reconsideration of WSI's decision, and argued Carlson was an independent contractor. Based on the additional information submitted, WSI issued a notice of decision reversing its earlier decision and denying Carlson benefits because it concluded he was an independent contractor rather than an employee of GMR. After Carlson requested reconsideration, WSI issued an order finding Carlson was an independent contractor and requiring him to repay disability and medical benefits previously awarded. Carlson requested a rehearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ recommended finding Carlson was an independent contractor and was not entitled to benefits. WSI adopted the ALJ's recommendation and the district court affirmed WSI's decision. Carlson appealed to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, Merwin commenced a federal court action against GMR, its owners, and its out-of-state attorneys alleging numerous claims for relief, including that GMR unlawfully failed to secure WSI coverage for him, and therefore GMR was liable for his work-related injuries under N.D.C.C. 65-09-02. The federal district court granted summary judgment dismissing the action, concluding Carlson had failed to plead or prove sufficient facts to maintain a civil action under N.D.C.C. 65-09-02. Merwin and his wife Denise then appealed the state court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their personal injury and loss of consortium action against GMR Transportation, Inc. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the state district court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that GMR had not lost its employer immunity under the workers' compensation laws, it affirmed. View "Carlson v. GMR Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Brandon Clark fell ten feet while working as a carpenter for Employer. Clark’s workers’ compensation doctor prescribed various drugs to treat Clark’s injuries, and Clark’s personal doctor prescribed additional drugs. In 2009, Clark died from the “combined toxic effects of the four sedating drugs detected in his blood with associated early pneumonia.” Clark’s family sought workers’ compensation death benefits, arguing that the medications Clark was prescribed for his work-related injuries caused his death. The workers’ compensation judge awarded death benefits to the family. The Court of appeal reversed, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that the drugs Clark was prescribed for his work injuries contributed to his death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Court of Appeal wrongly applied a higher proximate cause standard to this wrongful death case than the Legislature intended; and (2) substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s finding that two drugs, prescribed by the workers’ compensation doctor for Clark’s industrial injury, contributed to his death. View "South Coast Framing v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law