Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Askew, a military veteran and a former U.S. Postal Service employee, underwent a cardiac stent placement at the St. Louis Veterans Administration Medical Center. He was readmitted with an infection and the medical center responded negligently. As a result of the infection and attendant loss of blood, Askew suffered severe anoxic brain injury and amputation of his right leg. In Askew’s suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, the government did not dispute liability. The government requested that the court structure an award for future medical damages as a trust to provide periodic payments to Askew, with a reversionary interest in favor of the government upon Askew’s death. The district court declined to order a reversionary trust, awarded $253,667 in past economic damages, $525,000 in past non-economic damages, $4,000,000 in future economic damages, and $2,000,000 in future non-economic damages to Dirk Askew. The court awarded $1,525,000 to Askew’s wife for loss of consortium. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded, describing the reversionary trust remedy as the most reasonable analogy to the relief available against a private individual in like circumstances under Missouri law. View "Askew v. United States" on Justia Law

Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. and its assistant fire chief, Louis Cass White, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion for summary judgment on the basis of immunity as to negligence claims asserted against them by plaintiffs L.C. Westbrook, Jr., and Kimberly Lewis. Plaintiffs were seriously injured when the automobile they were driving collided with a fire department truck that was dispatched to a house fire. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded that petitioners established a clear right to mandamus relief as to White, but not to the department itself. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition as to White, and directed the trial court to enter summary judgment in his favor on plaintiffs' negligence claim. The Court denied the petition as to the department. View "Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Department, Inc." on Justia Law

When a fire caused by NSTAR Electric and Gas Company employees damaged a building owned by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), two insurers paid the claims of the building’s tenants. The insurers then brought this complaint against NSTAR Electric Company and NSTAR Electric & Gas Company (collectively, NSTAR) seeking to recover for the claims paid. NSTAR moved for partial summary judgment, contending that, to the extent to which the insurers sought recovery for business interruption losses, the claims were barred by Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy Tariff No. 200A, filed with and approved by the Department of Public Utilities, and in effect when the explosion occurred. The tariff contained a limitation of liability clause that limited NSTAR from liability to nonresidential customers for special, indirect, or consequential damages resulting from the utility’s gross negligence. A judge of the superior court allowed NSTAR’s motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that a tariff filed with and approved by a regulatory agency may limit a public utility’s liability. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the limitation of liability clause in the tariff precluded Plaintiffs’ claims to recover for business interruption and other consequential or economic damages. View "Maryland Cas. Co. v. NSTAR Elec. Co." on Justia Law

While fishing with his son-in-law and grandson near Gavins Point Dam on the Missouri River in Cedar County, Nebraska, Metter was struck and killed when a parked pickup truck came out of gear and rolled down an unprotected river bank. Metter’s widow, personal representative of his estate, brought survival and wrongful death actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, asserting the Corps negligently maintained the site. The grandson brought a separate suit against the Corps raising the same theories of liability for the mental and physical harms to Justin caused by witnessing his grandfather’s death. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the claims barred by the FTCA’s discretionary function exception, and that the United States did not waive sovereign immunity. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Corps removed the guardrails and posts itself to save money and to expedite a project, reasons that reflect the discretionary exercise of choice and judgment “susceptible to policy analysis.” View "Metter v. United States" on Justia Law

Ortiz, working for a concrete products manufacturer, was in a sand storage bin trying to scrape its wall, when he sank and was engulfed by sand up to his neck. Workers tried to dig him out. Plant manager MacKenzie was notified within 10 minutes. He decided there was no emergency and left the scene. Rescue efforts were not progressing; Ortiz asked the workers to call 911. No one did. Eventually, MacKenzie called 911. The Fire Department’s Technical Rescue Team arrived within minutes. Ortiz had been trapped for 90 minutes. Using a vacuum truck to remove the sand, the team extricated Ortiz in about four hours. He sustained serious injuries to his lower body. The bin is a “permit-required confined space.” OSHA requires “procedures for summoning rescue and emergency services, for rescuing entrants … and for preventing unauthorized personnel from attempting a rescue.” The plan must specify that emergency services are to be summoned immediately and forbid others to attempt rescue. Other regulations require danger signs and a protective barrier. An OSHA inspector cited the employer for three “serious” and one “willful” violation, 29 U.S.C. 666. An ALJ imposed a penalty of $70,000. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review that challenged the finding of the willful violation and the finding of violation of the requirement of a barrier. View "Dukane Precast, Inc. v. Perez" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Bacon appealed a circuit court order that found he violated RSA 206:26-bb (2011) (amended 2014) by acting negligently while hiking, so as to require a search and rescue effort by the plaintiff, the New Hampshire Fish and Game Department, and that he, thus, was responsible to the Department for the reasonable costs associated with the search and rescue. defendant began a five-day solo hiking trip in the White Mountains, during which he planned to hike several mountains with summits over 5,000 feet. At the time of the hike, defendant was fifty-nine years old, had undergone four hip surgeries since 2005, and had an artificial hip that had dislocated on five occasions, twice during the prior year. Defendant also had a “bad back” and was taking a variety of medications for multiple ailments. During the hike, defendant encountered a waist-high rock ledge that he needed to traverse in order to continue on the trail. He attempted to jump backward up onto the ledge and, in the process, fell and dislocated his hip. Approximately one hour later, a Conservation Officer received an alert that a hiker had dislocated his hip and needed assistance. He responded immediately and eventually located the defendant on the trail between Little Haystack and Lincoln Mountains. The Officer testified that when he found defendant his left leg was flexed and internally rotated, the very position that defendant’s orthopedic surgeon had warned him to avoid due to his hip replacement. Approximately fifteen Department personnel and thirty-five volunteers participated in defendant’s rescue. The trial court found for the Department “for all of the reasons cited in the plaintiff’s closing memorandum,” and awarded the Department $9,334.86 in damages. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, to which the Department objected. The court denied defendant’s motion, stating that “[t]he actions of the defendant were a gross deviation from those of a reasonable person that surpasses the [negligence] standard required.” After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "New Hampshire Fish & Game Dept. v. Bacon" on Justia Law

The City of Horn Lake contracted with Phillips Construction Company and its owner Michael Phillips (collectively “Phillips”) to work on a sewer project. Two employees of Phillips, Bertram Hill and David Mooneyhan, were working near the bottom of a trench that was seventeen feet deep when the walls of the trench suddenly collapsed. Mooneyhan was killed, and Hill was injured. Mooneyhan’s beneficiaries and Hill sued the City for Phillips’s negligence under respondeat superior and also alleged that the City had negligently hired Phillips. The City moved for summary judgment on grounds: (1) that Plaintiffs contended that Hill and Mooneyhan were employees of the City, thus rendering their claims subject to the exclusive remedy provision found in the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act; (2) that Phillips was an independent contractor, not an agent, so the City could not be liable to Plaintiffs under respondeat superior; and (3) the discretionary function exemption of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”) rendered the City immune from liability for maintenance of a sewer system. The circuit court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on all issues, holding that Plaintiffs had not established the City had more than a supervisory role over the project, that the City’s maintenance of a sewer system is a discretionary function, and that the burden under Mississippi Code Section 31-5-51(7) was placed on the contractor, not the City. Plaintiffs appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hill v. City of Horn Lake" on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides that a tort claim against the United States “shall be forever barred” unless presented to the appropriate federal agency for review within two years after the claim accrues,” 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). If the agency denies the claim, the claimant may file suit in federal court within six months of the denial. Wong failed to file her FTCA claim in federal court within six months, but argued that the district court had not permitted her to file until after the period expired. June failed to present her FTCA claim to a federal agency within two years, but argued that her untimely filing should be excused because the government concealed facts vital to her claim. In each case, the district court dismissed the FTCA claim, holding that those time bars are jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded. Section 2401(b)’s time limits are subject to equitable tolling. Congress must do something special to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional and prohibit a court from tolling it, but did no such thing in section 2401(b). Separation of a filing deadline from a jurisdictional grant often indicates that the deadline is not jurisdictional; the FTCA’s jurisdictional grant appears in another section and is not expressly linked to the limitations periods. The phrase “shall be forever barred” was commonplace in statutes of limitations enacted around the time of the FTCA, and does not carry jurisdictional significance. View "United States v. Wong" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ricky Rhame filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The single commissioner found the claim compensable. Respondent Charleston County School District sought review, and the matter was heard by an Appellate Panel of the Commission. The Appellate Panel reversed, denying the claim. Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing before the Appellate Panel. He did not file his notice of appeal until after the Appellate Panel denied his motion for rehearing. The notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the Appellate Panel's initial denial of the claim. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal because the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days from the date the Appellate Panel denied his claim. The court of appeals held that motions for rehearing are not permitted before the Commission on review of a single commissioner's decision. After its review, the South Carolina Supreme Court held Rhame's motion for rehearing to the Appellate Panel was proper and stayed the time for serving the notice of appeal for thirty days from receipt of the decision denying the motion. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of Rhame's appeal. View "Rhame v. Charleston County School District" on Justia Law

In 1998, Glenn Johnson suffered serious work-related injuries. In separate administrative proceedings, the parties contested the details and amounts of the lifetime workers’ compensation benefits Johnson was entitled to. Johnson and his wife filed the instant suit against his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance provider and related individuals and entities (collectively, Crawford), alleging that Crawford engaged in a plan to delay and deny benefits that the Johnsons were entitled to receive. Crawford filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Texas Department of Insurance Division of Workers’ Compensation had exclusive jurisdiction over all of the Johnsons’ claims because they arose out of the workers’ compensation claims-handling process. The trial court dismissed the Johnsons’ claims for breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing and for violations of the Texas Insurance Code but refused to dismiss any of the other claims. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that all of the Johnsons’ claims arose out of Crawford’s investigation, handling, and settling of claims for workers’ compensation benefits, and therefore, the Division had exclusive jurisdiction over the Johnsons’ claims. View "In re Crawford & Co." on Justia Law