Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Enacted after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), authorizes execution, in satisfaction of judgments against terrorists, on blocked assets that are seized or frozen by the United States. The plaintiffs, victims of terror, hold a judgment against al Qaeda for their $2.5 billion subrogation claims. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs have constitutional and statutory standing and TRIA is a remedial statute, under the statute the only assets subject to execution are blocked assets. Assets that are subject to a United States government license for final payment, transfer, or disposition, among other requirements, do not qualify as blocked assets. By the time plaintiffs filed their initial claims, the Office of Foreign Assets Control had already issued its license and the funds had already been arrested to preserve them for forfeiture; the funds were no longer blocked. View "United States v. Art Ins.Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Sarah Burnett and a friend went camping at Cherry Creek State Park. They chose a campsite under a canopy of mature cottonwood trees. "The weather that night was uneventful." Early the next morning, while petitioner and her friend remained sleeping inside their tent, a large limb dropped from one of the trees and struck both of them. The blow fractured petitioner's skull and a vertebra, and caused other injuries, including a concussion and multiple lacerations to her scalp and face. The friend suffered only minor injuries, and was able to drive petitioner to the hospital. Petitioner brought a premises liability action against the State Division of Parks and Outdoor Recreation, seeking compensation for her injuries, arguing the Park was a "public facility" and the branches overhanging the campsite constituted a "dangerous condition." The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the State waived its immunity for petitioner's injuries. The answer turned on whether the tree was a "natural condition...of unimproved property" under 24-10-106(1)(e) C.R.S. (2014) of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. The Court held that a "natural condition of any unimproved property" includes native trees originating on unimproved property. Because a limb from such a tree caused petitioner's injuries, the natural condition provision of the statute immunized the State in this case. View "Burnett v. Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Argonaut sued Audrain County Joint Communications (ACJC) alleging ACJC's negligence in monitoring a security alarm panel caused or contributed to damages arising out of the burglary and fire of a grocery store insured by Argonaut. Public employees at the ACJC call center monitored a private security company's alarm panels. The panels were defective. ACJC argued that it was entitled to sovereign immunity as a Missouri state entity, and to statutory immunity as a 911 call center. The district court denied summary judgment after finding ACJC had waived its sovereign and statutory immunity by purchasing insurance. The Eighth Circuit dismissed part of an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but otherwise affirmed. Missouri Revised Statutes Section 537.600 generally preserves "sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common law" and specifically refers to "the immunity of [a] public entity from liability and suit." Section 190.307, however, does not create a substantive right to be free from the burdens of litigation. There was no clear error in the district court's determination under section 537.600 that ACJC did not prove the existence of a pre-existing agreement between itself and the insurer to include the sovereign immunity endorsement with the original policy. View "Argonaut Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Audrain Cnty. Joint Commc'ns." on Justia Law

Under the Freeway Service Patrol (FSP) Act, motorists receive emergency roadside assistance on California’s highways. The FSP program is administered by, among other agencies, the Department of the California Highway Patrol (CHP). Local agencies then contract with privately owned tow services, which provide trucks dedicated to the FSP program. One local agency contracted with California Coach Orange, Inc. for FSP tow services and also contracted with CHP for field supervision and program management. Joshua Guzman, a California Coach FSP tow truck driver, hit a car on an interstate highway, injuring Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued CHP, among other defendants, seeking recovery on the theory that CHP was Guzman’s “special employer.” The trial court denied CHP’s motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that CHP cannot be the special employer of an FSP tow truck driver as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Court of Appeal erred by ruling that FSP statutes categorically bar CHP from acting as a special employer; and (2) the language of the statutory scheme does not support a finding that CHP is the special employer of FSP tow truck drivers, but this conclusion does not eliminate the possibility that CHP might act as a special employer in particular circumstances. View "State ex rel. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Mason Mauldin, an employee of Central Flying Service, Inc. (CFS), was killed when the plane he was flying during the course of his employment crashed. Mauldin’s estate (the Estate) filed a wrongful-death complaint against CFS and Mauldin’s supervisor (collectively, Petitioners), alleging intentional misconduct, respondeat superior, wrongful death, and survival. The Estate then amended its complaint to raise a claim challenging the constitutionality of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act. Petitioners moved to dismiss the Estate’s complaint because of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting that the Estate’s exclusive remedy was provided by the Act. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the circuit court from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the complaint. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the circuit court was wholly without jurisdiction over the Estate’s complaint, as (1) Petitioners were entitled to immunity from tort liability for the Estate’s claims against them; and (2) in order to challenge the constitutionality of the act, the Estate must demonstrate that the Act applies to it, and the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act. View "Central Flying Serv. Inc. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Lucious Primas was injured while driving a prison work-detail van owned by the City of Milledgeville. The van was leased to the Georgia Department of Corrections but pursuant to contract, the City was responsible for maintaining the vehicle and purchasing insurance policies. On the day of the accident, as Primas approached an intersection, the brake line failed. Primas was able to steer the car off the road, but he was injured when he collided with a utility pole. Primas sued the City, alleging it was negligent by failing to inspect and maintain the vehicle’s brake lines. The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment in which it claimed the maintenance and inspection of a brake line was a discretionary act for which its sovereign immunity had not been waived. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Primas’ claim against the City was barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity because the alleged negligent act was a discretionary act for which sovereign immunity had not been waived under Georgia law. Because the Supreme Court found that the proper analysis was not applied, it vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "Primas v. City of Milledgeville" on Justia Law

Ted Boroujerdi’s home and yard were flooded with sewage that backed onto his property in February 2009. Boroujerdi sued the City of Starkville, alleging that he had suffered property damage and personal injuries as a result of the City’s negligent maintenance of its sewage system. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the maintenance of the sewage system is a discretionary function and that the City was immune from suit pursuant to statute and Supreme Court precedent, "Fortenberry v. City of Jackson," (71 So. 3d 1196 (Miss. 2011)). Boroujerdi appealed, arguing that the maintenance of the sewage system was ministerial and the City is not immune from suit, that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate, and that this Court should overrule its plurality opinion in Fortenberry. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. Recently, in "Brantley v. City of Horn Lake," (152 So. 3d 1106 (Miss. 2014)), the Supreme Court overhauled its analysis of discretionary function immunity. Accordingly, the Court revisited the issue of sewage-system maintenance as a discretionary function. The Court held that, while the overall function of maintaining a sewage system may be discretionary, certain narrower functions and duties involved with sewage maintenance may be rendered ministerial through applicable statutes, regulations, and/or ordinances. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case back to the trial court for plaintiff to address whether his premises flooded as a result of the City’s fulfilling or its failing to fulfill a ministerial function or duty. View "Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville" on Justia Law

The gas company found stray voltage on Wilson’s gas meter the year after she moved into her house, and again two years later. Edison paid for measures that virtually eliminated the voltage on the meter. After Wilson remodeled her bathroom, she began felt low levels of electricity in her shower, which had metal pipes and a drain connected to the ground. Edison offered to replace the metal pipes with plastic, to eliminate the voltage in her shower, but Wilson refused and insisted that Edison eliminate all stray voltage on her property. A jury found in favor of Wilson on claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and nuisance, and awarded $1,050,000 in compensatory damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeal held that the Public Utilities Commission has not exercised its authority to adopt a policy regarding the issues in the lawsuit, and, therefore, does not have exclusive jurisdiction over Wilson’s claims. Wilson, however, failed to present sufficient evidence to support her IIED and negligence claims, or to support an award of punitive damages. The verdict on the nuisance claim cannot stand because the court refused to give Edison’s proffered instruction regarding causation of Wilson’s physical symptoms. The jury relied upon irrelevant evidence. View "Wilson v. Southern Cal. Edison Co." on Justia Law

Yvonne Lovett was employed as a security guard for Delta Regional Medical Center. While on duty, Lovett slipped and fell. As a result of her fall, Lovett experienced injuries to her back and to her right knee. Months after returning to work at Delta, Lovett experienced dizziness and weakness and sought treatment. Subsequently, Lovett was diagnosed as having suffered a mini-stroke. Delta covered the costs of Lovett's related medical treatments and paid her disability benefits during the time in which she could not work. Lovett filed two workers' compensation claims based on the two events, which were consolidated. The administrative judge found certain subsequent medical expenses were not related to her employment and would not be covered. Both parties sought review by the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission. After review, the Supreme Court found that substantial evidence supported the Commission's finding that Lovett did not receive a thirty percent loss of wage-earning capacity. However, when the Commission reversed the administrative judge's finding, it failed to then consider Lovett's functional loss. The case was remanded for the Commission to conduct findings on Lovett's functional loss; the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission in all other respects. View "Lovett v. Delta Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

The law firm sued, alleging that it agreed to act as co-counsel with defendant on workers’ compensation claims; plaintiff was to receive 45% of fees recovered and defendant would receive 55%. After the cases settled, defendant refused to pay plaintiff its share of the attorney fees. Plaintiff attached an attorney-client agreement, signed by plaintiff, defendant, and the clients, describing the allocation of responsibilities and fees. Defendant argued that under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305/16a(J), the Commission was to hear “[a]ny and all disputes regarding attorney’s fees.” The circuit court found plaintiff’s complaint sought recovery based on a referral agreement, that the claims based on that agreement did not fall within the Act, denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, and entered judgment for plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court holding that the Commission’s authority does not extend to “issues concerning a breach of a referral agreement delineating the percentage of the awarded fee that should be allotted to the attorney who represented the claimant before the Commission and the attorney who referred the claimant to that attorney,” but is limited to hearing attorney fee disputes “concerning the amount of fees to be awarded to those who represent clients before the Commission.” View "Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito" on Justia Law