Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Kathy Inwards was injured while employed as an assembler by Bobcat. WSI accepted liability for her claim and awarded Inwards vocational rehabilitation benefits to assist her in returning to work. In early June 2011, WSI issued a notice of intention to discontinue benefits ("NOID") stating her disability benefits would end then convert to retraining benefits. She had 30 days to request reconsideration of the decision. WSI issued a formal order requiring Inwards to "enter into training at Hutchinson Community College, Hutchinson, Kansas, in the Business Management & Entrepreneurship AAS program." Inwards requested reconsideration of the vocational rehabilitation plan, but attended two college courses during the summer of 2011 in accordance with the plan. Inwards complained to her physician that she was having increased pain as a result of her course work. Although Inwards registered for fall courses at the college, she withdrew from them. In October 2011, WSI issued a NOID to Inwards stating "[t]here is no medical evidence that supports your professed inability to attend the classes as outlined in the administrative order dated June 27, 2011. You are now considered to be in non-compliance with vocational rehab." Inwards timely requested reconsideration of this NOID, and on January 13, 2012, WSI issued a formal order suspending Inwards' rehabilitation benefits based on her noncompliance with the rehabilitation plan. Inwards timely requested a hearing to challenge WSI's finding of noncompliance and suspension of benefits. The ALJ reversed WSI's January 13, 2012 order suspending benefits for noncompliance with the vocational rehabilitation plan. WSI appealed to district court and Inwards moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because WSI failed to serve the notice of appeal and specification of errors on Inwards and her employer. The court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding Inwards had no standing to object to defective service on her employer and there was good cause to excuse WSI's mistake about recently mandated court electronic filing requirements. The court reversed the ALJ's decision, concluding the finding of good cause was "not supported by law," and reinstated WSI's January 13, 2012 order of noncompliance. The Supreme Court concluded the ALJ erred as a matter of law in ruling Inwards had good cause for failing to comply with a retraining program because WSI's previous order requiring Inwards to participate in the retraining program had been appealed and had not been finally resolved at the time she withdrew from the retraining program. The Court affirmed the district court judgment reversing the ALJ's decision and reinstating WSI's order of noncompliance. View "Inwards v. WSI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the widow of the deceased, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims that individual defendants used excessive force against her husband and that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment as to all of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that the record presented genuine issues of material fact from which a jury could conclude that excessive force was used against the husband. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider in the first instance whether any or all of the individual defendants may proceed to trial on a theory of direct liability for use of force or, in the alternative, on a theory of bystander liability. The district court should also consider whether individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in regards to the deliberate indifference claim and the municipal liability claim for failing to provide adequate training. View "Kitchen v. Dallas County Texas, et al." on Justia Law

Seventy-year-old James Higginbotham was employed by Industrial Contractors, Inc. ("ICI") as a welder and pipefitter in May 2010 when he sustained an injury to his left rotator cuff. The medical records demonstrated that Higginbotham's injury arose out of and in the course of his work for ICI. Prior to his injury, Higginbotham made $34.61 per hour, but only worked part time. He often traveled to work sites some distance from his home near Hazen, including a site north of Mandan. Since his injury, Higginbotham was no longer able to make the trip from Hazen to Bismarck without stopping, and he could no longer perform welding or pipefitting work. Higginbotham lived in a mobile home near Hazen, approximately 70 miles from Bismarck and 80 miles from Minot. He indicated he was having difficulty paying bills, which he did not have before the injury, and he wanted to maintain the lifestyle he had prior to his injury. Following left rotator cuff surgery, WSI referred Higginbotham to vocational rehabilitation with Kim Hornberger, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, who identified the first appropriate rehabilitation option for Higginbotham and developed a vocational consultant's report ("VCR"). The VCR concluded that it was appropriate for Higginbotham to return to an occupation in the statewide job pool suited to his education, experience, and marketable skills: cashier, telephone sales representative, gaming dealer, and greeter, and the expected income of $332 per week exceeded 90% of Higginbotham's pre-injury income of $227 per week. WSI approved the vocational plan and notified Higginbotham that it intended to discontinue his benefits. Higginbotham asked for reconsideration, and WSI issued an order affirming the rehabilitation plan and denying further disability benefits. Higginbotham appealed, and an ALJ affirmed the WSI order. Higginbotham appealed the ALJ's decision, and the district court affirmed. Higginbotham now appeals the district court judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Higginbotham v. WSI" on Justia Law

U.S. Border Patrol Agent Mesa, standing in the United States, shot and killed Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican citizen, standing in Mexico. Hernandez's family filed suit against the United States, Agent Mesa, and Agent Mesa's supervisors, alleging a number of claims. Hernandez was gathered with a group of friends on the Mexican side of a cement culvert that separated the two countries, playing a game that involved running up the incline of the culvert, touching the barbed-wire fence, and then running back down the incline. Agent Mesa fired at least two shots at Hernandez, one of which struck him in the face and killed him. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the United States where the United States has not waived sovereign immunity for any of the claims asserted against it; affirmed the judgment of the district court in favor of the supervisors where plaintiffs failed to establish that either supervisor was personally responsible for the alleged constitutional violations; and reversed the judgment in favor of Agent Mesa, holding that, in light of Boumediene v. Bush, plaintiffs can assert a Fifth Amendment claim against the agent and that they have alleged sufficient facts to overcome qualified immunity. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Hernandez, et al. v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lorraine Gormley was an attorney employed by the Department of the Public Advocate, Division of Mental Health Advocacy, providing legal representation to clients involuntarily committed in state psychiatric facilities, including Ancora Psychiatric Hospital. Each ward at Ancora contained a day room in which up to forty patients could congregate. Visiting attorneys and psychiatrists also were required to use the day rooms for professional interviews. Although frequent violence occurred in the day rooms, no security guards or cameras were posted there. While at Ancora, Gormley met for the first time with her client B.R., a 21-year-old woman committed sixteen days earlier for a “psychotic disorder” that induced hallucinations. At the start of the interview in the hospital’s crowded and chaotic day room, B.R. violently attacked Gormley in the presence of hospital staff. Gormley filed a civil action against Ancora’s CEO, LaTanya Wood-El, and other government officials, in their individual capacities, under both the Federal Civil Rights Act and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, alleging that her constitutional right to be free from state-created danger was violated. On defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Gormley had presented sufficient evidence to proceed on the civil-rights claims under the state-created-danger doctrine. The court deferred deciding whether she was entitled to injunctive relief. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether injuries Gomley suffered resulted from a state-created danger that violated her substantive-due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the lawyer had a substantive-due-process right to be free from state-created dangers. Because that right was clearly established at the time the lawyer was attacked, the state official defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Gormley v. Wood-El" on Justia Law

Kelly Colvin was killed in an automobile accident while returning to Utah from a work project in Maryland. The accident occurred when Colvin was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his coworker, Joseph Giguere. Colvin’s widow and son sued Giguere, claiming that Colvin’s death was proximately caused by Giguere’s negligent driving. Giguere moved for summary judgment, asserting that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act barred this suit because the accident occurred in the course of his and Colvin’s employment. The district court agreed and granted Giguere’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the accident occurred while Colvin and Giguere were carrying out a special errand for their employer, this action was barred under the Act’s exclusive remedy provision. View "Colvin v. Giguere" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2008, defendant Eli and Bessie Cohen Foundation, doing business as Cohen Camps, hired Michael Feld to serve as a counselor at Camp Tel Noar on Sunset Lake in Hampstead, as it had done the previous summer. Prior to employing him each summer, defendant performed a criminal background check on Feld, and each time his record was clear. During the beginning of his second summer at the camp, other counselors noticed a change in Feld's personality from the prior year, including that he was more outgoing and eccentric, and that he behaved inappropriately at times. Feld has suffered from bipolar disorder for years. Feld's father spoke with the camp director and informed him that Feld could become "manic" and should be taking his medication. On the evening of July 6, Feld and a group of counselors went to a doughnut shop. While there, Feld became increasingly agitated, expressed a desire to return to the camp, and began throwing away the other counselors' unfinished food and drinks in an attempt to compel them to leave. Upon their return to the camp around midnight, Feld’s roommate reported Feld’s behavior to the boys' head counselor. Feld and his roommate then conversed with one another in their room for several hours, during which time Feld’s behavior became increasingly erratic and he demonstrated mood swings, paranoid thoughts, and delusions of grandeur. At approximately 5:00 a.m., Feld forced his way into a private residence immediately adjacent to the camp. The homeowner's wife telephoned the police and Feld ran from the premises. Plaintiff Kathleen Boulter, a Hampstead police officer, was dispatched "to detain, question and/or arrest the suspect as a result of his alleged conduct, and to investigate the home invasion complaint." As the plaintiff was interviewing the homeowner, they observed Feld running down the road naked. Plaintiff ran after Feld, repeatedly telling him to "get down on the ground." When Feld charged at her, plaintiff discharged her taser, but Feld tackled her and began to strangle her, nearly causing her to lose consciousness. The homeowner knocked Feld off plaintiff and plaintiff locked herself and the homeowner in her police cruiser to wait for backup. Feld was subsequently apprehended following a struggle with the plaintiff and two other officers who had been called to the scene. Plaintiff sued defendant and Feld to recover for injuries she suffered as she was attempting to arrest Feld, alleging negligent, reckless, and intentional misconduct. All four of the counts in her writ that pertained to defendant were based upon the assertion that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care. According to plaintiff, "as a direct, proximate, and foreseeable result of the negligence of the Defendant, . . . [she] sustained painful, serious and permanent injuries." Because the injury giving rise to plaintiff's negligence claims directly arose from the alleged "negligent conduct which created the particular occasion for [her] official engagement," the Supreme Court concluded that such claims were barred by the Firefighter's Rule. View "Boulter v. Eli & Bessie Cohen Foundation" on Justia Law

In 2005, John Block purchased property in Lewiston from Jack Streibick to develop. Block submitted an application to resubdivide the property into three residential lots, which Lewiston approved. Prior to Block's purchase of the property, Lewiston issued two separate permits to Streibick allowing him to place and grade fill in the area of those lots. In 2006, Block received permits from Lewiston to construct homes on each of the three lots. During construction of the homes, Block hired engineering firms to test compaction of the finished grade for the footings on the lots. Following the construction of the homes, Lewiston issued Block certificates of occupancy for each of the homes after conducting inspections that found the homes to be constructed in accordance with applicable building codes and standards. In April 2007, Block sold the home and property at 159 Marine View Drive. In November of that year, the owner reported a crack in the home's basement. Around that same time, settling was observed at the other two properties. In early December 2007, Block repurchased 159 from the owners. He also consulted with engineers regarding options for immediate repair to the homes. As early as February 2009, further settling problems were reported at the properties. After Lewiston inspected the properties in May following a gas leak at 153, it posted notice that the residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. Block ultimately filed a Notice of Claim for Damages with Lewiston that also named City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw as a defendant, but did not effectuate process on Lewiston and Cutshaw until ninety days had elapsed from the date he had filed the Notice of Claim. The City defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Block's claims should be dismissed because he failed to timely file a Notice of Claim with Lewiston. This first motion for summary judgment was denied because a question of material fact existed concerning whether Block reasonably should have discovered his claim against Lewiston prior to 2009. The City defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all of Block's claims against them, arguing that they were immune from liability for all of these claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and that Block could not establish that he was owed a duty. The district court granted this second summary judgment motion dismissing Block's claims based on the application of the economic loss rule. The court also held that immunity under the ITCA and failure to establish a duty provided alternate grounds for dismissal of Block's claims. Block appealed on the issue of immunity. Finding no reversible error as to that issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Block v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

In the spring of 2009, Haley Maxwell was a student at Agnes Scott College in Decatur, Georgia. Maxwell reported that she had been beaten and brutally sexually assaulted in her dorm room during the early morning hours of April 13 by a University of Tennessee graduate student named Amanda Hartley. Maxwell also told the officers that on April 27 (two weeks after the alleged attack in her dorm room) she went alone to Hartley's apartment in Knoxville, where Hartley beat her again. A reasonable investigation would have revealed that Maxwell's accusations against Hartley were demonstrably false. Instead, on April 30, without investigating the truth or falsity of Maxwell's story, officers obtained warrants for Hartley's arrest on charges of aggravated sexual battery, battery, and sexual battery. He then contacted the Knoxville Police Department to cause Hartley's arrest and extradition to Georgia. Hartley was arrested and detained in Tennessee on May 6, extradited to Georgia on May 17, and not released on bond until May 28. In December, the district attorney dismissed all charges against Hartley after a reasonable investigation uncovered evidence showing that she was not in Georgia at the time of the alleged assault in Maxwell's dorm room. In April, 2011, Hartley filed a tort lawsuit against Agnes Scott College and three of its campus police officers, alleging that the three officers were acting within the scope of their employment by the college at the relevant times. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages based on claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The officer defendants answered and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that they were entitled to immunity. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed. After considering the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA) as a whole, rather than only its definitions section, the Supreme Court disagreed with a three-judge panel of the Court of appeals that concluded the officers were entitled to immunity. "[I]t was clear from the trial court record that the Agnes Scott officers were not acting for any state government entity when they committed the alleged torts." The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' plurality opinion. View "Hartley v. Agnes Scott College" on Justia Law

The City of Midfield, Officer Jason Davis, and Sgt. Otis Brown petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor, based on State-agent immunity, on claims filed against them by Patrick Williams ("Patrick") and Elizabeth W. McElroy, as successor administratrix of the estate of Willie Lee Williams. Police engaged a suspect in a high speed chase following a traffic stop. The driver struck Patrick's vehicle. The collision caused the truck to flip over several times. Willie Lee died at the scene, and Patrick suffered severe injuries. Patrick and the estate sued the driver alleging claims of wrongful death, negligence, and wantonness. Patrick and the estate also sued the Midfield defendants, alleging various negligence claims. The Midfield defendants moved the circuit court to dismiss the claims against them, alleging, among other things, that Officer Davis and Sgt. Brown were entitled to police-officer immunity, and that because the officers were immune from suit, the claims against Midfield also failed. The circuit court denied the motion, and the Midfield defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief, which was denied in May 2012. While the Midfield defendants' first mandamus petition was pending, Patrick and the estate amended their complaint, alleging negligence per se against Midfield for the negligence of Sgt. Brown, claims of negligent supervision and training against Midfield, and claims of general negligence against Officer Davis and Sgt. Brown and, derivatively, against Midfield. In May 2013, the Midfield defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment, again arguing, among other things, that Officer Davis and Sgt. Brown were immune from suit and that the claims against Midfield were too. The circuit court denied the motion, and the Midfield defendants appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in denying the Midfield defendants' motion for summary judgment, granted their petition, and issued the writ. View "Williams v. City of Midfield" on Justia Law