Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Zachariah Stennis sued Moss Point School District (MPSD) and several school-district officials for injuries she sustained in an off campus assault by a fellow student and the student’s mother. MPSD filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss, which were denied by the circuit court. Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, MPSD filed this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the circuit court erroneously found that MPSD’s duty of ordinary care to provide a safe school environment applied in this case. However, the student handbook evidence presented at trial arguably imposed a duty on the school to report the threat. Based on the record before it, the Supreme Court could not make that determination. As such, the case was remanded for consideration of whether the student handbook imposed such a duty. View "Moss Point School Districtv. Stennis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against Defendants, the construction manager and owner of a building at a construction site, after a large, flat object fell and injured his hand. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, a violation of N.Y. Lab. Law 241(6). Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, arguing the form that injured Plaintiff’s hand was not subject to the safety requirements of Industrial Code N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a). The Court of Appeals remitted the matter for further proceedings for a hearing on whether the object as issue was a “form” within the meaning of the Industrial Code. After a hearing, Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s section 241(6) claim, concluding that the form at issue did not come within the coverage of the regulation or section 241(6). The Appellate Division reversed and granted summary judgment to Plaintiff. The Court of Appeals accepted certification and concluded that the Appellate Division’s order should be affirmed, holding that the language of N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. 12,23-2.2(a) could sensibly be applied to the form that fell on Plaintiff’s hand. View "Morris v. Pavarini Constr." on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the state recreational use statute. Susan Camicia was injured when she was thrown from her bicycle after colliding with a wooden post on a portion of an Interstate I-90 bicycle trail in the City of Mercer Island. The City moved for summary judgment based on statutory immunity granted for unintentional injuries to landowners who allowed members of the public to use land for outdoor recreation (without charging a fee for the use). The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the recreational immunity could not be determined as a matter of law in this case because there were disputed facts as to whether the trial in question served a recreational purpose as opposed to a transportation purpose. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court’s reasoning and affirmed its decision. View "Camicia v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Thomas and Lori Likens filed a complaint against Petitioners in the circuit court, alleging several claims, including the allegation that Skyline had negligently designed and built their manufactured home. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Likenses were required to file an administrative complaint with the West Virginia Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Board (the Board) as a prerequisite to the filing of their civil complaint. The circuit court denied Petitioners’ motion to dismiss, concluding that W. Va. Code 21-9-11a did not require the Likenses to first file an administrative complaint seeking relief with the Board before asserting their claim seeking damages. Petitioners requested the Supreme Court to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing its order. The Court granted the requested writ, concluding that W. Va. Code 21-9-11a(b) requires an aggrieved party to file an administrative complaint with the Board before he or she may file a civil lawsuit for monetary damages. View " State ex rel. Skyline Corp. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former captain of a village fire department, filed this action against the department, its fire chief, and the board of fire commissioners (collectively, Defendants) after the board chose to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff alleged political discrimination in violation of the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983, retaliation in violation of the Massachusetts Whistleblower Act, and tortious interference with contractual relations. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all counts. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants presented legitimate, business-related grounds for their employment decisions, and Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the proffered explanations were pretextual. View "Pierce v. Cotuit Fire Dist." on Justia Law

Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. appealed the appellate court's decision to reverse an Industrial Claim Appeals Office decision disallowing respondent Elaine Loofbourrow's award of temporary disability benefits. The ICAO concluded that once respondent's treating physician placed her at maximum medical improvement, temporary total disability benefits could not be awarded for the injury for which she was initially treated. The appellate court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, such an independent medical exam was not a prerequisite to temporary total disability benefits. After its review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court was correct in its decision: because a determination of maximum medical improvement has no statutory significance with regard to injuries resulting in loss of no more than three days (or shifts) of work time, respondent's award of temporary total disability benefits was not barred by her failure to first seek a division-sponsored independent medical examination. View "Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. v. Loofbourrow" on Justia Law

A Jefferson County Sheriff Deputy was transporting two juveniles from a court hearing. The two were seated in the rear of the transport van, handcuffed. En route, another driver allegedly turned into an intersection without yielding and collided with the transport van. As a result of the collision, the juveniles sustained multiple injuries. The juveniles sued the County, alleging the deputy transporting them was negligent. The County claimed it was immune from suit. The trial court denied the County's motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. Upon review of the County's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in finding allegations of negligence alone were sufficient to overcome the statutory grant of immunity and the presumption of good faith afforded to law enforcement. The Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Young v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

Warren Parsons appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance Fund ("WSI") decision that denied his claim for workers' compensation benefits. Parsons applied for workers' compensation benefits from WSI, alleging he sustained an injury to his left shoulder and neck while working for Ames Construction. He claimed he developed pain at the base of his neck and into his left shoulder from hitting the seat belt repeatedly while driving the dump truck on rough roads. Parsons argued his cervical spine and left shoulder injuries were "compensable injuries" by law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded WSI erred in determining Parsons' injury was not a compensable injury and in denying his claim for benefits. View "Parsons v. WSI" on Justia Law

Chad Jones petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his motion for a summary judgment in an action filed against him by Latonya Hall, individually and as mother and next friend of Demetrius Hall, a minor, and Maurice Caffie, individually (collectively referred to as "Hall"), and to enter a summary judgment in his favor on the basis of State-agent immunity. Jones was employed as a physical-education teacher at Gresham Middle School and Demetrius Hall and Michael Boyd were students. A fight between the young men broke out during a school basketball game. According to Demetrius, he was guarding Boyd tightly when Boyd became angry and threw the basketball at him, striking him in the face with the ball. Demetrius responded by pushing Boyd and throwing a punch. After the two exchanged insults, another student unexpectedly shoved Demetrius into Boyd, and Boyd responded by "slamming" Demetrius into some nearby metal stairs and striking him in the head. Demetrius was seriously injured as the result of the altercation. Jones contends that he was at the opposite end of the gym when the altercation occurred. Hall sued Jones, Sokol, and Sammy Queen, (another school physical-education teacher) asserting claims of negligence and wantonness and alleging that the defendants had breached their duty to reasonably supervise Demetrius and Boyd by leaving them unattended for an extended length of time. Concluding that Jones failed to demonstrate that he had a clear legal right to the relief sought, the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of mandamus. View " Hall v. Jones" on Justia Law

The County of Kauai Planning Commission approved a subdivision application for a Trust's development of land in Koloa, Kauai. During the Commission's consideration of the application, the parties assumed that a historic road (Road) that the Trust needed to breach to provide access into the subdivision belonged to the County of Kauai. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint alleging several claims against Defendants, including breaches of the public trust. Plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint because he discovered that the road belonged to the State and not the County and asserted two additional claims against the Trust for allegedly breaching the Road. The circuit court dismissed the claims, concluding (1) because the State had not given its approval to breach the Road, the issues raised in Plaintiff's complaint were not ripe; and (2) even if Plaintiff had claims that were ripe and severable, the court had the discretion to dismiss the claims in the interest of judicial economy. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's final judgment, holding (1) all of Plaintiff's claims were ripe for adjudication; and (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing claims on the basis of judicial economy. Remanded. View "Blake v. County of Kauai Planning Comm'n" on Justia Law