Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two Chicago firefighters suffered duty-related injuries in the 1980s and later died. Their widows each received an ordinary widow’s pension from the Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Retirement Benefit Fund of Chicago. The two widows were later awarded annuities available to widows of firemen who died in the line of duty, retroactive to the date of death of each spouse, with interest, because the injuries were permanent and had prevented them from ever returning to active duty. The widows claimed that the calculation of their annuities (based on the current salary of the position last held by the deceased) should include duty availability pay, which is generally intended to compensate firefighters for being available for duty. This type of compensation was created in the 1990s, after these firemen’s accidents, and neither ever received it. Their argument, based on Pension Code language added in 2004, was rejected by the Board and the trial court. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the denial. If duty availability pay may be used for pension calculation, it must be pay that was actually received by the firemen. View "Hooker v. Ret. Bd. of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago" on Justia Law

Ramage, born in 1933, worked for Island Creek for 28 years, five years underground and 23 years on the surface. In 2007 he sought black lung benefits. While the claim was pending, Congress revived a statutory rebuttable presumption that a coal miner who worked in an underground coal mine for 15 years and suffers from a total respiratory or pulmonary disability is presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4), applicable to pending claims filed after January 1, 2005. The ALJ noted that x-rays did not show pneumoconiosis, that Ramage could not complete a pulmonary function test due to a tracheostomy, and that arterial blood-gas studies were qualifying under the federal standards. The ALJ summarized the medical opinions of five doctors, including one who emphasized that it was impossible to distinguish between the damage due to coal dust as opposed to the damage due to smoking. The ALJ awarded benefits and the Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review, holding that the ALJ’s determinations were reasoned and reasonable and that the legislative provisions creating the presumption are self-executing.View "Island Creek KY Mining v. Ramage" on Justia Law

A Caterpillar worker developed epicondylitis, an inflammation of tendons near the elbow. A Department of Labor regulation requires employers to report injuries if “the work environment either caused or contributed to the resulting condition.” The employee worked in a packing department, placing items in boxes for shipping. Caterpillar convened a panel, with three board‐certified specialists in musculoskeletal disorders. Relying on guides issued by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the American Medical Association that repetitive motion plus force (weight or impact) can cause epicondylitis, and that pronation plus force also can cause the condition, but that repetitive motion alone does not, the panel found that work could not have caused the employee’s epicondylitis. Although Caterpillar presented several witnesses, the ALJ accepted the view of the DOL’s single witness, which ignored epidemiological studies and Caterpillar’s experience. The Seventh Circuit remanded. On remand, the ALJ again held that Caterpillar must pay a penalty for failing to report an injury as work‐related and OSHA declined to review the decision. Caterpillar has filed another petition for judicial review. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Prevailing views, and the data behind them, must be considered; they cannot be ignored on the opinion of any witness. View "Caterpillar Logistics, Inc. v. Soli" on Justia Law

The City of Seattle appealed an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed a $12.75 million verdict in favor of former Seattle fire fighter Mark Jones. Jones was injured when he fell fifteen feet through a station "pole hole." The City argued that the trial court erred by excluding three late-disclosed defense witnesses without first conducting the necessary inquiry under "Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance," (93 3 P .2d. 1036 (1997)) and by denying the City's motion to vacate the judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence. After review, the Supreme Court found that though the trial court erred in excluding testimony by the late-disclosed witnesses, the Court agreed with both parties that the error was harmless. Further, the Court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the City's motion to vacate. Therefore the trial court was affirmed. View "Jones v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment when he was struck by a sheet of plywood that fell from a building under construction. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries and then filed this personal injury action. Thereafter, the insurance carrier for Plaintiff's employer filed a motion to discontinue Plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits. An administrative law judge found Plaintiff had no further causally-related disability and that he had no further need for treatment. The Workers' Compensation Board Panel (Board) affirmed. Subsequently, in this negligence action, Defendants moved for an order estopping Plaintiff from relitigating the issue of causally-related disability. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the determination of the Board was one of ultimate fact and thus did not preclude Plaintiff from litigating the issue of his ongoing disability. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants failed to establish that the issue decided in the workers' compensation proceeding was identical to that presented in this negligence action. View "Auqui v. Seven Thirty One Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Thomas and Marie Baptie, administrators of the estate of their son, John Baptie, appealed a superior court's decision granting defendant and former police officer Aron McNeil, summary judgment dismissing their negligence case against him. Specifically, plaintiffs argued the officer was liable for the death of their son as the result of the negligent investigation of their complaint against defendant Jonathon Bruno, the man who murdered their son four days after they made a complaint. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's conclusions that defendant was entitled to qualified official immunity from plaintiffs' lawsuit and that, they could not prove all of the elements of their negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims. View "Baptie v. Bruno" on Justia Law

Sherry Walker was denied disability benefits by the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS). The Circuit Court reversed PERS’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, reinstating PERS’ denial of benefits. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded PERS’ decision to deny Walker’s request for regular disability benefits was unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed part of the appellate court's decision and reversed the Circuit Court's decision, and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in Walker’s favor on her regular disability benefits claim. View "Public Employees' Retirement System v. Walker" on Justia Law

NorthWestern Energy (NWE) disconnected electric service to Plaintiff's residence based on an outstanding balance on Plaintiff's utility bill. Plaintiff filed an action alleging property damage due to NWE's negligence and negligence per se, claiming that the termination of his electric service caused his furnace to fail, which led to water pipes freezing and bursting. NWE filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies before the Public Service Commission (PSC). The district court granted NWE's motion and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the PSC had no authority to adjudicate Plaintiff's damage claim, and a negligence action seeking damages could be maintained against the power company in district court. View "Schuster v. NorthWestern Energy Co." on Justia Law

Defendant-Respondent Russell Griffeth, a licensed physical therapist, operated a clinic in Idaho Falls. He received no training as a contractor and was never licensed as a contractor. He did, however, act as a general contractor in the construction of his two homes. He organized and supervised various subcontractors. In early 2009, Griffeth decided to remodel his physical therapy clinic by constructing an addition to the existing building. Griffeth intended to be the general contractor for the project, but the city required a licensed commercial contractor. Consequently, Griffeth hired Bryan Robinson, a friend with construction experience, to serve as the general contractor. Robinson obtained a commercial contractor license for the project. Near the end of the project, Robinson hired Claimant Geff Stringer as a carpenter. As the clinic project neared completion, the construction workers used a hoist attached to the roof to move heavy beams into position in the attic. Unfortunately, on or near the last day of the project, the ceiling collapsed, and a beam fell on Stringer. The impact from the beam fractured Stringer's left ankle. At the time of the accident, Robinson did not have worker's compensation coverage. Stringer filed worker's compensation complaints against both Robinson and Griffeth. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Commission held that Robinson was Stringer's direct employer and that Griffeth was his category one statutory employer. Because Robinson did not pay worker's compensation benefits to Stringer, Griffeth, as the statutory employer, normally would be liable for such benefits. However, the Commission held that Griffeth was exempt from worker's compensation liability because Stringer's employment with Griffeth was "casual" under I.C. 72-212(2). Stringer appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Stringer v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Claimant-Appellant Dallas Clark appealed an Industrial Commission order that denied her workers' compensation benefits. Claimant worked for Shari's Management Corporation as an experienced server. During a graveyard shift, she suffered a herniated disc in her back while lifting a heavy tray onto a high shelf. She would later be diagnosed with sciatica attributed to the lifting injury from work. Shari's completed a Report of Injury, interviewing Claimant in the process. The investigator testified that Claimant attributed the injury as "standing wrong" at a salad bar, which left her unable to lift the tray. The Commission concluded after a hearing that Claimant was unable to prove an industrial accident had occurred. The Supreme Court agreed with the Commission and affirmed its order. View "Clark v. Shari's Management Corp" on Justia Law