Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in this case to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that the public duty doctrine insulated the City of Doraville from liability arising from the response of a Doraville Police Department ("DPD") officer to a vehicle emergency on an interstate highway which culminated in a multi-vehicle accident injuring Kenyatta Stevenson. Stevenson sued the City and a DPD Officer, asserting that the officer was negligent in failing to redirect traffic away from Stevenson's disabled car and in causing traffic to move in Stevenson's direction by engaging his vehicle's blue emergency lights while stopped near the outer lane of the highway behind and to the right of Stevenson. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants, finding official immunity shielded the officer from liability and that the public duty doctrine precluded Stevenson's claims against the City. Stevenson appealed, arguing that the public duty doctrine did not apply to his case because he alleged affirmative acts of negligence and that, even if the doctrine did apply, he fell within the special relationship exception identified in "City of Rome v. Jordan," (426 SE2d 861) (1993)). The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding Stevenson's arguments lacked merit. Although it appeared that the appellate court based its rejection of Stevenson's first argument on a finding that "there [was] nothing in the record . . . showing any active negligence on the part of the officer," the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, but wrote to clarify the public duty doctrine. The doctrine "does not apply to limit liability where a claim of active negligence (misfeasance), rather than a mere failure to act (nonfeasance) is alleged." View "Stevenson v. City of Doraville" on Justia Law

While working for Employer, Employee filed notice of a workers' compensation claim related to a lower back injury he received during the course of his employment. Employee was discharged approximately four years later pursuant to a termination agreement that provided that he agreed to release Employer from any and all workers' compensation claims. Employer later brought an action against Employee, alleging civil theft, fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion based on Defendant's admission that he never intended to release his workers' compensation claim. Employee counterclaimed, claiming that Employer's cause of action was in retaliation for Employee's decision to exercise his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. Employer filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim, asserting that the doctrine of absolute immunity shielded Employer from the counterclaim. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss, holding that an employer's right to seek redress for its alleged grievances in court does not outweigh an employee's interest in exercising his rights under the Act without fear of retaliation by his employer, and therefore, absolute immunity did not shield Employer from Employee's counterclaim. View "MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti" on Justia Law

Appellant Annette Shoap sustained a work-related injury in the nature of a left shoulder injury while working as an employee of Phoenixville Hospital. She began receiving temporary total disability benefits pursuant to a Notice of Compensation Payable dated 2003. The treatment for Appellant’s injury included three surgeries and physical therapy. In 2007, the employer filed a modification petition alleging both that Appellant’s physical condition had improved and that work was generally available to her within her physical restrictions in the relevant geographical area, as demonstrated by two labor market surveys. Appellant denied the material allegations of Employer’s petition, and a hearing was held before a Workers’ Compensation Judge. After the WCJ ruled in the employer's favor, Appellant unsuccessfully appealed to the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board and Commonwealth Court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant asserted that the Commonwealth Court erred by concluding that “substantial gainful employment existed” for purposes of granting a modification of her compensation benefits pursuant to Section 306(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act, despite the fact that her application for the specific jobs involved failed to result in any offers of employment. Secondarily, Appellant argued that the Commonwealth Court, even if correct in its interpretation of Section 306(b), erred by not remanding the case for further evidentiary development based on its interpretation of Section 306(b), which Appellant contended represented a change in the standard for evaluating cases under that statute. After careful review, the Supreme Court agreed with Appellant's second contention, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Phoenixville Hospital v. WCAB (Shoap, Aplt)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed personal injury and wrongful death claims against the United States and Coast Guard under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA), 46 U.S.C. 30901-30918. Plaintiff and her husband fell overboard their boat and her husband subsequently died of drowning. The court concluded that the Coast Guard neither increased the danger facing plaintiff and her husband nor induced reliance on the part of either plaintiff, her husband, or a third party. Accordingly, plaintiff could not prove that the Coast Guard breached its duty to her or her deceased husband, and the district court properly entered summary judgment on plaintiff's tort claims. The court also found that the rulings on the issues of spoliation and the timeliness of the motion reflected proper exercises of the district court's discretion and the court affirmed as to these issues. The court also affirmed the district court's ruling that the Coast Guard's response to plaintiff's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request satisfied its duty under that Act. View "Turner v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), alleging that the Army was negligent and therefore liable for an Army Specialist's sexual assault against plaintiff. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government, concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that the sexual assault was foreseeable under North Carolina law, and thus the Army did not breach a duty owed to plaintiff as landlord of Fort Bragg; the Army did not have a special relationship with the assailant for purposes of an FTCA claim; the government did not breach a voluntarily assumed duty to plaintiff; and, because discovery would serve no purpose, it was not error for the district court to reach the merits of plaintiff's claim at this stage of the litigation. The court also concluded that, although the government's ability to control a tortfeasor must be independent of the tortfeasor's status as a government employee, knowledge of the tortfeasor's propensity for violence or criminal history did not, per se nullify an FTCA claim. Accordingly, the district court's dismissal on this alternative basis was erroneous. View "Durden v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Greenway v. Northside Hosp., Inc." (730 SE2d 742) (2012)), to determine if the appellate court erred in its evaluation of Deputy Sheriff Terry Roper's claim that he was entitled to official immunity from liability in connection with the euthanization of two dogs. Greenway was taken by ambulance from his home to a hospital; two dogs remained at the home. While Greenway was in the hospital's emergency department, and uncertain whether he would live, he was pressured to sign an “Owner Release Form” regarding his dogs; the form was given to him by Roper and authorized Forsyth County Animal Control to destroy the dogs. At the time he signed the form, Greenway was unable to read it without his eyeglasses and understood that his dogs were going to the Humane Society; the dogs were euthanized before Greenway was able to recover from his illness and take further action. Greenway sued Roper, the hospital, the Sheriff, and the County's animal shelter provider. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed as to Roper, the hospital, and the animal shelter operator. As to Roper, the Court of Appeals found that the doctrine of official immunity insulated him from liability from his decision to ask Greenway to sign the form, but not from his execution of that decision. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed that court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Roper v. Greenway" on Justia Law

The Bessemer City Board of Education and Davis Middle School petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss the claim filed against them by John Doe, a minor, by and through his next friend, W.A. ("Doe"), and to enter an order dismissing with prejudice the claim against petitioners. The matter stemmed from a claim of negligence Doe raised against the school; Doe claimed he had been sexually abused by an unidentified person as a result of the negligence of petitioners. The Circuit Court denied petitioners motion based on qualified immunity grounds. After review, the Supreme Court found that petitioners demonstrated they were entitled to absolute immunity from Doe's action against them. Therefore the Court granted their petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Bessemer City Board of Education" on Justia Law

Jose Hernandez, Jr., and Salvador Hernandez were killed by a motorist while they were performing road construction in Oklahoma. Their representative sued their employer, Duit Construction Company, and the motorist and alleged a substantive due process claims against multiple Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) employees. All ODOT employees (except the director and the resident engineer on the construction project) were dismissed by the district court. The question before the Tenth Circuit in this case was whether the two remaining employees were entitled to qualified immunity. The district judge said no; but because the alleged facts revealed no constitutional violation, the Tenth Circuit reversed. View "Hernandez v. Ridley, et al" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to address two issues: (1) whether a political-subdivision employer may be required to provide workers' compensation benefits to an off-duty employee injured while providing services to a private entity; and (2) whether, under the facts presented, the claimant's salaries from his full-time employment as a deputy sheriff and his part-time job as a security officer may be combined when determining the amount of benefits to which the employee is entitled. Respondent-claimant John David Waldenville was injured while acting as a security guard for petitioner Cattlemen's Steakhouse, Inc. Initially, Cattlemen's contended that Waldenville was an independent contractor but later conceded that it had workers' compensation coverage for him through their insurer. Nevertheless, the employer continued to assert that Waldenville was an employee of respondent, Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department when injured. The trial court determined that: Cattlemen's was the employing entity when the employment-related injury occurred; Oklahoma County should be dismissed pursuant to 85 O.S. 2001 sec. 2b(G); Cattlemen's was estopped to dispute employee status based on the payment of workers' compensation premiums associated with Waldenville's employment; no evidence existed indicating that the employee was acting in his official capacity as a Deputy Sheriff at the time of the incident; and because the duties that Waldenville was carrying out at the time of his injury were the same or similar to those he executed as a Deputy Sheriff, the claimant's salaries were to be combined for establishment of weekly rates. The Supreme Court held that: (1) the "plain, clear, unmistakable, unambiguous, mandatory, and unequivocal" language of 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 313(G) mandated that private employers, hiring off-duty municipal employees, alone shall be responsible for the payment of workers' compensation benefits arising from incidents occurring during the hours of actual employment by the private employer; and (2) under the facts of this case, claimant was engaged in the same, or substantially similar, employment to that of his profession as a Major with the Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department when he was injured, warranting the combination of salaries for purposes of determining workers' compensation benefits. View "Cattlemen's Steakhouse, Inc. v. Waldenville" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stephen Dichiara, Jr. appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendants Sanborn Regional School District and Robert Ficker on municipal immunity grounds. Plaintiff tried out for the high school basketball team; Ficker was the team's coach. At the tryout, plaintiff played in a 'loose ball' drill when he collided with another player and suffered substantial injury to his arm. Plaintiff sued for negligence and respondeat superior liability of the school district. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court misinterpreted the applicable statute when it held that a municipality is only liable for negligence arising out of the ownership, occupation, maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle or premises. Essentially, the plaintiff maintained that, under RSA 507-B:2, a governmental unit is liable for bodily injuries “caused by its fault or by fault attributable to it,” regardless of any connection to a motor vehicle or premises. While most personal injury actions are unlikely to involve a nexus with a premises or vehicle, there are circumstances under which a plaintiff could recover for a personal injury under RSA 507-B:2. This case did not fall within that exception. Therefore the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. View "Dichiara, Jr. v. Sanborn Regional High School" on Justia Law