Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Two police officers and the City of Birmingham petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its judgment denying the petitioners' motion for a summary judgment and to enter a judgment in their favor based on State-agent immunity. Officers with the Birmingham Police Department (BPD) responded to a vehicle fire, as did James Higginbotham, a firefighter employed by the Birmingham Fire and Rescue Service (BFRS). The officers sustained injuries as a result of an accident between the first responders. The injured officers sued Higginbotham, the City, and several fictitiously named defendants, asserting claims of negligence and wantonness against Higginbotham and vicarious liability against the City. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the petitioners demonstrated a clear legal right to a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and issue the writ directing the circuit court to enter a summary judgment for one of the officers and for the City as to its liability based on the claims against that officer. View "In re: Whatley v. Higginbotham" on Justia Law

On January 21, 2009, Amburgey sought treatment for his persistent pneumonia from Dr. Alam at a Whitesburg, Kentucky clinic run by MCHC. He died that same day from a severe allergic reaction to an intravenous contrast dye that was administered in preparation for a CT scan, despite an allergy notation in his chart. His wife, Delma, sued Dr. Alam, MCHC, and, because MCHC is an agency of the federal government, the United States. On January 20, 2011, Delma mailed the required form for asserting a wrongful-death claim against the government to MCHC. MCHC received the form four days later and in turn forwarded it to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the appropriate federal agency for notification purposes under 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The district court dismissed the claim as untimely. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Delma’s claim did not accrue until after she had received the autopsy report in April 2009 View "Amburgey v. United States" on Justia Law

Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") appealed a district court's judgment reversing an administrative law judge's ("ALJ") order, which affirmed WSI's order denying Ronald Kershaw's work injury claim. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in reversing the administrative law judge's order. The ALJ's decision was reinstated. View "Kershaw v. WSI" on Justia Law

Shealeen Hillerson, as "best friend" to T.D., a minor child, and T.D. appealed from a summary judgment dismissing their negligence lawsuit against the Missouri Valley Family YMCA for injuries T.D. suffered in a near-drowning accident while participating in a YMCA summer program. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the waiver of liability signed by T.D.'s mother was ambiguous, a question of fact existed as to the intent of the parties. Accordingly, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hillerson v. Bismarck Public Schools" on Justia Law

Three motorists sued the Mississippi Department of Transportation after their vehicles collided with a pine tree that had fallen across the highway. The Department filed a motion to dismiss asserting immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), and the trial court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The motorists appealed. Finding that the Department’s motion to dismiss should not have been granted, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Little v. Mississippi Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Paul Chan Kim murdered his partner, Baerbel K. Roznowski, after officer Andrew Rensing of the Federal Way Police Department served Kim with an antiharassment order forbidding him to contact or remain near Roznowski. Roznowski's two daughters filed suit against the city of Federal Way, alleging that Rensing's negligent service of the order resulted in Roznowski's death at Kim's hands. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict against the City. The City claims the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and its motion for judgment as a matter of law because it owed Roznowski no duty under the public duty doctrine, foreclosing any tort liability. The Supreme Court disagreed. The City had a duty to serve the antiharassment order on Kim, and because it had a duty to act, it had a duty to act with reasonable care in serving the order. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of the City's motions, although on different grounds than those relied on by the Court of Appeals. View "Washburn v. City of Federal Way" on Justia Law

Augutis had reconstructive surgery on his foot at a VA hospital. Complications led to amputation of his leg. Augutis claims that the amputation was the result of negligent treatment and filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs. The VA denied the claim. Augutis timely requested reconsideration on March 21, 2011. On October 3, the VA informed him that it had not completed reconsideration, but that suit could be filed or additional time could be permitted to allow it to reach a decision. The letter noted that Federal Tort Claims Act claims are governed by both federal and state law and that some state laws may bar a claim or suit. Days later, the VA denied reconsideration. The letter explained that a claim could be presented to a district court within six months, but again noted that state laws might bar suit. Augutis filed suit on April 3, 2012, more than five years after the surgery, but within six months of the VA’s final dismissal. The district court dismissed under Illinois’s statute of repose, 735 ILCS 5/13‐212(a), which requires that a medical malpractice claim be brought within four years of the date of the alleged malpractice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the state limitations period was preempted by the FTCA period. View "Augutis v. Uniited States" on Justia Law

George Mason petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment for him on the basis of State-agent immunity in an action filed against him by Kola Oyedepo, individually and as grandfather and next friend of Joshua Dosunmu. George Mason was a bus driver employed by the Macon County Board of Education. Joshua Dosunmu, a fifth-grade student in the Macon County school system, was a passenger on the school bus Mason was driving. After the bus had continued on its route, Dosunmu attempted to cross the highway. He was struck and injured by an automobile, driven by Janie Pearson Sellers. Oyedepo sued Mason and others alleging negligence and wantonness arising from Mason's alleged failure to properly supervise Dosunmu and/or his alleged failure to ensure that Dosunmu got off the bus at the appropriate school-bus stop. Mason moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to State-agent immunity because as a bus driver employed by the Macon County Board of Education at the time of the accident, he was exercising judgment in transporting and supervising students on the day of the incident. The Supreme Court concluded that Mason demonstrated that he was entitled to State-agent immunity as to the claims asserted against him in his individual capacity in Oyedepo's action. Therefore the Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Oyedepo v. Sellers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., against the Army after plaintiff, an employee of a private Army contractor, was injured on the job when he tripped and fell. Plaintiff sued the Government for negligence and premises liability because he found that the workers' compensation benefits he received through his employer's policy was insufficient to cover his needs. Under Texas law, general contractors who require subcontractors to provide workers' compensation insurance to their employees and who pay for that coverage were "statutory employers" protected by the exclusive-remedy provision. In this instance, the parties agreed that the Government has taken the basic steps it needed to take to avail itself to the exclusive-remedy rule as a statutory employer. The court concluded that, because plaintiff did not allege a lack of notice or prejudice from any lack of notice, the federal government was in "like circumstances" as a Texas statutory employer. Accordingly, plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits were his exclusive remedy, and his claims against the Government were properly dismissed. View "Willoughby, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, representative of the estate of her deceased son, filed suit against the City of New York, police officers, and others, alleging that they were liable for her son's death. A jury found in favor of defendants. The court held that, where a municipality acted in a governmental capacity, a plaintiff could not recover without proving that the municipality owed a "special duty" to the injured party. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving a special relationship, and where the plaintiff failed to meet this burden, the analysis ended and liability could not be imputed to the municipality that acted in a governmental capacity. The distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance was irrelevant to the analysis and the existence of a special relationship was a question of law that could be properly submitted to the jury. In this instance, the court found no error entitling plaintiff to a new trial and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Velez v. City of New York" on Justia Law