Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from an action filed against the City of Lewiston by Tim Thompson, Janet Thompson, and Thompson's Auto Sales (collectively, Thompson). Thompson filed a claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), alleging the City negligently designed and installed a storm water drain system on a city street adjacent to Thompson's property, which caused storm water runoff to flow onto Thompson's property and damage it. After suit was filed, Thompson entered bankruptcy proceedings and the bankruptcy trustee, C. Barry Zimmerman, was substituted as Plaintiff in the action. The City moved for summary judgment on the grounds of discretionary immunity and design immunity. The district court denied the motion as to design immunity, but granted the motion on the ground of discretionary immunity. Zimmerman appealed, arguing that the discretionary immunity exception to liability under the ITCA does not grant immunity from liability for damage caused by negligent design and, alternatively, that even if discretionary immunity was considered, it was inapplicable in this case because the City's actions were not discretionary within the meaning of the exception. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the City was not entitled to immunity from liability under any exception to the ITCA. View "Zimmerman v. City of Lewiston" on Justia Law

Benjamin Morris appealed an order of the Idaho Industrial Commission that denied his motion to set aside a lump sum settlement agreement he made with his employer's surety, Liberty Northwest Insurance. Morris initiated his workers' compensation action after he suffered injuries while working construction for his employer, Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc. Morris sustained a serious head injury on when a twenty-five pound rock thrown by a piece of heavy machinery struck him in the head. Morris initiated settlement discussions with Liberty Northwest Insurance, Hap Taylor & Sons' insurer. Liberty responded with a counter-offer—a single lump sum payment which Morris accepted "with the clear understanding this is a partial settlement and does not resolve the medical side." The parties executed a Stipulation and Agreement of Partial Lump Sum Discharge (LSSA) and submitted it to the Commission for approval. Approximately eighteen months later, on July 8, 2011, a Notice of Appearance was filed with the Commission whereby Morris substituted attorney Michael Walker with his then present counsel, attorney Starr Kelso. On the same day, Morris filed a motion to review the LSSA, accompanied by an affidavit signed by Kelso. Kelso's affidavit expressed concern that Morris may not have been "competent to testify" due to his injury—though, no credible evidence of incompetence was ever offered. Liberty filed an objection to Morris' motion to review. Ultimately, the Commission denied Morris' motion. Following the Commission's refusal to review the LSSA, Morris filed a Motion to Set Aside Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, seeking to void the LSSA on grounds of illegality and constructive fraud. The Commission issued an order denying Morris' motion to set the LSSA. Morris filed a timely appeal to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission did not err in denying Morris' request for a hearing on his fraud claim. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the Commission's decision to deny Morris' motion to set the LSSA. View "Morris v. Hap Taylor & Sons" on Justia Law

Palmetto Hardwood, Inc., employed Petitioner Clifton Sparks as a saw operator. Petitioner suffered three work-related injuries during this employment, the first two of which injured Petitioner's lower back. In the third incident, Petitioner was required to remove a piece of metal from under a gang saw. In the process, the metal exploded and a three- to four-inch cubic piece struck him in the head. Petitioner subsequently sought workers' compensation for his injuries. At the hearing, Petitioner testified to substantial head pain, loss of cognitive ability, and other brain-function-related symptoms, including inability to read without severe headache, loss of his mathematical abilities, inability to balance while standing or to walk without a cane, hand tremors, anxiety, and more. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied an improper definition of "physical brain damage" within the meaning of section 42-9-10(C). The Supreme Court disagreed. Because "physical brain damage" as contemplated in S.C. Code Ann. 42-9-10 required "severe and permanent physical brain damage as a result of a compensable injury" and the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Petitioner did not suffer such brain damage was supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Sparks v. Palmetto Hardwood" on Justia Law

After an administrative judge (AJ) ruled on a claimant's petition to controvert a workers' compensation claim, the claimant had twenty days to file a notice of appeal with the full Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission. In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether an AJ's order, handed down more than twenty days after the AJ's ruling and granting a claimant thirty additional days in which to prosecute her claim, should be given legal effect by the Commission so that the claimant's notice of appeal, filed within the additional thirty days, would be considered timely. Upon review, the Court found that, under the facts and circumstances presented, such an appeal was timely. View "Felter v. Floorserv, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this case was appeal and cross-appeal of summary judgments dismissing claims against Defendants Ada County, Deputy Jeremy Wroblewski, Kate Pape, and James Johnson in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action brought by Rita Hoagland on behalf of herself and the estate of her deceased son, Bradley Munroe ("Munroe"), claiming a violation of a Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care and safety while Munroe was detained at Ada County Jail where he committed suicide. Munroe had a history of incarceration at Ada County Jail ("ACJ"). During the evening of September 28, 2008, Munroe was arrested and charged with the armed robbery of a convenience store. Munroe was intoxicated and uncooperative. During booking, Munroe was screaming and being rowdy. Munroe took a string and wrapped it around his neck. Because of his bizarre behavior throughout the night, Munroe was placed in a holding cell for observation until he was sober. The next morning booking continued. At that time, Munroe requested protective custody. Munroe was placed in a cell by himself and a well-being check was scheduled to occur every thirty minutes. Later that evening during a well-being check, the performing deputy found Munroe hanging from his top bunk by a bed sheet. Munroe was pronounced dead later that evening. Among the issues on appeal were: whether the decedent's estate could assert a 42 U.S.C 1983 action for alleged violations of the decedent's constitutional rights; whether the parent had standing to assert a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for the death of her adult child while incarcerated; and whether the district court erred in awarding costs to Defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court: (1) was affirmed in dismissing Hoagland's 1983 claim on behalf of Munroe's estate; (2) was reversed in finding that Hoagland had a 1983 cause of action for violations of her own constitutional rights; (3) was partially affirmed in its award of costs as a matter of right; (4) was reversed in its award of discretionary costs; and (5) was affirmed in denying attorney fees. The case was remanded for the reconsideration and entry of express findings regarding the district court's award of discretionary costs. View "Hoagland v. Ada County" on Justia Law

In 2007, the decedent allegedly sustained personal injuries while disembarking from a bus operated by [defendant]. Decedent died a year later from causes unrelated to the bus accident. In 2009, more than two years, but less than three years, after the bus incident -- plaintiff, decedent's personal representative, filed a complaint alleging that [defendant] had negligently injured decedent and sought damages for the alleged personal injuries. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether plaintiff's survival action against a public body should have been brought within two years or three years of the alleged injury. One of two statutes provided the applicable statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that ORS 30.075(1) was the governing statute that triggered a two-year limitation period of ORS 30.275(9). View "Bell v. Tri-Met" on Justia Law

Michael Jassek appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the binding dispute resolution decision of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") that denied payment for a myoelectric prosthesis. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore vacated the judgment. Jassek contended that because WSI failed to explain its reasons for disregarding the medical evidence favorable to Jassek, its binding dispute resolution decision was arbitrary, and that WSI's binding dispute resolution procedure violated his right to due process because it failed to provide a formal hearing. The language of N.D.C.C. 65-02-20 unambiguously provides that "[a] dispute resolution decision under this section requested by a medical provider concerning . . . a request for . . . treatment is not reviewable by any court." The statute based appealability on the identity of the party who requests binding dispute resolution, not on who appeals the binding dispute resolution decision. Jassek’s orthotist was a "medical provider," and this dispute concernd "a request for diagnostic tests or treatment," specifically the determination of an appropriate prosthetic device. Accordingly, WSI's decision on the medical provider’s request for binding dispute resolution was not reviewable by the district court, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction, and the judgment affirming WSI's decision was void. View "Jassek v. Workforce Safety and Insurance" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Stephen Arrants appealed a superior court order that affirmed an Industrial Accident Board's order granting employer-appellee Home Depot's petition to terminate appellant's total disability benefits. Appellant raised two claims on appeal: (1) the Board's decision was in error because all experts agreed that his condition had not improved since the 2007 Board finding of total disability; and (2) the Board's decision was not supported by competent evidence in the record. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both arguments were without merit, and affirmed the superior court. View "Arrants v. Home Depot" on Justia Law

The Board of Supervisors of Fluvanna County filed a complaint against Davenport & Company asserting that Davenport, which served as the financial advisor to the Board, knowingly made false representations and used its fiduciary position to persuade the Board to hire Davenport as an advisor regarding the financing of the construction of a new high school. Davenport filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the circuit court granted on the basis that the separation of powers doctrine prevented the court from resolving the controversy because the court would have to inquire into the motives of the Board's legislative decision making. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board effectively waived its common law legislative immunity from civil liability and the burden of litigation, and therefore the circuit court erred in sustaining Davenport's demurrer on these grounds. View "Bd. of Supervisors of Fluvanna County v. Davenport & Co. LLC" on Justia Law

A fire destroyed a hydroponic tomato facility belonging to a new business, Sunnyland Farms, Inc. The day before the fire, Sunnyland's electricity had been shut off by its local utility, the Central New Mexico Electrical Cooperative (CNMEC), for nonpayment. Sunnyland's water pumps were powered by electricity, and without power, Sunnyland's facility had no water. Sunnyland sued CNMEC, alleging both that CNMEC had wrongfully suspended service, and if its electrical service had been in place, firefighters and Sunnyland employees would have been able to stop the fire from consuming the facility. After a bench trial, the court found CNMEC liable for negligence and breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages, including lost profits, of over $21 million in contract and tort, but reduced the tort damages by 80% for Sunnyland's comparative fault. It also awarded $100,000 in punitive damages. The parties cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the contract judgment, vacated the punitive damages, held that the lost profit damages were not supported by sufficient evidence, affirmed the trial court's offset of damages based on CNMEC's purchase of a subrogation lien, and affirmed the trial court's rulings on pre- and post-judgment interest. Sunnyland appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals regarding the contract judgment, punitive damages, and interest, and reversed on the lost profit damages and the offset. The Court also took the opportunity of this case to re-examine the standard for consequential contract damages in New Mexico. View "Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Central N.M. Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law