Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

During her birth in 2004, the 11-pound baby became lodged in the mother’s pelvis, so that nerves in her shoulder were injured (brachial plexus injury), resulting in a limited range of movement in her right arm A few months later her mother consulted a lawyer, who recommended against suing. Fifteen months later the mother consulted another lawyer; he agreed to represent her, but 16 months later, he withdrew. Finally, in 2010, the mother filed a malpractice suit against the Erie Family Health Center and the Center’s nurse-midwives who had provided her prenatal care. Erie is a private enterprise, but it receives grant money from the U.S. Public Health Service, so that its employees are deemed federal employees, 42 U.S.C. 233(g)(1)(A),(g)(4) and tort suits against it or its employees can be maintained only under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(a),(g)(1)(A). The district court found the claim time-barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the limitations period for a tort suit under Illinois law would be eight years for a minor, 735 ILCS 5/13-212(b), the extension of the statute of limitations for a child victim does not apply to claims governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act. View "Arteaga v. United States" on Justia Law

Following an automobile accident in which Ron'Drequez Cortez White was killed by a drunk driver, Elizabeth McElroy, the county administrator for Jefferson County and appointed personal representative of White's estate, hired an attorney to file a wrongful-death action against the drunk driver. The wrongful-death action resulted in a recovery, and, following litigation on the issue of the personal representative's fee, the Circuit Court awarded McElroy a fee from the wrongful-death proceeds. Samuel Rodgers, White's father, contended in the litigation below that, as personal representative, McElroy was not entitled to be compensated for her services from the recovery in the wrongful-death action. Rodgers appealed the circuit court's judgment awarding McElroy a fee to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a personal representative may be compensated out of the proceeds recovered in a wrongful-death action. Upon review, the Court concluded that McElroy was not entitled to compensation out of the proceeds of the wrongful-death recovery for her services as personal representative and that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in awarding McElroy compensation out of that recovery. View "Rodgers v. McElroy" on Justia Law

An employee filed an affidavit of readiness for hearing in her workers' compensation case approximately four years after her employer filed a controversion of her written workers' compensation claim. The employer petitioned to dismiss her claim based on the statutory deadline for a hearing request. After a hearing, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board dismissed her claim, and the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision. Because the employee did not file a timely request for a hearing and was not excused from doing so, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Pruitt v. Providence Extended Care" on Justia Law

Berrien worked for a civilian contractor (TECOM) at a military base in Michigan. He was fatally injured by a gutter that fell from the liquor store on the base while he was working alone, behind the store. The district court awarded $1.18 million in damages for failure to warn, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because the Act does not waive the immunity of the United States for acts of independent contractors, liability could only be based on the negligence of government employees. There was no evidence that government employees actually knew of the dangerous condition of the liquor store, so that, under applicable Michigan law, any liability for failure to warn an invitee of a dangerous condition would have to have been based on a negligent failure to discover the dangerous condition. Even though the United States retained the right to conduct spot checks under its contract with TECOM, this right does not subject it to FTCA liability. View "Berrien v. United States" on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the government’s sovereign immunity from tort suits, but excepts from that waiver certain intentional torts, 28 U. S. C. 2680(h). Section 2680(h) contains a proviso that extends the waiver of immunity to claims for six intentional torts, including assault and battery, that are based on the “acts or omissions” of an “investigative or law enforcement officer” “who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests.” A federal prisoner, sued the United States under the FTCA, alleging assault and battery by correctional officers. The district court granted the government summary judgment; the Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the “law enforcement proviso” applies only to tortious conduct that occurs during the course of executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. The Supreme Court reversed. The law enforcement proviso extends to law enforcement officers’ acts or omissions that arise within the scope of employment, regardless of whether the officers are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest. Congress intended immunity determinations to depend on a federal officer’s legal authority, not on a particular exercise of that authority. Nor does the proviso indicate that a waiver of immunity requires the officer to be engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity. View "Millbrook v. United States" on Justia Law

Claimant Dorothy Robinson was a police officer for the City of Pittsburgh. In 1997, she sustained a work-related injury, and the City placed her on light-duty. In 2001, while traveling for treatment of her injury, Claimant was involved in an automobile accident in which she sustained new injuries. After the accident, Claimant did not return to her light-duty position nor was she offered any other light-duty work. In late 2004, Claimant received a disability pension. In connection with Claimant’s claim of entitlement to a disability pension, she was examined by three physicians who certified that Claimant was unable to perform her pre-injury job as a police officer. Nearly three years later, an independent medical examiner concluded that although Claimant was not fit to perform her prior job as a police officer, she could perform modified-duty work. The City filed a Petition to Suspend Compensation Benefits, asserting that Claimant was capable of working, "but has voluntarily removed herself from the work force as she has not looked for or sought employment in the general labor market." Claimant filed a response, denying the averments of the suspension petition and asserting that she remained attached to the workforce and had registered for work with the Pennsylvania Job Center. She further claimed that she was not presently working only because of the unavailability of work and because the City had eliminated her light-duty position. The Workers' Compensation Judge denied the suspension petition, concluding that Claimant had not voluntarily removed herself from the workforce. The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal concerned the assignment of the burden of proof when the employer sought to modify or suspend a claimant's benefits on the basis that the claimant had retired. The Commonwealth Court plurality devised a "totality of the circumstances" test and concluded that the City failed to show that the injured worker had voluntarily withdrawn from the workforce. The City appealed, but the Supreme Court concurred with the Commonwealth Court and affirmed. View "City of Pittsburgh v. WCAB (Robinson)" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services removed Woods, then seven years old from his parents’ home in 1991 and placed him in a residential treatment facility. There had been many reports of sexual abuse among residents of the facility and Woods, claiming to have been abused by another resident, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because Woods failed to bring his claim within two years of its accrual, rejecting Woods’s contention that the 20-year limitations period applicable in Illinois to personal injury claims based on childhood sexual abuse applied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The limitations period applicable to all Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years, as provided in 735 ILCS 5/13-202, and this includes claims involving allegations of failure to protect from childhood sexual abuse. View "Woods v. IL Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

A hotel worker fell and injured her back while cleaning a room. Her employer initially paid benefits, but it filed a controversion of benefits after its doctor doubted the accident’s occurrence and said any work injury was not the substantial cause of the worker’s continuing need for medical care. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that the fall was the substantial cause of the worker’s disability, finding the worker’s testimony about the injury credible and the employer’s doctor’s testimony not credible. Based on the testimony of the worker and her treating physician, as well as an MRI showing a herniated disc, the Board decided that the injury was compensable. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission reversed the Board’s decision because, in the its view, substantial evidence did not support the decision. Because the Commission incorrectly decided the substantial evidence question, the Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision. View "Sosa de Rosario v. Chenega Lodging" on Justia Law

In 2008 a city promoted a police officer to chief. The city’s hiring determination and the officer’s subsequent conduct led four police department employees to sue the police chief and the city. The employees asserted several claims including wrongful termination, sexual harassment, and negligent hiring. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of the police chief and the city on all claims. The employees appealed several of the superior court’s summary judgment rulings, its denial of sanctions for evidence spoliation, and an attorney’s fees award in the city’s favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact barring judgment, and affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of both the employees’ hostile work environment sexual harassment claims against the police chief and the employees’ negligent hiring claim against the city. And because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery sanctions, the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling too. But because genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment as to the employees’ claims against the city for wrongful termination and sexual harassment, the Court reversed those rulings, vacated the attorney’s fees award, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mills v. Hankla" on Justia Law

Employee suffered an injury to his left hand while working for Employer. Later, Employee's left index finger had to be amputated. Employee subsequently filed a petition for specific loss benefits. The parties agreed Employee was entitled to specific loss benefits because of the amputation for a period of thirty-eight weeks. At issue was whether Employer was entitled to an offset for the incapacity benefits it paid before the amputation. The Workers' Compensation Board granted the petition for specific loss benefits and determined that Employer was allowed to offset the incapacity benefits paid before the amputation. The Supreme Court vacated the Board's decision, holding that Employer was not entitled to offset the incapacity benefits paid during the months after Employee's initial injury but before the amputation of his finger. View "Scott v. Fraser Papers, Inc. " on Justia Law