Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant filed an application for permanent total disability (PTD). The Industrial Commission of Ohio found Appellant was capable of sedentary sustained remunerative employment and denied her request for PTD. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals denied the mandamus action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's conclusion that Appellant's allowed conditions did not foreclose sustained remunerative employment was not an abuse of discretion; (2) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in failing to view Appellant's rehabilitation efforts favorably; and (3) the Commission did not improperly factor the economic climate into the PTD equation. View "State ex rel. Guthrie v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

Petitioner Arthur Firstenberg allegedly suffers from electromagnetic hypersensitivity (EHS), which requires him to avoid exposure to sources of electromagnetic radiation. These sources include cell-phone towers which emit radio-frequency (RF) radiation. Petitioner filed suit against the City of Santa Fe, New Mexico, and AT&T Mobility Services, LLC (AT&T), asserting that signal upgrades at AT&T base stations in Santa Fe adversely affected his health and that the City is required to regulate those upgrades. The district court dismissed Petitioner's action against the City and AT&T for failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Petitioner appealed. After briefing, the Tenth Circuit noted a potential jurisdictional problem: Petitioner's complaint failed to satisfy the well-pleaded-complaint rule for purposes of federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. All parties insisted that federal jurisdiction was proper. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, and reversed the district court's dismissal to remand the case to state court. View "Firstenberg v. City of Santa Fe, et al" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal came before the Supreme Court from the denial of a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, motion for summary judgment. The issue was whether George Poppenheimer, a volunteer firefighter, was immune under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) for claims arising from an automobile accident. The county court found that a volunteer fire department is not a government entity for purposes of the MTCA and denied Poppenheimer's motion. Aggrieved, Poppenheimer appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the Bridgetown Volunteer Fire Department (BVFD) and its employees receive protection under the MTCA; and (2) whether the county court erred by denying his motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The Supreme Court found that the BVFD is not a governmental entity or instrumentality of the state, but an independent contractor. Also, as a volunteer firefighter, Poppenheimer is not immune from suit arising out of alleged automobile negligence. Thus, the Court affirmed the county court's denial of Poppenheimer's motions. View "Poppenheimer v. The Estate of Coyle, " on Justia Law

In 1994, while en route to the scene of a fire, volunteer fireman James Hingle collided with a vehicle occupied by Sam and Ruby Anderson. Hingle was driving his personal vehicle at the time of the accident. The Andersons filed suit against Hingle, Marshall County, the volunteer fire department, and the Marshall County Board of Supervisors. The Andersons claimed that their injuries and damages amounted to $4,150,000. At the time of the accident, Hingle had two insurance policies with Guidant: personal automobile liability policy with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident, and an umbrella protection policy with a $1,000,000 limit. Marshall County had a business automobile liability policy with a $300,000 limit through INA, which covered non-owned automobiles and provided coverage to the volunteer fire department. A dispute arose regarding which insurance company should defend the litigation and which provided primary coverage. INA filed a declaratory-judgment action against Guidant in the Circuit Court of Marshall County. INA asked for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that Guidant had a duty to defend all the defendants and INA did not have any duty to defend, and that Guidant's policies afforded primary coverage for all defendants, while INA provided excess coverage only. INA moved for summary judgment in the declaratory-judgment action, but the trial court held the motion in abeyance pending a final determination on the merits of the underlying lawsuit. Following that ruling, INA provided defense counsel to Marshall County and the fire department in the Anderson lawsuit. Guidant defended Hingle. INA appealed the trial court's decision on remand. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case back to the trial court. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of INA's Rule 56(f) motion for continuance and the denial of INA's request for prejudgment interest. The Court found that INA's claims of procedural errors warranting reversal were without merit. While the Court agreed with the trial court's finding that INA was required to contribute to the settlement, the Court reversed the trial court's determination that INA was required to contribute its policy limit. The Court held that Guidant was required to exhaust its $500,000 per-accident limit before INA's insurance was to be applied. View "Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Guidant Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Merwin Carlson appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision that denied his claim for workers' compensation benefits after remand. Under the law of the underlying case, the Supreme Court held that the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in concluding WSI properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction under N.D.C.C.65-05-04 to deny Carlson benefits on remand. The Court reversed and remanded for WSI to award Carlson benefits based on the ALJ's calculation that Carlson's average weekly wage was $722. View "Carlson v. Workforce Safety & Ins." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this case to determine whether the immunity provisions of Section 23 of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act 44) applied to "subrogation and/or reimbursement claims sought against an employee who has entered into a third[-]party settlement with a Commonwealth [p]arty such as Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ('SEPTA')." Upon review of this matter, the Supreme Court held that the portion of Act 44 at issue in this case barred any claim made by the employer for the recoupment of workers' compensation benefits it paid. View "Fraizer v. W.C.A.B." on Justia Law

After injuring another student, a public high school student was cited for an infraction of the student conduct rule proscribing reckless endangerment. The principal's decision to suspend the student for ten days was upheld by a hearing board and the director of schools. Thereafter, the student and his family sought judicial review of the disciplinary decision. The trial court concluded (1) the school officials had violated the student's procedural due process rights because one official had performed both prosecutorial and decision-making functions and because this official was biased against the student; and (2) the evidence did not support the conclusion that the student's conduct amounted to reckless endangerment. Accordingly, the court directed the school system to expunge the student's record and awarded the student and his family attorneys' fees and costs. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the student received the required due process protections before he was suspended; (2) the hearing process after the student was suspended as applied did not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair; and (3) the court of appeals did not err by overturning the trial court's conclusion that the school officials acted arbitrarily and illegally. View "Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Bd. of Pub. Educ." on Justia Law

Frank Hutson was working as a crane operator for the State Ports Authority when he suffered an injury to his lower back and legs while attempting to remove a container from a ship. He was diagnosed with a disc bulge for which he was treated with steroid injections, physical therapy, and used a back brace. After reaching maximum medical improvement, he filed a Form 50 with the workers' compensation commission for continued benefits alleging permanent and total disability pursuant to Sections 42-9-10 and 42-9-30 South Carolina Code (1976 & Supp. 2011) or, alternatively, a wage loss under Section 42-9-20. He also asked to receive the award in lump sum. Although the Ports Authority and its insurance carrier, the State Accident Fund (collectively, Respondents), admitted the accident and the back injury, they disputed the claims to his legs and argued he should receive only permanent partial disability benefits. They also objected to Hutson's request that his benefits be paid in a lump sum. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether speculative testimony by the claimant concerning his possible future work as a restaurateur qualified as substantial evidence to establish he did not sustain a wage loss pursuant to Section 42-9-20 of the South Carolina Code (1976). The Court held it did not, and therefore reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hutson v. SC State Ports Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Clarice Sanchez, a long-time secretarial employee of the United States Forest Service, suffered irreversible brain damage after falling at work. As a result of her injury, Sanchez lost the left half of her field of vision. She requested a hardship transfer to Albuquerque where she could better access ongoing medical treatment. After the Forest Service declined to accommodate her request, she brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed and held that Plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding her disability. On appeal, the Forest Service urged the Court to affirm summary judgment on an alternative ground. However, the Court declined, concluding that transfer accommodations for the purpose of medical treatment or therapy were not unreasonable per se. View "Sanchez v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Pennie Keyes-Zachary appealed a district court order that affirmed the Commissioner's decision denying her applications for Social Security disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits. Plaintiff alleged disability based on, among other things, neck, back, shoulder, elbow, wrist, hand, and knee problems, accompanied by pain; hearing loss; urinary frequency; anger-management problems; depression; and anxiety. The ALJ upheld the denial of her application for benefits. The Appeals Council denied her request for review of the ALJ's decision, and she then appealed to the district court. The district court remanded the case to the ALJ for further consideration. After the second hearing, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained residual functional capacity to perform light work with certain restrictions, but that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council declined jurisdiction, and the ALJ's decision was then deemed the Commissioner's final decision. On appeal Plaintiff raised two issues: (1) that the ALJ "failed to properly consider, evaluate and discuss the medical source evidence;" and (2) the ALJ "failed to perform a proper credibility determination." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no error in the ALJ's decision and affirmed the Commission's final determination in Plaintiff's case. View "Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue" on Justia Law