Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Carson Sweeney petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order of May 26, 2011, insofar as the order granted Timmy Joe Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's demand for a trial by jury in Holland's trespass action against him. In 2010, Holland sued Sweeney, alleging that Sweeney had entered Holland's property and damaged it by, among other things, "remov[ing] trees, timber and other foliage, [and] soil"; "redirect[ing] water flow"; and "install[ing] drainage apparatuses." The complaint stated the following causes of action: "trespass - trespass to chattels," negligence, negligent supervision, and conversion. The circuit court ultimately entered an order that, among other things, granted in part and denied in part Holland's motion to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-complaint. In its order, the circuit court found that Sweeney's failure to file his answer and counter-complaint in a timely manner "was unreasonable and inherently prejudicial" to Holland and that "[g]ood cause has not been shown for said failure." Nonetheless, the circuit court denied Holland's motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's answer and counter-complaint because, the circuit court said, "the interest of preserving a litigant's right of trial on the merits is paramount." However, the circuit court granted Holland's motion insofar as it sought to strike Sweeney's demand for a jury trial, concluding that Sweeney had "waived his right to demand a trial by jury." Sweeney filed a "motion for reconsideration, modification, new hearing, or in the alternative, motion to alter, amend or vacate" the order striking his jury-trial demand, which the circuit court denied. Sweeney then filed this petition for the writ of mandamus, seeking relief from the circuit court's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Sweeney demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief sought in his petition for the writ of mandamus. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Holland v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the State of Idaho, former Governor James E. Risch, and former Fish and Game Department Director Steven Huffaker (collectively "Defendants"). Appellants, Rex and Lynda Rammell, owners of a domestic elk ranch, brought suit against Defendants to recover for the loss and destruction of elk that escaped from their ranch in 2006. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Rammell v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an employee who filed an injury claim against his employer under the State Workers' Compensation Act and receives compensation in exchange for a "no liability" settlement with his employer that is approved by the State Board of Workers' Compensation may then turn around and sue the co-employee who caused the injury in a tort action. Ten years ago, the Court of Appeals answered this question no, holding that the Act's exclusive remedy provision bars such a lawsuit based on the same injury for which the employee has already received a remedy. In this appeal, however, the Court of Appeals was equally divided as to whether the underlying case law should be overruled, and the case was sent to the Supreme Court for resolution. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that "Ridley" was correctly decided. Thus, appellant Joseph Smith, having previously entered a Board-approved settlement with his employer in exchange for compensation, would be barred from suing appellee John Ellis for the same injury in tort if Ellis qualified as an "employee of the same employer" as Smith, rather than a "third-party tort-feasor," as those phrases are used in the applicable statutory authority. However, the evidence did not establish that Ellis was acting as "an employee of the same employer" in the course of his employment, at the time he injured Smith. The trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to Ellis, and that judgment was reversed. View "Smith v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Dr. Jerry Pratt slipped and fell down a set of stairs at the Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport. Pratt filed suit against the Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport Authority (GBRAA) in the Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Harrison County, alleging negligence and claiming he suffered injuries as a result of the fall. GBRAA moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), and the circuit court granted the motion. Pratt appealed, and we assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed, reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case. GBRAA filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that GBRAA was entitled to immunity under the MTCA, and accordingly reversed the appellate court, reinstated and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of GBRAA. View "Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport Authority" on Justia Law

Ernest Murphy was employed by the Commonwealth as a superior court judge for eight years. Following the publication of libelous articles about Murphy's performance of his judicial duties, and his subsequent receipt of hate mail and death threats, Murphy was diagnosed with PTSD and major depressive disorder and was unable to continue performing the essential duties of his job. The state board of retirement rejected his application for accidental disability retirement benefits pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws 32, 7, and this denial was upheld by the contributory retirement appeal board (CRAB). At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Murphy was entitled to receive accidental disability retirement benefits on the grounds that he was permanently disabled from performing the essential duties of his job by reason of a personal injury sustained as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties. The Court affirmed, holding that Murphy did not sustain his disabling injuries while in the performance of his judicial duties, as (1) Murphy was not engaged in judicial work during the time he opened and read the death threat; and (2) the act of opening and reading his mail was, in itself, not a judicial duty. View "Murphy v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd." on Justia Law

A compensation judge found Respondent was barred from receiving workers' compensation benefits because his written notice of injury, given nearly two years after his last day of work, was not timely and because Respondent's employer did not have actual knowledge that Respondent's back problems were work-related. The workers' compensation court of appeals (WCCA) reversed, concluding that a reasonable person in Respondent's position would not have known his injury was compensable until Respondent's doctors provided written reports to Respondent's attorney establishing a relationship between Respondent's back problems and his job duties. The Supreme Court reversed the WCCA and affirmed the denial of benefits, holding (1) the WCCA erred in overturning the compensation judge's finding that Respondent failed to give timely notice to his employer of his work-related injury; and (2) the compensation judge did not err in finding that the employer did not have actual knowledge of such an injury. View "Anderson v. Frontier Commc'ns" on Justia Law

Respondent sustained six injuries while playing for the Washington Redskins on four separate occasions. Consequently, Respondent filed with the Maryland Workers Compensation Commission six separate claims against his employer, the Washington Redskins (Petitioner). The Commission denied five of Respondent's claims on the ground that he was not a "covered employee" because he was working for the Redskins outside of the State when he sustained the injuries underlying the claims. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a football player employed by the Washington Redskins is a "covered employee," and therefore entitled to avail himself of Maryland's workers' compensation laws, when injured while practicing and playing football outside of Maryland. View "Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the method for excluding impairment from a non-compensable disability when calculating a worker's permanent disability benefit under the post-1996 version of Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(b). The ALJ calculated a benefit based on the claimant's entire post-injury permanent impairment rating and then subtracted an amount equal to a benefit based on his pre-existing active impairment rating. The workers' compensation board reversed, determining that the present version of section 342.730(1)(b) requires the calculation of income benefits to be based only on the permanent impairment rating caused by the injury being compensated. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pre-existing impairment must be excluded when calculating a total disability award under section 342.730(1)(b). View "Tudor v. Indus. Mold & Mach. Co." on Justia Law

Claimant sustained a work-related injury in 2003, for which he was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits followed by 425 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. In 2007 Claimant sustained another injury. After finding the effects of the 2003 injury caused Claimant's 2007 injury, an ALJ increased Claimant's partial disability benefit at reopening and tripled the entire income benefit awarded for his injury. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the finding of increased impairment as well as the finding that Claimant lacked the physical capacity at reopening to perform the type of work performed at the time of his injury; and (2) the combined effects of the impairment present at the time of the initial award and the additional impairment present at reopening entitled Claimant to triple benefits based on the whole of his disability for the balance of the compensable period. View "James T. English Trucking v. Beeler" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an ALJ's decision to award the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for his work-related shoulder injury from the date he left work, May 10, 2007, until May 8, 2009. The ALJ also awarded permanent income and medical benefits for the injury but denied claims for cervical and lumbar spine injuries. A court of appeals majority reversed, concluding that the opinion and award failed to contain findings adequate to make clear whether the ALJ considered and understood all of the evidence relevant to the date when TTD began. The Supreme Court (1) reversed to the extent that the ALJ made the finding of fact required by Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(11)(a); but (2) affirmed to the extent the Court was unable to determine whether the ALJ simply misstated May 10, 2007 as being the date the claimant testified he stopped working due to the effects of his injury, misunderstood the evidence concerning his reason for missing work on May 10, 2007, or chose May 10, 2007 based on other evidence. Remanded to the ALJ to clarify that portion of the decision. View "Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg." on Justia Law