Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration denied Hill's application. An ALJ also denied Plaintiff's application, and the appeals council denied Plaintiff's request for review. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security and affirmed the ALJ's decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the ALJ failed to consider evidence favorable to Plaintiff and posed an improper hypothetical question to the vocational expert; and (2) therefore, substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act.

Perks applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. An ALJ denied Perks's application. On appeal to the appeals council, Perks submitted additional evidence. The appeals council noted the receipt of the additional evidence but denied further review of Perks's claim. The district court affirmed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that Perks was not disabled; and (2) the additional evidence submitted to the appeals council did not undermine the ALJ's determination, as the ALJ would not have reached a different result with the additional evidence and the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

This interlocutory appeal presented the issue of whether a volunteer fire department incorporated under the Mississippi Non-Profit Corporation Act is a "political subdivision" under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and thus immune from liability. The volunteer fire department argued immunity for itself and its employee, asserting it was a "body corporate. . . responsible for governmental activities" under the MTCA's definition of "political subdivision." However, plaintiffs Milton and Brenda Spotts argued that the volunteer fire department was an independent contractor with Lowndes County and was not entitled to immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the volunteer fire department did not meet the definition of a political subdivision, as the term "body corporate" does not mean any corporate body, but a public corporate body. Furthermore, the Court found that the volunteer fire department was acting as an independent contractor with the county. Thus, the volunteer fire department and its employee did not have immunity for their alleged acts of negligence.

This workers' compensation appeal raised the question of whether the fifteen-percent statutory violation penalty under Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.120.4 applies to an employee's (claimant) compensation award from the Second Injury Fund (SIF). The ALJ here refused to award the claimant additional benefits, determining that the fifteen-percent penalty under section 287.120.4 was not applicable to enhance the claimant's award. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission found that the fifteen-percent penalty applied to the compensation awards entered by the ALJ. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the section 287.120.4 penalty was inapplicable to the award that claimant received from the SIF.

Deborah Gervich appealed the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denying her workers' compensation benefits as a dependent of her deceased husband, Gary Gervich. The Commission found that Gary's right to permanent total disability benefits terminated at the time of his death because his wife's right to such benefits had not "vested" prior to the 2008 statutory amendments that eliminated dependents from the definition of "employee" in Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.020.1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutes in effect at the time of Gary's injury governed, and under those statutes, the dependents of an injured worker, who was entitled to permanent total disability benefits and who died of causes unrelated to the work injury, are included within the definition of "employee"; (2) therefore, such dependents are entitled to continuing permanent total disability benefits; and (3) because an employee's dependents are determined at the time of the injury and include the spouse of an injured worker, the Commission was not authorized by law to deny such benefits to Deborah.

Shirley Frisby died from an apparent heart attack while working on an assembly line at Milbank Manufacturing Company in Arkansas. A claim for workers' compensation death benefits was filed just before the two-year statute of limitations expired. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denied the claim. Curtis Frisby, as administrator of his wife's estate, then commenced this wrongful death diversity action against Milbank. The district court dismissed the action as time barred. Curtis appealed, arguing that the filing of a workers' compensation claim tolls the statute of limitations for a tort claim against the employer for the same injury, and alternatively, that the Arkansas "savings statute" applies and provided him one year after the workers' compensation claim denial to file this action for the same injury. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Curtis was able to file a timely wrongful death tort action before or concurrent with the claim for workers' compensation benefits, the district court correctly rejected his tolling argument; and (2) the savings statute did not apply because the dismissal of the workers' compensation claim did not have the same effect as a nonsuit.

In September 2007, Henry Phillips murdered Doris Shavers in the home they shared. The heirs of Shavers sued the City of Jackson ("the City"), claiming the actions of its police officers caused Shavers's death. The City moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"). The circuit court denied the City's motion, and the City brought this interlocutory appeal. The question before the Supreme Court was whether there was a genuine issue of dispute that the City, through its police officers, acted in reckless disregard of Shavers's safety, thereby exposing the City to liability. The Supreme Court held that as a matter of law, the City did not act with reckless disregard. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the City.

Claimant was employed by New Orleans Depot Services, Inc. (NODSI) as a mechanic from 1996 until 2002. Prior to his employment with NODSI, Claimant was employed by New Orleans Marine Contractors (NOMC) for five months. During his employment with both NODSI and NOMC, Claimant was exposed to loud noises on a continuous basis and did not use hearing protection. Claimant sought permanent partial disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act for a hearing impairment. The ALJ determined that NODSI was liable for Claimants benefits as his last maritime employer. The Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirmed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence to support the factual findings of the ALJ.

In July 2009, Charles Albert’s Billings, Montana home caught fire. Despite response by the City of Billings Fire Department, the house burned to the ground. Albert sued the City for negligence of the Billings Fire Department, discrimination based upon age and disability, slander, and violation of his constitutional and statutory right to know and obtain documents held by the City. The District Court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on all issues. Albert appealed. Finding no error in the district court's consideration of Albert's case, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's decision.

Deborah Benge, a former employee of Pacific Ship Repair and Fabrication, filed a disability claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act seeking compensation for her work-related injury. The ALJ found that Benge's disability at the time was permanent. The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) made partial permanent disability payments to Benge until Benge underwent surgery. An ALJ subsequently determined that Benge's nine-month total disability immediately following the surgery was temporary in nature. This determination absolved the OWCP from making disability payments during this time period. Instead, Pacific was liable for the payments. The Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ, concluding that even if a disability is declared permanent, it may be later re-characterized as temporary when the underlying condition worsens and re-stabilizes following a surgical procedure. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the Longshore Act, a prior finding of partial permanent disability does not preclude a later finding of temporary disability for the same underlying injury during a period of recovery following surgery; and (2) because Benge's partial disability could be re-characterized as a temporary total disability in accord with changed circumstances, Pacific was responsible for the temporary total disability payments.