Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Injury Law
Runstrom v. Alaska Native Medical Center
A healthcare worker was sprayed in the eye with fluids from an HIV-positive patient. She received preventive treatment and counseling. Her employer initially paid workers' compensation benefits; it later filed a controversion based on its doctor's opinion that the employee was able to return to work. The employee asked for more benefits, but the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied her claim. The employee appealed, but the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the Commission that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision, the Court affirmed the Commission's decision.
Geraldine Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad
In this appeal, the Court determined whether N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 provided immunity to the Plainfield Rescue Squad as an entity, regardless of any negligent delay in transporting a gunshot victim to a hospital. According to the report of the Plaintiff's expert, the Rescue Squad members "wasted over 30 minutes" performing ineffective CPR, depriving the decedent of "any chance of surviving his injury." The decedent needed an immediate transport to the nearby emergency room, where a surgical trauma team could have opened his chest and taken him to the operating room for surgical repair. Had the decedent been transported promptly, he would have had a twenty to thirty percent chance of surviving. The expert concluded that the Squad members engaged in "significant deviations" from usual standards of practice that were significant contributing factors to the decedent's death. Plaintiffs filed a wrongful-death/survival action against the Plainfield Rescue Squad and others. Ultimately, the trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. With respect to the Rescue Squad, the trial court found immunity under both N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 and another statute. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, determining that only N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 shielded the Squad from civil liability. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed: "[a]lthough N.J.S.A. 26:2K-29 provides immunity to 'officers and members' of a rescue squad for civil damages in rendering 'intermediate life support services in good faith,' the plain language of the statute does not provide immunity to a rescue squad as an entity. Thus, Plainfield Rescue Squad is subject to a civil suit for negligence based on the facts alleged by plaintiffs."
State ex rel. Oakwood v. Indus. Comm’n
In 2008, Craig Ali was a police officer for appellant, the village of Oakwood. That spring, his department assigned him to perform traffic-control duties on a highway-construction project overseen by appellee, Kokosing Construction Company, Inc. Ali was injured while performing those duties. At issue was which entity was Ali's employer for purposes of his workers' compensation claim. A district hearing officer with the Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Kokosing was Ali's employer at the time of injury. A staff hearing officer reversed, finding the correct employer was Oakwood Village. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the commission, when confronted with two potential employers, may, but is not required to, use any of the State ex rel. Lord v. Daugherty and Fisher v. Mayfield factors it believes will assist analysis; (2) therefore, the commission did not abuse its discretion by not directly discussing the three enumerated Lord/Fisher factors; and (3) the staff hearing officer's decision was supported by evidence in the record.
LeGrande v. United States
While working as a flight attendant, LeGrande was injured when the aircraft encountered severe turbulence. She sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, alleging that air traffic controllers employed by the FAA negligently had failed to warn the flight’s captain that turbulence had been forecast along the flight path. The district court concluded that FAA employees did not breach any duty owed LeGrande and granted summary judgment for the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. LeGrande argued, for the first time, that her injuries resulted from the negligence of a National Weather Service meteorologist. The court concluded that the FAA breached no duty owed to LeGrande and that LeGrande failed to give the NWS the notice that the FTCA requires.
Hale v. Ward County
Plaintiffs-Appellants Robert and Susan Hale appealed a district court summary judgment that dismissed their nuisance and governmental takings claims against Ward County and the City of Minot. The Hales own property on what is otherwise agricultural land approximately one mile southeast of a shooting range used for training Minot area local, state and federal law enforcement officers. Mr. Hale brought suit against Ward County and Minot alleging the law enforcement shooting range was a private and public nuisance and the shooting range devalued his property, resulting in a governmental taking. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. "When viewed in the light most favorable to the Hales, the maps, photographs and additional evidence raise[d] a genuine issue whether the terrain surrounding the shooting range prevents bullets from exiting the shooting range." The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the Hales' public nuisance claim, but affirmed in all other respects.
Harvey v. United States
Petitioner Frances Leon Harvey's appeal before the Tenth Circuit stemmed from a Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")lawsuit that he brought against the United States government for complications arising from an injury to his hand. Petitioner claimed that government employees injured him by: (1) misdiagnosing and delaying treatment of his hand fracture; and (2) performing negligent surgery on his hand. He argued that the district court erred in holding the misdiagnosis/delay-in treatment claim to be time-barred and in granting summary judgment on the negligent surgery claim for failure to produce expert evidence. Furthermore, Petitioner argued because Navajo law was the substantive law of this case, the district court failed to follow Navajo law when it dismissed his negligent surgery claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly denied Petitioner's motion for default judgment. Although the Court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the misdiagnosis claim was time-barred, the Court concluded that Petitioner's failure to provide expert evidence doomed both his misdiagnosis and surgical malpractice claims. Finally, although the parties disagreed about whether Arizona law or Navajo law applied, the Court did not reach the issue because the outcome would have been the same under both.
In re XL Specialty Ins. Co.
An injured employee (Employee) sought workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury. A claims adjuster with Employer's workers' compensation insurer's (Insurer) third party administrator denied the claim. The Division of Workers' compensation determined that Employee was entitled to medical and temporary income benefits. Employee subsequently brought a bad faith action against Insurer, its third party administrator, and the claims adjuster (Defendants). During discovery, Employee sought communications made between Insurer's lawyer and Employer during the administrative proceedings. Defendants argued that the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The trial court held that the privilege did not apply. The court of appeals subsequently denied mandamus relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney-client privilege did not protect the communications between Insurer and its insured.
Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Samudio
Employee suffered an injury during the course of his employment that was compensable under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Petitioner insurance company provided workers' compensation coverage to Employee's employer. Petitioner disputed the impairment rating of twenty percent assigned by the doctor in the administrative proceedings. A hearing officer issued a decision finding that Employee had an impairment rating of twenty percent. The Division of Workers' Compensation upheld the decision. Petitioner appealed. The trial court granted Employee's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a reviewing court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve an impairment rating appeal if the only rating presented to the agency was invalid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the absence of a valid impairment rating does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Remanded.
Waldinger Corp. v. Mettler
In this case the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Iowa's workers' compensation statute allows a claimant to recover healing period benefits - after he had reached maximum medical improvement and returned to substantially similar work following a work-related injury - for a period of approximately thirteen weeks of postsurgical convalescence during which he was unable to work. The workers' compensation commission awarded such benefits, and the district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that Iowa Code 85.34(1) did not authorize the benefits under the circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court's judgment affirming the award, holding that section 85.34(1) did authorize an award of healing period benefits in this case.
Iozzi v. City of Cranston
Plaintiffs Joseph and Josephine Iozzi owned a home located in Cranston. On October 15, 2005, excessive rainfall overwhelmed the sewer system servicing the Iozzis's home, causing water and sewage to back up and enter their basement, resulting in extensive damage to their home and personal property. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages from Triton Ocean State, LLC (Triton); U.S. Filter Operating Services, Inc. (Veolia); and Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless). The complaint alleged that Triton and Veolia were jointly and severally liable for negligently "operating, maintaining and repairing the sewer disposal system" in the city. As to Peerless, the complaint alleged that it was liable for breach of contract for rejecting plaintiffs' claim for damages under their homeowner's insurance policy. Peerless moved for summary judgment arguing that the language in the homeowner's policy was clear and unambiguous and excluded coverage for the claims Plaintiffs made. Triton and Veolia filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that neither of them had a contractual or common-law responsibility to Plaintiffs for the damage to their property because a lease service agreement with the City of Cranston relieved them of responsibility for the damage and because the flooding that caused Plaintiffs' damages was caused by an "Act of God." Agreeing with the superior court's reasoning for granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiffs' case.