Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An employee of a tribal enterprise sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court. Petitioner John A. Waltrip fell on a patch of ice while working as a surveillance supervisor at a casino and injured primarily his right shoulder. Petitioner initially obtained treatment from his personal physician but Tribal First, the employer Osage Million Dollar Elm Casino's claim administrator, sent him to an orthopedic specialist who recommended surgery in 2009. Petitioner filed a claim in the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court on July 17, 2009, seeking medical treatment and temporary total disability. The Casino and Insurer Hudson Insurance Company asserted that court lacked jurisdiction based on the tribe's sovereign immunity. A hearing was held solely on the jurisdictional issue; the Workers' Compensation Court denied jurisdiction and dismissed the claim holding that the tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity and that the provisions of the tribe's workers' compensation policy did not subject the insurance company to liability for claims in state court. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari review. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the tribe enjoyed sovereign immunity and was not therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court; and (2) the workers' compensation insurer did not enjoy the tribe's immunity and was estopped to deny coverage under a policy for which it accepted premiums computed in part on the employee's earnings.

Assistant United States Attorney Richard Convertino led the prosecution of the Detroit Sleeper Cell defendants in 2003. Convertino was later removed from the case for alleged violations committed during the prosecution. The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) began an internal investigation into whether Convertino knowingly withheld evidence from the defense. A few months later, a reporter published an article in the Detroit Free Press including details of the OPR referral. Convertino brought suit, alleging that an unidentified DOJ employee willfully or intentionally disclosed confidential information protected by the Privacy Act to the reporter. After several years, Convertino moved for a motion to stay the proceedings on the ground he was pursuing discovery to learn the source's identity. The district court granted summary judgment to DOJ and denied Convertino's motion to stay. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's summary judgment, holding that the district court committed an abuse of discretion in denying Convertino's motion to stay, as (1) the district court mistakenly assumed Convertino could maintain discovery proceedings even after the Privacy Act litigation ended; and (2) Convertino submitted ample evidence to suggest that additional discovery could reveal the source's identity. Remanded.

Plaintiff-Appellee William Mohr was struck in Delaware as a pedestrian by a car insured in Delaware. He recovered the minimum $15,000 coverage limit from the carrier that insured the striking car. Plaintiff also sought to recover from Defendant-Appellant Progressive Northern Insurance Company which sold an automobile insurance policy to Plaintiff's mother. Under the policy, Plaintiff's mother was the named insured, and Plaintiff was a member of her household. The Progressive policy, by its terms, did not cover Plaintiff as a pedestrian. The superior court held nonetheless that Plaintiff was entitled to recover under Progressive's policy because insofar as it denied PIP coverage, the policy conflicted with the Delaware automobile insurance statute which mandated such coverage. Progressive appealed. The court ordered Progressive to pay the difference between the amount Plaintiff recovered from the striking-car's policy and PIP limit of his mother's policy. Finding no error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Appellant Timothy Daniels appealed a superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility and North Country Associates, Inc. Appellant contended that the court erred in concluding that Narraguagus and North Country were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his disability discrimination and retaliation claims made pursuant to Maine's Human Rights Act. Appellant suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder in 2007 and thereafter was given work restrictions by his physician that prevented him from performing all of the work duties he had previously handled. In 2008, Appellant underwent surgery and then began a leave of absence. A few months later, Appellant notified his employer that he was applying for more leave at her insistence. In that letter, Appellant also reported that he had been cleared for light duty work, accused his supervisor of refusing to accommodate his disability, and asked for light duty work. No work was afforded to Appellant as a result of that letter. Appellant suffered another work-related injury to his right shoulder in 2009, and, although he did not lose any time from work as a result of that injury, he was restricted to modified duty for the next three months. During that period Appellant was disciplined for performance issues. Early in November 2009, when Daniels no longer had any work restrictions, a new Narraguagus administrator gave Appellant a performance improvement plan for failing to complete some tasks at all and failing to complete other tasks on time. In November, 2009, in response to the complaint that he filed in 2008, the Commission issued Appellant a right-to-sue letter pursuant to the Human Rights Act. When state regulators visited Narraguagus to conduct a licensing inspection, they uncovered issues that resulted in fines to the facility. Narraguagus blamed Appellant for the negative inspection and terminated his employment on January 29, 2010. After his termination, Appellant filed a two-count complaint against Narraguagus and North Country. On appeal, Appellant advanced two theories of liability against North Country: (1) that it can be liable because it is part of an integrated enterprise with Narraguagus, and (2) that it acted in Narraguagus’s interest in discriminating against him. Finding multiple issues of disputed facts regarding North Country's involvement in the actions that Appellant claimed constituted discrimination and retaliation, the Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In August 2004, Plaintiff-Appellant Gwyniece Hutchins, a letter carrier with the United States Postal Service, stepped on an improperly fitted manhole cover maintained by the Town of Ninety Six, South Carolina. The manhole cover flipped up, and Plaintiff fell into the manhole, sustaining serious injuries. Because she was injured in the course of her duties as a United States Postal Service employee, she filed a claim for workers’ compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA). The Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs accepted Plaintiff's claim as covered by FECA and paid her lost wages and medical benefits. In 2007, Plainitff accepted an offer of judgment arising from a South Carolina state court action that she brought against the Town. The Department of Labor asserted that it was entitled to recover a portion of that judgment. Plaintiff opposed the Department of Labor's assertion, arguing that the Town was not a "person" under 5 U.S.C. sections 8131 and 8132 and that if 5 U.S.C. section 8131 was construed to allow such a claim, it would be unconstitutional. The Office of Workers' Compensation rejected Plaintiff's arguments and determined that the Department of Labor was entitled to reimbursement. Plaintiff paid the sum but appealed the Office of Workers’ Compensation's decision to the Employees' Compensation Appeals Board. The Appeals Board affirmed. Because the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Department of Labor that the Town qualified as a "person other than the United States," the Court upheld the district court's determination that Plaintiff reimburse the Department of Labor from her judgment.

When calculating the income benefit for he claimant's work-related injury, the ALJ apportioned sixty-three percent of the twenty-one percent permanent impairment rating that existed at maximum medical improvement (MMI) to a pre-existing active condition, which was non-compensable. The court of appeals affirmed the workers' compensation board's decision to vacate the calculation on the ground that the ALJ should have subtracted the pre-existing active impairment rating that existed immediately before the injury from the impairment rating that existed at MMI and based the income benefit on the remainder. The employer appealed, arguing that nothing prevented the ALJ from apportioning the impairment rating at MMI based on permissible inferences drawn from the medical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board and court of appeals applied the correct methodology for determining the impairment rating upon which to base income benefits.

In 2004 an ambulance, answering an emergency call, drove through a stop sign and was hit by a passenger vehicle that had the stop sign in its favor. The injured driver of the passenger car sued the ambulance driver and Massac County Hospital, for which he worked, and recovered $667,216.30 for negligence. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the situation was governed by the Vehicle Code, not by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, which protects local public entities and their employees from liability for injuries "caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle or firefighting or rescue equipment, when responding to an emergency call." The Vehicle Code imposes duties on drivers of both public and private emergency vehicles to refrain from negligence. The supreme court reversed. The evidence was insufficient to establish the willful and wanton conduct that might preclude municipal immunity. The statutes at issue are not in conflict; each governs in its own sphere. Under the plain language of the Tort Immunity Act, the legislature has chosen to grant immunity from negligence liability to public employees and employers, such as the driver and hospital, and this result is not abrogated by the Vehicle Code.

Appellee received temporary total disability compensation (TTC) for a period of a year and a half during which time Appellee also helped his wife with her business. Appellee was not paid for his services. Appellant Industrial Commission of Ohio learned of these activities, determined that they constituted "work," and concluded that TTC should not have been paid. Accordingly, the TTC award was vacated and overpayment was declared. In addition, the Commission found McBee had committed fraud by submitting disability paperwork during the relevant time period, in which Appellee certified he was not working. The court of appeals overturned the finding of fraud after concluding that the evidence did not prove McBee knew that his unpaid activities for his wife's company constituted "work" for purposes of TTC eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that McBee knowingly misled the Commission because there was no evidence McBee knew his unpaid activities constituted work that would preclude TTC.

This appeal was brought by Appellant following two separate orders of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Allied Warehousing Services, Inc., the Appellee, dismissing Appellant's workers' compensation fraud and common law fraud claims and granting summary judgment to Appellee, finding it to be a special employer of Appellant for the purpose of workers' compensation immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on Appellant's workers' compensation and common law fraud claims because there was no basis to conclude that the alleged fraudulent conduct had any prejudicial effect on the decision of the ALJ regarding the suspension of Appellant's temporary total disability benefits; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee on Appellant's negligence claim on the basis that Appellee was Appellant's special employer, thus entitling Appellee to workers' compensation immunity from such a negligence claim.

Appellant had an allowed workers' compensation claim arising from a 2002 injury. Appellant retired from Appellee a year later and never worked again. In 2009, the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application for temporary total disability compensation (TTC) after finding, among other things, that Appellant had abandoned the work force for reasons unrelated to his injury. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion in denying TTC. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not credibly assert that he had lost income due to his industrial injury, and therefore, the Commission did not err in denying TTC.