Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Relator Minh Nguyen was injured after falling from a ladder while employed by Audio Communications. Nguyen filed an amended petition to seek benefits for permanent total disability, but his petition did not seek to establish the date of onset of permanent disability. After a compensation judge awarded Nguyen benefits from March 4, 2008, for permanent total disability, Audio Communications petitioned the compensation judge for determination of the date of onset. The judge found that Nguyen became permanently and totally disabled as of March 1, 2007. Nguyen then petitioned to require Audio Communications to pay the attorney fees he incurred in partially succeeding in opposing Audio Communications' petition for determination of the date of onset of permanent total disability. The compensation judge denied the claim for attorney fees, and the WCCA affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employer is not liable for the attorney fees incurred by an injured employee in successfully defending against the employer's petition to offset social security disability benefits paid to the employee against benefits paid by the employer for permanent total disability, where the employee's attorney fees can be paid from ongoing workers' compensation benefits paid to the employee.

The trial court awarded workers' compensation benefits to an injured lineman who had violated a rule requiring the use of protective gloves while in a bucket lift. The employer appealed, contending that the statutory defenses of willful misconduct and, more particularly, the willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or device precluded recovery. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the case, holding that because the evidence established that the employee admitted his knowledge of a regularly enforced safety rule, understood the rationale for the rule, and willfully failed to comply, the injuries he suffered because of the rule violation were not compensable.

Claimant Kelly Mowdy filed a workers' compensation claim after a spider bit him. Claimant worked as a floor hand for Petitioner Nomac Drilling, LLC when he noticed two red bumps on his knee. He reported the bumps to his supervisor, who seemed unconcerned about the injury. Over the course of a few days, the bumps grew swollen, infected, turned dark red and purple, and would later be diagnosed as an abscessed spider bite in which methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) cultures were found. Claimant underwent surgery to remove dead and infected tissue. Nomac denied Claimant's injury was the result of his employment. The case was tried, and testimony revealed that Claimant's living arrangements while working for Nomac were in a heavily wooded area that "was not real clean, not real kept up." A big hole underneath his bed lead all the way to the outdoors. The Workers' Compensation Court found Claimant's testimony was credible and persuasive. The court concluded that the incident was the predominant cause of Claimant's right leg injury, and awarded Claimant TTD benefits. Nomac appealed to the three-judge panel. The panel sustained the award. The Court of Civil Appeals, however, vacated the award and ordered the claim dismissed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "an appellate court must sustain the Workers' Compensation Court's decision where there is any competent evidence supporting the decision. Claimant's expert medical report [was] not defective, and there [was] sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the Claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment."

The Workers' Compensation hearing officer terminated Petitioner Gloria Clay's benefits, finding her employer had sufficiently proved the availability of jobs such that Petitioner was capable of earning at least ninety percent of her pre-injury wages. The court of appeal reversed, finding the jobs identified by the vocational rehabilitation counselor were not available to Petitioner. Finding no manifest error in the hearing officer's decision, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the hearing officer's ruling terminating Petitioner's benefits.

Plaintiff sued the city after he was injured by a falling tree during a softball game on a public field owned by the city. The city appealed the denial of its motion for summary judgment based on the ground that it was immune from suit pursuant to the recreational use statute, G.L.c. 21, section 17c. The city argued that it was entitled to immediate appellate review of the denial under the doctrine of present execution. Although the court held that the doctrine did not apply in the circumstances of the case, the court nonetheless considered the merits of the city's appeal and concluded that the denial of its motion for summary judgment was appropriate.

Matthew Thorpe was the owner of a self-storage facility and operated a side business that installed residential porch railings. While installing metal sheets on the roof of a customer's building, Thorpe fell through a skylight to his death. His widow, Alissa Thorpe, filed with the Workers' Compensation Commission a claim for worker's compensation benefits. The deputy commissioner (1) found Alissa was entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, and (2) awarded $48 payable weekly for 500 weeks. The Commission agreed with the deputy commissioner, and the court of appeals affirmed. Alissa appealed, arguing that the court of appeals erred in holding that $48 was Thorpe's average weekly wage applicable to the claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the deputy commissioner did not err in determining Thorpe's average weekly wage.

Employee sought workers compensation benefits after receiving two injuries at her place of employment. While working for Employer, Employee received a salary increase of $1000. Although Employee received a salary increase of $1000 per month for more than a year, Employer claimed the increase was supposed to have been $1000 per year. The deputy commissioner calculated a weekly compensation rate based on the $1000 per month raise Employer actually paid Employee. The district court reversed and instead used the $1000 per year figure Employer claimed was accurate. The court of appeals reversed and determined that the $1000 per month raise should be included in the calculation of Employee's compensation rate. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and remanded the case for a factual determination as to Employer's claim that it accidentally overpaid Employee $916 per month.

Michael Joyce, who was frequently exposed to airborne asbestos while working, died of lung cancer. His last documented exposure to asbestos dust was while working for Commercial Welding. A Workers' Compensation Board hearing officer later awarded the estate of Joyce benefits on a petition for an award of compensation and ordered benefits paid to Mary Joyce, Michael's widow, on a petition for death benefits. Commercial Welding appealed the hearing officer's decision as well as the hearing officer's determinations that (1) it had not cured a previously established violation of the Board's "fourteen-day-rule" because it had not paid interest on the required payment imposed for the violation, and (2) it was not permitted to offset the amount of the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary by the amount of the payment for the fourteen-day rule violation. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the hearing officer's decision. The Court (1) disagreed with the hearing officer's decision that interest was due on the required payment to the Estate, but (2) agreed that the required payment amount could not be used to offset the death benefits ordered to be paid to Mary.

Plaintiff-Appellant Danni Lynch appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her action against The New Public School District No. 8 for breach of contract, damage to professional reputation, intentional infliction of emotional harm and negligent infliction of emotional harm. Appellant had taught fifth grade classes at Stony Creek school for eighteen years. In 2008, she was informed she would be transferred to Round Prairie school to teach second grade. She sent a letter to the District's superintendent asking why she was being transferred. The District responded that the decision to transfer her was made "to promote the best interests of the students" and that the decision would not be changed. Appellant did not show on the first day she was to teach second grade; the District construed Appellant's letter explaining why she was a no-show as a resignation. Appellant then filed suit against the District. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) Appellant was not entitled to a notice of nonrenewal; (2) the District did not violate its grievance procedures; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to compel discovery. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Appellant Robert Johnson appealed a district court's judgment affirming an administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision that North Dakota Workforce Safety Insurance (WSI) was not liable for his right shoulder condition, and that he had a retained earnings capacity of $290.00 per week. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "a reasoning mind" reasonably could have found Appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his right shoulder pain was substantially accelerated or substantially worsened by his work injury and vocational training, and that WSI proved Appellant had a retained earnings capacity of $290.00 per week. Accordingly, the Court affirmed WSI's judgment.