Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a physician, sought compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 300aa-1 to -34, alleging that Hepatitis B vaccination caused her multiple sclerosis. The Special Master dismissed her petition as untimely. The Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit held that, contrary to precedent, the Act's statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, and that some claims brought under the Act are subject to equitable tolling. The court rejected a discovery rule and concluded that plaintiff's claim did not meet equitable tolling criteria. The Sixth Circuit subsequently remanded for a determination of whether plaintiff should be awarded reason-able attorneys’ fees and costs. Although she did not ultimately prevail on the merits, her appeal prompted a change of law in a limited way that potentially opens the door to certain Vaccine Act petitioners who otherwise would have been precluded from seeking redress.

Petitioner Thomas Moore appealed a judgment that dismissed his claim for medical expenses incurred by his son, M.M., in their personal injury action against Fargo Public School District No. 1 and Eugenia Hart. In May 2004, M.M., a 15-year-old student at Discovery Middle School in Fargo, was seriously injured while practicing a bike stunt in the school auditorium in preparation for '60s Day, part of the curriculum for Hart's history class. Moore and M.M. brought a personal injury action against the District and Hart. The district court dismissed the action against the District as a matter of law, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of Hart. The Supreme Court concluded the court erred in ruling the recreational use immunity statutes barred the action against the District and erred in excluding certain evidence from the jury in the action against Hart, and we reversed and remanded for a new trial. On remand, Hart settled, and the case was tried to the jury only against the District. At the close of the evidence, the district court rejected the District's request to include a line on the special verdict form for apportioning fault to Petitioner, concluding there was no evidence from which a jury could find him was at fault. The jury returned a verdict allocating 30 percent fault to "Eugenia Hart and any other employee of the Fargo Public School District" and 70 percent fault to M.M. The jury awarded Petitioner $285,000 for past economic damages based on M.M.'s medical expenses incurred while he was a minor. Because M.M.'s fault was greater than the fault of the District, the court entered judgment dismissing the action and awarding costs in favor of the District. The court also denied Moore's request to have judgment entered in his favor for $85,500, representing 30 percent of the $285,000 awarded by the jury for M.M.'s past medical expenses. Following the majority rule, the court concluded "a child's negligence should be considered in determining the extent of a parent's recovery against a third party for medical expenses paid." Because Petitioner's claim for past economic damages derived from M.M.'s injuries, and M.M. was denied recovery under North Dakota's modified comparative fault laws, the Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly dismissed Petitioner's claim for medical expenses.

Plaintiff, 12 years old, was bitten by a barracuda while playing in shallow water near Buck Island Reef National Monument. Buck Island is accessible only by watercraft and is open to the public for recreational activities. When boat owners apply for a permit to visit, they receive a brochure detailing hazards. There are also signs posted on the Island, warning of the same hazards. The warnings indicate that barracuda should be treated with caution, but are not usually aggressive toward humans. The government was aware of only one incident in 22 years involving a barracuda bite near Buck Island. Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671, alleging negligent failure to warn. The district court dismissed, citing the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Third Circuit affirmed. No statute, regulation, or policy mandated any particular method for warning about marine hazards. The National Park Service has discretion regarding whether to provide warnings and the extent of any such warnings, in light of the information available.

Several Citites and their employees, police officers J.J. Oglesby, J.M. Stewart, A.T. Caffey, Q.O. Commander, and N.W. McMahon petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Plaintiffs Dashad Berry, Kamessa Williams, and Miguel Johnson. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from a traffic stops conducted by the City officers. Each of plaintiffs suffer from a type of paralysis that inhibited their abilities to respond quickly and directly to officers' orders incident to the officers' initial investigations. Plaintiffs sued the City and the individual officers alleging assault and battery, wantonness, negligence, negligent hiring, negligent training and negligent supervision. A trial court entered an order denying the City and officers' motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the City and officers argued they were immune to Plaintiffs' claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Officers Oglesby and McMahon showed a clear legal right to the relief sought, and, as to them, their petition was granted and the trial court was directed to enter a summary judgment in their favor. Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief they sought, and, as to them, their petition was denied. However, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought as to the claims against it based on the acts of Officers Stewart, Commander, and Caffey, and its petition was denied as to those claims. Finally, the City has failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought based on the claims alleging negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and its petition was denied as to those claims.

Employee was injured while working for Employer. An MRI revealed evidence of previous back surgeries, which was the first record provided to Employer of Employee's previous permanent physical impairment. Employer eventually awarded Employee permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits. Employer's Insurance carrier sought reimbursement from the subsequent injury account for private carriers (Account) under Nev. Rev. Stat. 616B.587(4). The Nevada Division of Industrial Relations (DIR) denied the request for reimbursement, noting that section 616.587(4) had not been satisfied because Employer did not have knowledge of Employee's prior permanent physical impairment until after her industrial injury. An appeals officer affirmed. The district court denied Employer's petition for judicial review based on its determination that the appeals officer interpreted section 616.587 correctly. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not err in its judgment because an employer is required to acquire knowledge of an employee's permanent physical impairment before a subsequent injury occurs to qualify for reimbursement from the subsequent injury account for private carriers under section 616B.587(4).

While receiving permanent total disability compensation, Appellant Donald McNea's was engaged in the illegal sale of narcotics. Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio terminated McNea's benefits after finding that he had engaged in sustained remunerative employment while receiving those benefits. McNea filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court found no abuse of discretion had occurred and denied the writ. McNea appealed, challenging the Commission's finding that he was performing, or capable of performing, sustained remunerative work while receiving benefits, a determination that generated a declaration of overpayment for compensation paid during that period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in characterizing McNea's remunerative employment as sustained, and the Commission did not violate McNea's due process rights by terminating his benefits while he was in prison.

Claiming that the FAA, DOT, and SSA violated the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(4)(A), by sharing his records with one another, respondent filed suit alleging that the unlawful disclosure to the DOT of his confidential medical information, including his HIV status, had caused him "humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, fear of social ostracism, and other severe emotional distress." The District Court granted summary judgment against respondent, concluding that respondent could not recover damages because he alleged only mental and emotional harm, not economic loss. Reversing the District Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "actual damages" in the Act was not ambiguous and included damages for mental and emotional distress. Applying traditional rules of construction, the Court held that the Act did not unequivocally authorize an award of damages for mental or emotional distress. Accordingly, the Act did not waive the Government's sovereign immunity from liability for such harms. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.

Claimant injured his shoulder during his employment. Claimant and Employer agreed to settle the matter. Claimant subsequently underwent a surgery, which Employer failed to pre-authorize. Claimant then filed several motions, including a motion to reopen. An ALJ determined (1) the surgery was reasonable and necessary; (2) Employer must pay for the procedure and related expenses; (3) the parties' settlement precluded any claim for TTD benefits relative to the surgery; and (4) Employer's failure to pre-authorize or contest the surgery within thirty days did not warrant the imposition of sanctions. The workers' compensation board reversed with respect to future TTD benefits and affirmed otherwise. The court of appeals reversed with respect to future TTD and reinstated the ALJ's decision. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of a future TTD award, holding that the terms of the parties' agreement barred a future TTD claim; and (2) reversed with respect to the issue of sanctions, holding that the case must be remanded to the ALJ to reconsider the question of sanctions based on a correct understanding of Employer's obligations and any other considerations relevant to the reasonableness of its action under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.310(1) and 803 Ky. Admin. Reg. 25:012, 2(1)(a).

Claimant Randy Lewis sought benefits for work-related lumbar spine injuries sustained in 2001 and 2002 and a work-related cervical spine injury sustained in 2005. An ALJ awarded 425 weeks of partial disability benefits at the rate of $315 per week for the lumbar injuries beginning in 2004 and 425 weeks of partial disability benefits at the rate of $498 per week beginning in 2007. Employer filed a petition for reconsideration, noting that the combined weekly benefits would equal $813 during the weeks they overlapped and that Claimant was not entitled to receive combined weekly benefits totaling more than $607, the maximum benefit that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(a) allowed for total disability. The ALJ granted the petition and amended the claims, concluding that the separate partial disability awards did not entitle Claimant to receive at any time combined weekly benefits that exceeded the maximum for permanent total disability. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the maximum benefit permitted by section 342.703(1)(a) applies to multiple partial disability awards and does not entitle a worker to be compensated at one time for more than total disability.

Plaintiffs-Appellants JoAn and Fred Ball were patrons of the City of Blackfoot's municipal pool. JoAn slipped on ice accumulated on the sidewalk between the pool and the parking lot. The Balls brought suit against the City. A district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, dismissing the Balls' claims on grounds that property owners are not liable for injuries resulting from natural accumulations of snow or ice. The Balls appealed. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court appealed the wrong legal standard to the Balls' case, and therefore its grant of summary judgment was in error. The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.