Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After a work-related injury left appellant Laurie Vandenberg (a nurse) with a permanent partial impairment, she applied for reemployment benefits. The rehabilitation specialist assigned to her case used two job descriptions to describe one of her former jobs because the specialist did not think that a single job description adequately described that former job. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that only one job description was needed and that appellant retained the physical capacity to perform the functions of that job description; it therefore denied her reemployment benefits. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. Appellant appealed, arguing that the Board erred in selecting only one job description because the job description it selected did not adequately describe the job she held. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the Commission’s decision. View "Vandenberg v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and appellants Rosemary Morgan and Michelle Luna (collectively plaintiffs) were the widow and daughter, respectively, of decedent Mike Morgan. Morgan suffered fatal injuries when defendant Thomas Durnin crashed head-on into Morgan's vehicle as Durnin was fleeing from a Beaumont Police Officer during a vehicle pursuit that lasted nearly 12 minutes. As relevant to this appeal, plaintiffs' operative complaint alleged a wrongful death cause of action against defendants City of Beaumont (City) and the Beaumont Police Department (BPD). The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding they were immune from liability pursuant to Vehicle Code section 17004.7. On appeal, plaintiffs argued the court erred in granting summary judgment because defendants failed to show by sufficient evidence that BPD as a matter of law promulgated a vehicle pursuit policy and provided the requisite training as required under section 17004.7. After review, the Court of Appeal was persuaded by plaintiffs' argument and agreed that defendants failed to proffer sufficient evidence to establish as a matter of law that BPD promulgated its vehicle pursuit policy as required under section 17004.7. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's decision. View "Morgan v. Beaumont Police Dept." on Justia Law

Karen Dixon, recently substituted as appellant for her deceased husband Donald, and appealed a Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) decision dismissing her appeal based on a nonjurisdictional timeliness defense that Secretary of Veterans Affairs Robert McDonald waived. Mr. Dixon was diagnosed in 2003 with sarcoidosis of the lungs and transverse myelitis. He filed a claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) seeking benefits for his sarcoidosis, which he alleged was connected to his service. A VA regional office denied Mr. Dixon’s claim, and the Board of Veterans Appeals affirmed. Acting pro se, Mr. Dixon filed a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court sixty days beyond the 120-day filing deadline set out in 38 U.S.C. 7266(a). The Veterans Court denied Mr. Dixon equitable tolling. He obtained pro bono counsel and filed a request for reconsideration of this denial, but the Veterans Court denied that request too. Mr. Dixon appealed, but then he died of his medical conditions while his appeal was pending. The Federal Circuit reversed because the Veterans Court’s denial of an extension of time had effectively denied Mr. Dixon’s new pro bono counsel access to evidence he would need to prove his claim. On remand, the Veterans Court substituted Mrs. Dixon and requested briefing from the parties on whether equitable tolling excused Mr. Dixon’s late filing. The Secretary responded by waiving his objection. Because the Veterans Court did not have the sua sponte authority to grant the Secretary relief on a defense he waived, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of Mrs. Dixon’s appeal and remanded for consideration on the merits. View "Dixon v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Maurice Sullivan appealed a Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims' judgment which affirmed a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals conclusion that the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) had satisfied its duty to assist Sullivan with a request to reopen his claim. Sullivan filed a claim for service-connected benefits for back and neck injuries. He sought treatment in 1984 for back and neck pain at a VA medical facility in Asheville, North Carolina, but that the doctors found nothing wrong with his back and neck. The VA denied Sullivan’s claim, finding that the medical evidence of record did not establish service-connection for his injuries. Ten years later, Sullivan submitted new evidence and sought to reopen his claim. The Board denied the request to reopen, finding the newly submitted evidence was not material. The Board also determined that the VA had satisfied its duty to assist Sullivan in obtaining identified and available evidence. After review, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Veterans Court relied on the wrong legal standard in affirming the Board’s determination that the duty to assist was satisfied. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sullivan v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Wade Thompson appealed a Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims' judgment which affirmed a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals denying Thompson a disability rating in excess of 20% for degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine prior to March 8, 2011. The Veterans Court’s decision was based in part upon its interpretation of 38 C.F.R. 4.40 in light of section 4.71a. Thompson’s appeal raised a question of first impression for the Federal Circuit: whether section 4.40 provided a basis for a rating separate from section 4.71a. After review of the applicable statutes, the Court concluded "no" and affirmed the Veterans Court. View "Thompson v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Petitioner Raymond Cover appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board order denying his request for reinstatement to his former part-time position with the respondent, the New Hampshire Liquor Commission (Commission). Cover was a part-time employee of the Commission. In late May 2013, he sustained a work-related injury. The Commission sent him workers’ compensation forms on June 5 and warned him that he faced termination if he did not provide medical documentation by June 14 to justify his absence from work. On June 6, Cover gave the forms to his physician, who submitted them to the Commission on June 17, three days after the Commission’s deadline. Cover acknowledged that he did not submit any medical documentation to the Commission by June 14. On June 13, the Commission’s insurance carrier denied Cover’s workers’ compensation claim, stating that it had not received medical documentation concerning his injury. On June 17, the Commission terminated Cover’s employment. The board based its denial upon New Hampshire Administrative Rules, Lab 504.05(b)(3), which stated that part-time employees were ineligible for reinstatement under the Workers’ Compensation Law. On appeal, Cover argued that Lab 504.05(b)(3) conflicted with RSA 281-A:25-a and was therefore invalid. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the plain language of RSA 281-A:25-a supported Cover’s argument that the right of reinstatement extended to part-time employees. "By stripping part-time employees of the right to reinstatement provided by RSA 281-A:25-a, the rule cannot be characterized as a rule that merely 'fill[s] in the details to effectuate the purpose of the statute.' Rather, the rule impermissibly modifies the statute and is therefore invalid." The Court vacated the board’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Raymond Cover" on Justia Law

In 2010, Gerald Durk Simpson shot Ryan Mitchell in the back outside of a coffee shop in Pocatello. Prior to the shooting, Simpson had been receiving mental health services from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s Adult Mental Health program. In fact, Simpson had been receiving services from the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) for most of his adult life. In June of that year, IDHW sent a letter to Simpson informing him that he was being released from its program. The shooting occurred a little over three months after Simpson was released from IDHW’s care and custody. The Bannock County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office filed a charge of Aggravated Battery against Simpson with notice that the State would seek an enhancement penalty for the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime. Approximately ten days after the shooting, psychologist Daniel Traughber, Ph.D., prepared a memorandum on behalf of the IDHW, explaining the processes and procedures that were used to implement the budget cuts so that patient mental health services would be terminated in a way that “reduced the risk of harm to patients and/or the community.” Mitchell appealed a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of the State after he brought suit alleging the State violated his constitutional and statutory victims’ rights and that the State was negligent when it discontinued Simpson’s services. Mitchell sought declaratory and injunctive relief for his victims’ rights claim and sought damages for his negligence claim. Mitchell argued: (1) the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) did not shield the State from liability for its decision to discontinue mental health services for Simpson; and (2) the victims’ rights laws provided a private cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief against a state agency. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Mitchell's negligence claim: " It is clear that the complaint alleges that when IDHW made the decision to close Simpson’s file, it negligently followed, or failed to follow, procedures that were put into place to determine whether a client’s file should be closed. The evidence does not indicate who made the decision to close Simpson’s file in particular or how that decision was made." The Court reversed with respect to the negligence claim, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mitchell v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals certified two questions of Oregon law to the Oregon Supreme Court. This case arose when plaintiff, who was legally blind, was injured when she stepped into a hole while jogging in a public park in the City of Portland (the City). Plaintiff filed a complaint against the City and defendants Gibson and Stillson. Defendant Gibson had created the hole to fix a malfunctioning sprinkler head; he was a park technician with primary responsibility for maintenance of the park. Defendant Stillson was the maintenance supervisor for all westside parks in the City. As framed by the Ninth Circuit, the questions were: (1) whether individual employees responsible for repairing, maintaining, and operating improvements on City-owned recreational land made available to the public for recreational purposes are “owner[s]” of the land, as defined in the Oregon Public Use of Lands Act, and therefore immune from liability for their negligence; and (2) if such employees are “owner[s]” under the Act, whether the Act, as applied to them, violated the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the individual employees in this case did not qualify as “owner[s]” under the Act, and that the Court need not address the second certified question. View "Johnson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal inmate, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680, alleging that a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) official withheld wages he was owed for his work while incarcerated. Plaintiff also filed related claims of discrimination, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court concluded that the record shows that BOP regulations allowed no discretion to refuse to pay the wages at that stage and that the refusal was not grounded in policy. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the claim on the basis of the pleading allegations. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment in regards to the pay claim. The court affirmed as to the other claims. View "Douglas v. United States" on Justia Law

Cathy Trimble and Ida Longmire petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Perry Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Crystal Lewis, individually and by and through her mother and next friend, Mary Lewis. In October 2012, Crystal was a 12th-grade student at Francis Marion High School. The school system was covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which generally required a school district to provide reasonable accommodations to assist any child deemed to have a "disability" as that term is defined by the Act. Crystal had a medical condition that required the Perry County public school system to provide her with certain special accommodations. Longmire was an English teacher at Francis Marion High School and also served as committee-member secretary for the school's Section 504 special-accommodations meetings. Longmire prepared an updated report of the special accommodations required by Section 504 intended to inform particular teachers of the 504 accommodations for specific students. Longmire placed a copy of the report in sealed envelopes, which were to be hand delivered to the teachers. Longmire asked Trimble, acting principal of the school, about distributing the envelopes. Trimble assigned a student office aide the task of delivering the envelopes to the teachers. Rather than delivering the envelopes as instructed, the student office aide opened one of the sealed envelopes and read about Crystal's medical condition. She shared that information about Crystal's medical condition with other students. Crystal commenced this action against Longmire, Trimble, the student office aide, the Perry County Board of Education, "Francis Marion High School," and other school administrators. In her complaint, Crystal alleged that she has faced ridicule, harassment, and bullying as a result of the dissemination of her confidential medical information. She asserted claims of negligence, wantonness, nuisance, breach of contract, and invasion of privacy against each defendant and claims of negligent hiring, training, and supervision against all the defendants except the student office aide and Longmire. Longmire and Trimble moved for a summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to State-agent immunity as to all claims asserted against them by Crystal. The Supreme Court determined that Longmire and Trimble were entitled to State-agent immunity. The trial court was ordered to vacate its order denying the motion for a summary judgment filed by Longmire and Trimble and to enter a summary judgment in their favor. View "Ex parte Trimble & Longmire" on Justia Law