Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Jimmie McMasters was working as an HVAC journeyman when he fell from a beam to a concrete floor and suffered an injury. McMasters applied for permanent total disability benefits claiming a total disability. The Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division denied the application. The Division did not dispute that McMasters could not return to work but instead contended that McMasters' failure to obtain alternative employment was due to a preexisting psychological condition and a poor effort to find work. The Medical Commission agreed and upheld the denial of benefits. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) McMasters established a prima facie case under the odd lot doctrine when he showed he could not return to his former employment, and the combination of his psychological and physical conditions precluded alternative employment; (2) the burden thereafter shifted to the Division to show that light work of a special nature, which McMasters could perform, was available; and (3) the Division did not meet its burden.

Employee injured his shoulder while working for Employer. Employer offered Employee light-duty work in Des Moines, which was 387 miles from Employee's residence. Employee declined Employer's offer to perform light-duty work, and as a result, Employer suspended Employee's workers' compensation benefits. Employee filed a workers' compensation claim. The workers' compensation commissioner concluded (1) Employer improperly suspended temporary disability benefits where Employer failed to offer Employee suitable work because the job was located a great distance from Employee's residence; and (2) Employee experienced a sixty percent industrial disability. The district court reversed in part, concluding that Employer offered Employee suitable work and thus, Employee forfeited his right to benefits during his period of refusal. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the commissioner did not err in finding Employer failed to offer Employee suitable work; and (2) the commissioner's findings with respect to the extent of Employee's industrial disability were supported by substantial evidence.

On June 28, 2010, Appellant Maria Gomez filed a Worker’s Compensation Complaint with the Industrial Commission (Commission) claiming benefits for an accident that occurred in 2009, when she injured her lower back lifting sixty-pound boxes. The injury occurred at Blackfoot Brass (Dura Mark). Appellant had previously suffered two work-related accidents while working with Dura Mark, one in 2002, the other in 2006, but had returned to work without restrictions after participating in physical therapy for both injuries. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on a Commission order denying reconsideration of Appellant's motion to reopen the record to allow for additional evidence on the issue of causation. The Industrial Commission previously ordered that Appellant had failed to prove the medical treatment she received for a back injury was related to an industrial accident and injury. At the emergency hearing pursuant to the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure adopted by the Commission, Appellant introduced evidence regarding her entitlement to reasonable and necessary medical care pursuant to I.C. 72-432, but the referee denied Appellant's claim on the grounds of causation. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's judgment. In doing so, the Court wanted to provide a "clear message that without a specific stipulation that causation will be a contested issue at the hearing pursuant to I.C. 72-713, and especially if there is a difference of opinion as to causation by opposing parties and their experts, claimant’s attorneys should no longer be lulled by anything other than a stipulation to all legal prerequisites and elements for recovery and be prepared to present evidence of a causal connection between the industrial injury or sickness and the required treatment."

Appellant Ethel Kelly sued the Municipality of Anchorage (MOA) for negligence after she stepped into an uncovered valve box assembly pipe in a crosswalk and sustained injuries. MOA conceded that the valve box cover was missing, but denied it was responsible for this condition. MOA moved for summary judgment in superior court on grounds that it had no duty to Appellant since it neither caused nor had notice of the dangerous condition. Appellant filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to MOA. Appellant appeals. Because material issues of fact existed concerning whether MOA caused the defect and whether it had constructive notice of it, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Decedent Charles Gray sought treatment for epilepsy at Defendant University of Colorado Hospital. In the course of his withdrawal from medication, hospital staff left Decedent unattended and he died after suffering a seizure. Plaintiffs, decedent’s estate and family members, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging that the hospital (and affiliated doctors, nurses, and staff) deprived Decedent of life without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failing to state a constitutional claim. Plaintiffs appealed. Applying the appropriate legal standards, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but for reasons somewhat different than those of the district court: "The state actor’s affirmative act creating the danger or rendering the victim more vulnerable to it does not constitute a constitutional deprivation."

Plaintiff Donna Morris brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for unlawful arrest and excessive force on behalf of her deceased husband, William Morris III, against Defendants Officer Jaime Noe and the City of Sapulpa, Oklahoma. She alleged Defendants violated her husband's rights when Noe forceably arrested him and caused him injury. Defendant Noe moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the district court denied his motion. Defendant Noe then appealed. Finding that Mr. Morris "posed no threat to Noe or others," and that the officer had reason to believe Mr. Morris was "at most, a misdemeanant," the Tenth Circuit held Defendant was not entitled to qualified to immunity on either of Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court.

Plaintiff Steven Ford appealed a superior court's order that dismissed his negligence claims against Defendants the Town of Windham and the New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT). In late 2008 the vehicle in which Plaintiff was a passenger was struck by another vehicle in Windham. A severe ice storm had caused a power outage that had rendered the street and crossing lights at the intersection where the accident occurred inoperable. Several hours before the accident, both the Town and DOT had received notice that the lights were inoperable because of the storm. The accident caused Plaintiff to suffer severe injuries. He sued for negligence. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing they owed Plaintiff no duty to warn of any hazardous condition that might have existed because of the ice storm. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's negligence claims.

Plaintiffs Jason and Jennifer Antosz appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Doree Allain. Defendant owned property in Epping. In early 2008 the Town's fire department was called to Defendant's house because of a fire caused by the home's hot water heater. Jason Antosz was a volunteer firefighter with the Epping Fire Department who responded to the call. As he arrived on the scene, he walked down the home's driveway which was covered with packed snow and ice. He slipped and fell and was seriously injured. Plaintiffs sued Defendant for negligence, alleging the driveway was in an unsafe and unreasonable condition. Defendant argued that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the "Fireman's Rule." Finding that the Fireman's Rule only applied to paid firefighters, the Supreme Court overruled the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In this appeal the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the parties' indemnity agreement clearly and unequivocally indemnified the Snohomish County Public Transportation Benefit Area Corporation (doing business as Community Transit) for losses resulting from its own negligence. Upon review, the Court concluded that the language of the agreement, and in particular language providing that indemnity would not be triggered if losses resulted from the sole negligence of Community Transit, clearly and unequivocally evidenced the parties' intent that the indemnitor, FirstGroup America, Inc. (doing business as First Transit) indemnify Community Transit for losses that resulted from Community Transit's own negligence. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to the contrary and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Defendant Sylvia Montgomery filed suit against the Mississippi Transportation Commission (Commission) in the Circuit Court of Yazoo County after she was injured when her car struck a pothole in the northbound lane of Interstate 55 near Vaughan. The Commission filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming it was exempt from liability under several provisions of the Mississippi Torts Claim Act (MTCA). The court denied the Commission's motion. A three-justice panel of the Supreme Court granted the Commission's petition for interlocutory appeal. Upon review of the parties' briefs and the record, the Court found the trial court erred by not determining whether the duty to warn of a dangerous condition on the highway is a discretionary duty under the "public-function" test. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's denial of the Commission's motion for summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.