Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Craig Ali was a police officer for appellant, the village of Oakwood. That spring, his department assigned him to perform traffic-control duties on a highway-construction project overseen by appellee, Kokosing Construction Company, Inc. Ali was injured while performing those duties. At issue was which entity was Ali's employer for purposes of his workers' compensation claim. A district hearing officer with the Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Kokosing was Ali's employer at the time of injury. A staff hearing officer reversed, finding the correct employer was Oakwood Village. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the commission, when confronted with two potential employers, may, but is not required to, use any of the State ex rel. Lord v. Daugherty and Fisher v. Mayfield factors it believes will assist analysis; (2) therefore, the commission did not abuse its discretion by not directly discussing the three enumerated Lord/Fisher factors; and (3) the staff hearing officer's decision was supported by evidence in the record.

Maine Public Employees Retirement System (the System) appealed a superior court judgment reversing a decision of the System’s Board of Trustees that denied Petitioner Ellen Goodrich basic life insurance coverage under the group life insurance plan administered by the System. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment in part and remanded the case for entry of a judgment: (1) vacating the decision of the Board; and (2) remanding to the Board with instructions to provide Goodrich with prospective basic life insurance coverage after she paid back premiums accrued to date.

In these consolidated appeals, the Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR) determined that Douglas County committed a prohibited labor practice when it increased union members' monthly health insurance premiums without negotiating. The County appealed, contending that the parties' collective bargaining agreement authorized its unilateral action and that its action did not change the status quo. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed (i) the CIR's determination that the County committed a prohibited labor practice in failing to negotiate health insurance premium increases; and (ii) the CIR's decision not to award attorney fees; but (2) reversed and vacated those portions of the CIR's orders requiring the County to reimburse union members for increased insurance premiums deducted from their wages, plus interest.

Appellant Brandon Bentley, a deputy sheriff with the Spartanburg County Sheriff's Department, alleged that he developed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PSTD) and depression after he shot and killed a suspect who attempted to assault him. An Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation Commission unanimously found that Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing a compensable mental injury that arose out of an "unusual or extraordinary condition" of employment for a Spartanburg County deputy sheriff. "Whether the shooting and killing of a suspect by a deputy sheriff while on duty is an extraordinary and unusual employment condition such that mental injuries arising from that incident are compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act" was the issue central to this case. Appellant asked the Supreme Court to reframe the issue, take it out of its particular employment context, and ask "whether killing another human being is "unusual." Upon review, the Court held that Appellant's testimony that he "might be in a situation where he might have to shoot someone," similar testimonies by Sheriff Wright that officers were aware of the possibility that they might be required to shoot and kill, Appellant's training in the use of deadly force, and the department's policy addressing when deadly force should be used constituted substantial evidence supporting the Appellate Panel's conclusion that Appellant's involvement in the shooting was not "extraordinary and unusual," but was a standard and necessary condition of a deputy sheriff's job.

An injured employee (Employee) sought workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury. A claims adjuster with Employer's workers' compensation insurer's (Insurer) third party administrator denied the claim. The Division of Workers' compensation determined that Employee was entitled to medical and temporary income benefits. Employee subsequently brought a bad faith action against Insurer, its third party administrator, and the claims adjuster (Defendants). During discovery, Employee sought communications made between Insurer's lawyer and Employer during the administrative proceedings. Defendants argued that the attorney-client privilege protected the communications. The trial court held that the privilege did not apply. The court of appeals subsequently denied mandamus relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney-client privilege did not protect the communications between Insurer and its insured.

Employee suffered an injury during the course of his employment that was compensable under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Petitioner insurance company provided workers' compensation coverage to Employee's employer. Petitioner disputed the impairment rating of twenty percent assigned by the doctor in the administrative proceedings. A hearing officer issued a decision finding that Employee had an impairment rating of twenty percent. The Division of Workers' Compensation upheld the decision. Petitioner appealed. The trial court granted Employee's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a reviewing court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to resolve an impairment rating appeal if the only rating presented to the agency was invalid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the absence of a valid impairment rating does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Remanded.

Plaintiffs Joseph and Josephine Iozzi owned a home located in Cranston. On October 15, 2005, excessive rainfall overwhelmed the sewer system servicing the Iozzis's home, causing water and sewage to back up and enter their basement, resulting in extensive damage to their home and personal property. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory relief and compensatory damages from Triton Ocean State, LLC (Triton); U.S. Filter Operating Services, Inc. (Veolia); and Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless). The complaint alleged that Triton and Veolia were jointly and severally liable for negligently "operating, maintaining and repairing the sewer disposal system" in the city. As to Peerless, the complaint alleged that it was liable for breach of contract for rejecting plaintiffs' claim for damages under their homeowner's insurance policy. Peerless moved for summary judgment arguing that the language in the homeowner's policy was clear and unambiguous and excluded coverage for the claims Plaintiffs made. Triton and Veolia filed a joint motion for summary judgment arguing that neither of them had a contractual or common-law responsibility to Plaintiffs for the damage to their property because a lease service agreement with the City of Cranston relieved them of responsibility for the damage and because the flooding that caused Plaintiffs' damages was caused by an "Act of God." Agreeing with the superior court's reasoning for granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of Plaintiffs' case.

This appeal arose out of Ryan Dorman's petition for an extension of his worker's compensation temporary total disability (TTD) benefits and for reimbursement of travel expenses incurred in travelling from Idaho to Cheyenne to obtain medical care. In May 2006, Dorman sought treatment from an Idaho physician for treatment of his alleged work-related injury. Due to the nature of Dorman's injury, he consulted multiple physicians, first in Idaho, then in Wyoming. With each consultation, the doctors indicated that the injury was outside of their scope of expertise, and referred Doman to another specialist. During the period that Dorman was changing physicians, the Division and Dorman negotiated a stipulation concerning his TTD benefits and other benefits. This followed OAH and district court decisions that largely reversed the Division's earlier determinations concerning TTD benefits and Dorman's need for continued medical treatment. The Stipulated Order also provided that medical benefits would be paid as directed by the district court's order. After the Division paid the stipulated TTD benefits, Dorman submitted a letter to the Division requesting extended benefits The Division thereafter issued a final determination denying them, and further denied several applications for travel expense reimbursement for Dorman's trips to Idaho and Cheyenne. The matters were referred to the OAH where a combined hearing was held on the denial of TTD benefits, denial of travel reimbursement, and denial of diagnostic testing related to Dorman's injury. The OAH upheld the denial of TTD benefits on the ground that Dorman had failed to make the required showing that the Idaho and Cheyenne doctors were the closest available medical providers. Dorman appealed the portion of the OAH order denying extended TTD benefits and travel reimbursement to the district court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the OAH denial of the travel reimbursement: Dorman could not prove that reimbursement of travel expenses was not supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Glass v. Gates" to answer whether the definition of "any motor vehicle" in OCGA 33-24-51(a) continued to be the broader definition of the term provided for in prior case law, notwithstanding the 2002 passage of OCGA 36-92-1. As inmates at the Troup County Correctional facility, Jonathan Glass and Tony Smith were operating tractors when Smith's tractor got stuck in a ditch. Donrell Gates, Glass' detail supervisor, instructed the men to attach a chain to the tractors so Glass could use his tractor to pull Smith's from the ditch. As Glass did so, Smith engaged his tractor's bush hog, causing a rock to take flight and pierce Glass' throat. Glass bled profusely and died later that day. Plaintiffs, Glass' minor son and the executor of his estate, brought a wrongful death and survivor action against Troup County and Gates. The county sought summary judgment, claiming plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The County asserted that by revising OCGA 33-24-51 (b) in 2002 (effective 2005), the legislature demonstrated its intent to apply the more narrow definition of "motor vehicle" found in OCGA 36-92-1 (6) in determining whether a local government waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance on a motor vehicle. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the county did not waive sovereign immunity because neither a tractor nor a bush hog could be deemed a "motor vehicle" under OCGA 36-92-1. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the broader definition of "motor vehicle" should have been applied under 33-24-51, and that therefore, the County waived its sovereign immunity as long as it purchased insurance for the tractor and bush hog used by Smith. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' reasoning, and affirmed by answering the appellate court's original question in the affirmative.

The Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division awarded benefits to Appellant Gary Mitcheson after he fell at work and injured his tailbone in July of 2007. Approximately two years later, the Division issued a final determination denying payment for medical care that Appellant claimed was related to his workplace injury. Appellant requested a contested case hearing, and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the Division's determination. Appellant appealed to the district court, which upheld the OAH's order. On appeal, Appellant challenged the OAH order contending: (1) the order was arbitrary and unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) the OAH's denial of payment for treating Appellant's tailbone was arbitrary; and (3) the OAH order denying payment for medical care contrary to the "Rule Out" rule was contrary to law. Finding the issues Appellant raised on appeal to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed the OAH's decision.