Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company appealed a superior court order that denied its motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioner Rebecca Rivera. The court ruled that an automobile policy (policy) issued to Rivera’s parents excluded liability coverage but afforded uninsured motorist coverage for injuries Rivera sustained in a single-vehicle accident in Dracut, Massachusetts. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in Petitioner's favor: "the terms of the owned vehicle exclusion appear to remove [Petitioner's vehicle] from the definition of uninsured motor vehicle even though, as to Rivera, there [was] no insurance available. While Liberty Mutual is free to limit the extent of its liability through the use of an exclusion it cannot do so in contravention of statutory provisions or public policy."

This appeal arose from an insurance coverage dispute where the City sought coverage from Genesis for 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims in the nature of malicious prosecution. Genesis filed suit against the City, seeking a declaratory judgment that its policies provided no coverage for the underlying actions. The district court granted summary judgment to Genesis and the City appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the policies did not provide the City insurance coverage for the claims. Because Genesis did not have an insurance contract with the City in 1977, when the underlying charges were filed, it did not have a duty to defendant and indemnify the city in the suits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The Workers' Compensation hearing officer terminated Petitioner Gloria Clay's benefits, finding her employer had sufficiently proved the availability of jobs such that Petitioner was capable of earning at least ninety percent of her pre-injury wages. The court of appeal reversed, finding the jobs identified by the vocational rehabilitation counselor were not available to Petitioner. Finding no manifest error in the hearing officer's decision, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the hearing officer's ruling terminating Petitioner's benefits.

A 2011 amendment to Section 71-3-51 provides that, "from and after July 1, 2011," decisions of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, rather than to the circuit court, as required under the previous version of the statute. On July 1, 2011, the Commission denied Petitioner Joseph Dewayne Johnson’s claim for benefits, so he appealed to the Supreme Court. The ordered the parties to brief two issues: whether Section 71-3-51, as amended was constitutional; and whether the Court had appellate jurisdiction over direct appeals from the Commission. Upon review, the Court concluded that Section 71-3-51 was constitutional, and that the Court had appellate jurisdiction over direct appeals from the Commission.

The Oklahoma Tax Commission assessed corporate income taxes against Vermont Corporation Scioto Insurance Company for 2001 through 2005, based on payments Scioto received from the use of Scioto's intellectual property by Wendy's restaurants in Oklahoma. In response, Scioto protested these assessments on the ground that it did not contract with the Wendy's restaurants in Oklahoma for use of the property in question and did not conduct any business whatsoever in Oklahoma. The Tax Commission denied Scioto's protest and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court previously granted certiorari. Upon review, the Court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals opinion, reversed the Tax Commission's denial of Scioto's protest and remanded the case with instructions to sustain Scioto's protest.

The Employment Appeal Board (Board) denied Willie Hall's application for unemployment insurance benefits. Hall filed a petition for judicial review. The district court affirmed the decision of the Board and assessed costs against Hall. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment as it related to court costs, holding (1) pursuant to Iowa Code 96.15(2), any individual claiming benefits shall not be charged fees of any kind, including court costs, in a proceeding under the statute by a court or an officer of the court; and (2) therefore, the district court erred by requiring that Hall pay court costs.

After an insolvent employer's insurance company also became insolvent, the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Self-Insurers Guaranty Association (SIGA) made workers' compensation payments to an injured worker. SIGA sued the Mississippi Insurance Guaranty Association (MIGA) for reimbursement of those payments, and the trial court ordered reimbursement. The issue came before the Supreme Court who, after consideration, concluded that SIGA's claim against MIGA did not fall within the statutory definition of a "covered claim," and reversed the trial court’s reimbursement decision.

Appellant Beverly Fetzer appealed a district court judgment that affirmed a Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) order denying her request for benefits. While walking down a hallway on her employer's premises and during work hours, Appellant thought she heard someone call her name. Turning in response, she caught her foot and fell, fracturing her left hip and wrist. No cause of the fall was apparent. Appellant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with WSI, and WSI denied her claim. Appellant submitted a request for reconsideration; WSI issued an order consistent with its prior decision, determining Appellant’s injury "occurred in the course of, but did not arise out of" her employment. WSI added, "Mere walking, without more, is not an activity that is sufficiently linked to Claimant's employment so that the injury can be deemed to have arisen from employment." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: “If merely being at work was sufficient to show causation, the legislature need not have required the 'arising out of' test." Appellant was unable to prove a causal connection between her employment and injury.

Employee, a truck driver, resigned from his employment with Employer after he developed arthritis. Employee later filed an occupational disease claim, which the Montana State Fund (MSF) denied. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) concluded that Employee's job duties were the major contributing cause of his arthritic condition, and therefore, Employee was suffering from an occupational disease. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in concluding that Grande was suffering from a compensable occupational disease arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment, as the WCC's findings of fact were supported by substantial, credible evidence, and its conclusions of law were correct.

Plaintiff-Appellant Allen Perius appealed a district court judgment following a jury verdict in favor of Appellee Nodak Mutual Insurance Company. In 2004, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident with an uninsured driver, Jacob Kessler. Plaintiff insured his vehicle with Nodak for basic no-fault benefits and uninsured motorist benefits. Nodak paid Plaintiff no-fault benefits as a result of the accident. Plaintiff did not seek further medical treatment until March 2005, when he saw a chiropractor. Plaintiff submitted the bills to Nodak for payment as no-fault benefits. After Plaintiff submitted to an independent medical examination, Nodak denied him payment for any medical treatment after December 31, 2004, concluding such treatment was unrelated to the accident. In 2007, Plaintiff brought suit against Kessler, alleging he negligently operated his motor vehicle and caused Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff also sued Nodak, alleging the company breached its insurance contract with him. Nodak denied liability, and asserted a cross-claim against Kessler regarding Plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim. Kessler did not answer the claims against him. In 2009, Nodak moved for summary judgment, arguing no competent, admissible evidence established his claimed injuries were caused by the accident. Plaintiff resisted the motion, and submitted the affidavits of two of his treatment providers who stated their belief that Plaintiff's injuries and treatment were due to the accident. The district court granted Nodak's motion for summary judgment, and this Court reversed and remanded, finding disputed issues of material fact existed. A trial was set on remand. Shortly after, Plaintiff sent Nodak amended responses to Nodak's interrogatories. Prior to trial, Nodak was informed of Plaintiff's intent to call a chiropractor, as an expert witness. Nodak filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the expert witness, alleging the expert was not properly disclosed.The district court granted Nodak's motion, but ordered the doctor would still be allowed to testify as a fact witness. The jury returned a verdict in Nodak's favor. The Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff did not properly disclose his witness and that the district court did not abuse its discretion excluding the expert's testimony as a discovery sanction.