Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Lavabit, a company that provided encrypted email service, and Ladar Levison, the company's sole and managing member, appealed the district court's order of contempt and imposition of monetary sanctions because Lavabit and Levison failed to comply with the Government's court orders under both the Pen/Trap Statute, 18 U.S.C. 3123-27, and the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2701-12, requiring Lavabit to turn over particular information related to a target in a criminal investigation. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding Lavabit and Levison in contempt once they admittedly violated the order. In view of Lavabit's waiver of its appellate arguments by failing to raise them in the district court, and its failure to raise the issue of fundamental or plain error review, there was no cognizable basis upon which to challenge the order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Lavabit, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Seitz and Welter were partners in Wasco, a property management company. Greg was also a police officer. Elgin’s police chief confronted Greg with the emails showing that Greg had used the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System (LEADS) to research cars parked in front of Wasco properties. Illinois limits use of LEADS to criminal justice purposes. The chief notified Gregg of a misconduct investigation regarding his use of LEADS. The city allegedly received its information after Tamara, Greg’s then wife and a fellow police officer, and Beeter accessed Greg’s email account and conveyed print-outs to the corporation counsel under cover of anonymity. Greg and Seitz sued Tamara and Beeter, alleging violations of the Federal Wiretap Act (FWA), the Stored Communications Act (SCA), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and state law claims. They sued Elgin under the FWA. The district court dismissed the complaint against the city, concluding that the FWA, 18 U.S.C. 2511(1) prohibits “persons” from intercepting communications, but does not extend its definition of “person” to municipalities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A 1986 amendment permits suit against governmental units by adding “entity” to the text, but only for substantive provisions that identify an “entity” as a potential violator of that provision. View "Seitz v. City of Elgin" on Justia Law

EPIC filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request with the NSA seeking disclosure of any communications between NSA and Google regarding encryption and cyber security. EPIC's FOIA request arose out of a January 2010 cyber attack on Google that primarily targeted the Gmail accounts of human rights activists. The court held that any response to EPIC's FOIA request might reveal whether NSA did or did not consider a particular cyber security incident, or the security settings in particular commercial technologies, to be a potential threat to U.S. Government information systems. Any such threat assessment, as well as any ensuing action or inaction, implicated an undisputed NSA "function" and thus fell within the broad ambit of Section 6 of the National Security Agency Act, Pub. L. No 86-36, section 6(a), 73 Stat. 63. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The Information Security Management Act, 44 U.S.C. 3541â49, requires that federal agencies meet information security standards. Compliance is monitored by the Office of Management and Budget. The Department of Justice purchased a license for plaintiffâs compliance product. Plaintiff participated with DOJ in seeking designation as a "Center of Excellence." Without notifying plaintiff, DOJ developed an alternative product, accessing plaintiff's database to learn the systemâs architecture. OMB selected DOJ as a Center of Excellence and required agencies to purchase from COEs. DOJâs product substituted its alternative for plaintiff's software. Plaintiff filed, in district court, a Lanham Act claim; a common law unfair competition claim; and a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Months later, plaintiff filed, in the Court of Federal Claims, claims of: breach of oral or implied contract, breach of license agreement, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed all but the Lanham Act claim. The Claims Court dismissed all claims, applying 28 U.S.C. 1500, which precludes it from exercising jurisdiction over "any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff ⦠has pending in any other court any suit ⦠against the United States." The Federal Circuit reversed, in part, reasoning that the license agreement claim does not arise from substantially the same facts as the district court claim.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, considering a suit by the city to collect taxes from a ticket reseller, requested a determination of whether municipalities may require electronic intermediaries to collect and remit amusement taxes on resold tickets. The Illinois Supreme Court held that state law preempts such a tax. The state has a long history of protecting consumers and has regulated auctioneers for more than 10 years and ticket resales for 20 years; it has regulated scalping in some form since 1923. The statutory scheme, and the debates which produced the Ticket Sale and Resale Act (720 ILCS 375/0.01) evince an intent to allow internet auction listing services to opt out of any obligation regarding local tax collection. The city overstepped its home rule authority.

Petitioner Barry Gregg challenged a Workersâ Compensation Commission (Commission) holding that denied him permanent partial disability benefits. Petitioner was injured on the job for Respondent Natchez Trace Electric Power (Natchez) and was unable to satisfactorily return to his job nor earn on-call compensation. Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed the Commissionâs decision to the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the Commission erred in reaching its decision. In the decision adopted by the Commission, the administrative law judge observed that Petitioner made more money after his injury than before he was injured. The appellate court affirmed the Commissionâs decision on the basis of a presumption that because of that earning discrepancy, Petitioner failed to prove that he suffered a loss of âwage-earning capacity.â The Supreme Court found that the Commission erred by considering Petitionerâs higher wage post-injury as determinative of his earning capacity. The Court found that Petitioner had rebutted the presumption regarding his earning capacity. Subsequently, the Court reversed both the Commissionâs and the appellate courtâs holdings and remanded the case for further proceedings.