Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After the Unified School District No. 365 initiated condemnation proceedings on property owned by Donald and Susan Diebolt, the trial judge appointed three appraisers, who valued the property at $278,800. During the trial, the trial court allowed Donald to express a valuation opinion as to the property but excluded Donald’s testimony regarding the value of the property that was not relevant to the jury’s determination and that was beyond Donald’s expertise. The Diebolts appealed the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse his discretion in excluding the evidence, where Donald was not qualified to perform a cost appraisal and did not have appraisal expertise. View "Unified Sch. Dist. No. 365 v. Diebolt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, school districts and individuals, filed suit against the State, alleging, among other claims, that the State violated the Kansas Constitution by failing to provide a suitable education to all Kansas students. A district court panel concluded (1) the State violated Kan. Const. art. VI when the legislature underfunded K-12 public education between fiscal years 2009 and 2012; (2) the legislature failed to consider the actual costs of providing a constitutionally required education before making its funding decisions; and (3) the legislature withheld or reduced certain funding to which school districts were statutorily entitled. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) certain Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring some claims; (2) the panel did not apply the correct constitutional standard in determining that the State violated the Article 6 requirement of adequacy in public education; and (3) the State created unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities by (i) withholding all capital outlay state aid payments to which certain school districts were otherwise entitled, and (ii) prorating the supplemental general state aid payments to which certain districts were entitled. Remanded. View "Gannon v. State" on Justia Law

The taxpayers in this case were out-of-state natural gas marketing companies, out-of-state local distribution companies that were certified as public utilities in their states, and out-of-state municipalities. Each taxpayer bought natural gas from producers or other marketers then delivered it to pipelines under contracts allowing the taxpayers to withdraw equivalent amounts of gas at a later time from out-of-state distribution points. The taxpayers filed requests for ad valorem tax exemption, claiming the natural gas was exempt under Kan. Const. art. 11, 1, which exempts merchants' inventory from ad valorem taxation but does not exempt tangible personal property owned by a public utility. The Kansas Court of Tax Appeals determined the natural gas was not exempt because the taxpayers were public utilities pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. 79-5a01. The Supreme Court held (1) the taxation at issue did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution; (2) section 79-5a01 was constitutional as applied to the out-of-state local distribution companies; but (3) section 79-5a01 was unconstitutional as applied to the out-of-state natural gas marketing companies and those taxpayers that were out-of-state municipalities because those entities were not public utilities under the meaning of the statute. View "In re Property Valuation Appeals of Various Applicants" on Justia Law

The Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment decided to issue an air emission source construction to permit Sunflower Power Corporation for the construction of a coal-fired power plant at the site of Sunflower's existing plant. Sierra Club contended that the permit failed to comply with the requirements of the Clean Air Act, implementing federal regulations, the Kansas Air Quality Act (KAQA), and applicable Kansas Administrative Regulations. The Supreme Court reversed the KDHE's action of issuing the permit, holding that the KDHE erroneously interpreted and applied the CAA and the KAQA when it failed to apply the regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding emission limits for nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide during the permitting process, as the CAA, KAWA and implementing regulations required the KDHE to apply the EPA regulations during the permitting process. View "Sierra Club v. Moser" on Justia Law

The Topeka City Council granted the Episcopal church (the Church) a building permit for a parking lot on Bethany Place, a registered state historic site owned by the Church. Friends of Bethany Place, a nonprofit organization, opposed the project and appealed the decision to issue the permit. The district court reversed and ordered the parking lot permit set aside, holding that insufficient evidence existed to support the finding that no feasible and prudent alternatives to the project existed and that all possible planning to minimize harm had been undertaken, and that the Council's decision did not satisfy the "hard look" test required by Reiter v. City of Beloit. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Council did not take a "hard look" at all relevant factors that must be reviewed before authorizing a project that encroaches upon, damages, or destroys historic property, as the Council failed to adequately identify what feasible and prudent alternatives existed and what planning could be done to minimize harm to Bethany Place. Remanded. View "Friends of Bethany Place, Inc. v. City of Topeka" on Justia Law

While driving his vehicle within the boundaries of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation's (Nation) reservation, Appellant, an enrolled member of the nation, was arrested for operating a vehicle while under the influence. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) subsequently suspended Appellant's Kansas driver's license based on Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1567a, which prohibits any person less than twenty-one years of age from operating a vehicle in the state with a blood alcohol content of .02 or greater. Upon judicial review of the suspension order, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of KDR. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over any civil matter arising from the incident, and the KDR acted outside the scope of its authority in this case. Remanded with directions to order the reinstatement of Appellant's driver's license. View "Rodewald v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

After Ian Burch's motor home was stopped by a highway patrol trooper, the trooper found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and $15,000 in cash in the vehicle. The State filed criminal charges against Burch. The district court found the trooper had unlawfully extended the scope and length of the stop and suppressed the evidence found in the vehicle. The charges against Burch were later dismissed. The Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR) subsequently issued a tax assessment notice indicating Burch owed $17,761 in taxes and penalties on the drugs found in his motor home. The Court of Tax Appeals (COTA) granted summary judgment to KDOR on its assessment of taxes and civil penalties against Burch under the Kansas Drug Tax Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that COTA erred in granting summary judgment to KDOR because it failed to consider and apply the exclusionary rule to the drugs upon which the taxes were assessed. Remanded to COTA for consideration of the exclusionary rule. View "In re Tax Appeal of Burch" on Justia Law

The Kansas State Board of Healing Arts (Board) filed a formal disciplinary action against Dr. Amir Friedman that resulted in an order of the Board revoking Friedman's license to practice medicine and surgery in the state. The district court upheld the Board's order. Friedman appealed, raising several issues, including the question of whether the Board had jurisdiction to initiate a revocation proceeding after Friedman's license had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board had jurisdiction to revoke Friedman's license because Friedman was practicing medicine under the authority of a license issued by the Board when he committed the misconduct at issue in the revocation proceeding; and (2) substantial evidence supported the administrative hearing officer's initial order and the Board's final order. View "Friedman v. State Bd. of Healing Arts" on Justia Law

The Workers Compensation Board awarded Plaintiff benefits under the Workers Compensation Act for an injury he sustained while operating a go-cart at an event sponsored by his employer (Employer). Employer and its insurance carrier (Insurer) appealed the award, claiming that Plaintiff's injuries were not compensable because they were sustained during a recreational or social event that Plaintiff was not required to attend. The court of appeals affirmed the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board applied the incorrect legal standard in determining whether Plaintiff's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment, and the error was not harmless. Remanded to the Board to make the determination based on the statutory criteria of Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-508(f). View "Douglas v. Ad Astra Info. Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Corporation owned a club with exotic dancers who were treated as independent contractors rather than employees for the purposes of unemployment insurance. In 2005, the Department of Labor determined that the dancers were employees. A hearing officer upheld the determination, concluding that the dancers received wages for services and therefore, the dancers were employees under the Kansas Employment Security Law (KESL). The district court agreed with the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer, and the court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was the relationship between provisions in the KESL as they existed before amendments that took effect in 2011 and common-law rules used to determine the existence of employee status. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the determinative question in this case was whether the dancers had the status of employees under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship. Because the critical common-law factor in this analysis is the employer's right of control over the employee and her work, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the dancers were employees, where Corporation possessed such a right of control over the club's dancers. View "Milano's, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor" on Justia Law