Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This was an administrative appeal by the Shawnee County Board of County Commissioners from a decision by the Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) setting aside tax assessments the County claimed on three executive-style business aircraft for tax years 2000-2002. The dispute arose after the County had agreed in earlier proceedings that the aircraft were not subject to taxation and BOTA ordered them exempted. A few years later, the County attempted to reassess the aircraft for back taxes, interest, and penalties. The aircrafts' owners objected and commenced this action to avert the taxation. BOTA and the district court agreed with the owners but with different reasons for their rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that claim and issue preclusion barred the County from initiating new taxation efforts for the same tax years after the initial BOTA exemption orders became final. Remanded to BOTA for it to set aside the County's correction orders and assessment notices for the aircraft and tax years at issue.

This appeal stemmed from an order granting summary judgment to the Board of County Commissioners regarding its challenge to the annexation of certain land by Park City. The district court then granted Park City an extension of time to file a postjudgment motion. Twenty days after the district court's order, Park City filed a motion for postjudgment relief under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-259(f). The district court denied the motion as untimely, observing that a motion under section 60-259(f) must be filed within ten days after entry of judgment, and Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-206(b) specifically prohibits a district court from extending this time period. After the thirty-day time limitation for filing notice of appeal had expired, Park City appealed the summary judgment ruling. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court's decision in part, concluding that the unique circumstances doctrine, which permits an appellate court to exercise jurisdiction over a late appeal if the appellant reasonably relied on some judicial action, did not save the untimely appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctrine could not be used to extend a statutory deadline that was jurisdictional.

Property owners appealed a special tax assessment the Board of County Commissioners levied against real property for cleanup costs the County claimed it incurred while removing dangerous structures and unsightly conditions on that property. The district court found subject matter jurisdiction lacking and granted the County's summary judgment motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the property owners' claims could be brought on direct review under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-907(a), which provides injunctive relief against an illegal levy or enforcement of any tax, charge, or assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed and in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the property owners satisfied the jurisdictional burdens under section 60-907(a) on two of its three issues; and (2) because the district court went beyond the jurisdiction question and found for the County on the merits and the court of appeals stopped short of considering the merits of any claims when it found the entire case was jurisdictionally barred, the court of appeals erred in part in its jurisdictional ruling. Remanded to the court of appeals to determine whether the district court properly granted summary judgment as to the remaining claims.

Shelly Herrell filed suit against National Beef Packing Company to recover for a knee injury she suffered while working in its plant as an independent contractor, alleging negligence in maintaining a dangerous condition and failing to warn of a dangerous condition. The district court denied National Beef's motion for summary judgment and motion for judgment as a matter of law on the duty issue, and the jury entered a verdict in favor of Herrell. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of National Beef, holding that Herrell's remedy was limited to workers compensation because National Beef did not maintain substantial control over Herrell's employer's activities on the premises. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly denied judgment as a matter of law to National Beef because National Beef owed Herrell a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances; and (2) the inclusion in the jury instruction a description of an OSHA regulation, with no opportunity for the jury to differentiate any liability based upon it in the general verdict form, polluted the trial of the case and necessitated reversal. Remanded.

Twenty years before the current dispute arose, Cory Saylor, who worked for Westar Energy, injured his left knee on the job. More recently, Saylor underwent knee replacement surgery. On March 28, 2006, after the surgery, Saylor served a notice of intent and written claim on Westar seeking workers compensation benefits. The ALJ awarded Saylor seventy-four weeks of permanent partial disability compensation. The Workers Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, inter alia, that Saylor's date of injury was the date he provided notice to Westar on March 28, 2006. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board and court of appeals correctly interpreted and applied Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-508(d) as it was written, which resulted in the assignment of March 28, 2006 as Saylor's date of accident; (2) there was substantial competent evidence to support the Board's finding that Westar had knowledge of Saylor's work-related injury before the surgery and that Westar refused or neglected to provide medical treatment for that injury, and therefore, the application of Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-510j(h) was triggered, rendering Westar liable for the cost of Saylor's knee replacement surgery.

The Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) issued a show cause order alleging that Bartlett Grain Company solicited for-hire motor carriers who violated several motor carrier safety laws. Bartlett answered the show cause order, contesting the KCC's jurisdiction over it with respect to its hiring of third-party motor carriers. Upon reconsideration, the KCC found it had jurisdiction over Bartlett to proceed. On review, the district court affirmed. Bartlett appealed, and the KCC stayed the ongoing agency proceedings pending judicial review. The Supreme Court transferred the case to its court on its own motion. Before considering the merits of the jurisdictional issue, the Court first addressed the issue raised sua sponte by the Court, i.e., whether the agency's order finding it had jurisdiction over the substantive violations alleged in the show cause order was a final agency action subject to judicial review. The Court held that the action from which Bartlett appealed was a nonfinal agency action and, therefore, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Landowners owned property near an airport that was zoned as agricultural. Landowners filed an application with the City to classify their property as planned single-family residential and to approve a preliminary plat for a subdivision. Initially, the rezoning was approved, but after the County brought suit, Landowners initiated a new application to rezone the property and, following the directives of Kan. Stat. Ann. 3-307e, to seek the approval of the County once the City approved the rezoning and the plat. The County denied Landowners' rezoning application. On review, the district court held that the City was the zoning authority and the County took a quasi-judicial role in reviewing the City's rezoning decision. The court concluded that the County had failed to overcome the presumption that the City's decision was reasonable and upheld the City's decision to approve the rezoning. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding the district court's ruling was erroneous because section 3-307e allows the County to reach an independent determination that a court must presume to be reasonable, and to successfully challenge the County's action under section 3-307e, a landowner must prove that the County's action was unlawful or unreasonable. Remanded.

Employee injured his back before beginning work as a service technician for Employer. While working for Employer, Employee experienced a sudden, severe increase of pain in his back. Employee eventually underwent surgery and, later, quit his job after several months of physical therapy. Before undergoing surgery, Employee filed an application for a hearing with the Division of Workers Compensation. The ALJ found Employee was injured during the course of his employment and entered an award for Employee. On review, the Kansas Workers Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed the ALJ and the Board, finding that Employee was precluded from compensation because his injuries were the result of the normal activities of daily living. On review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee was not engaged in the normal activities of day-to-day living when he reached for his tool belt or when he bent down to carry out a welding task. Accordingly, Employee's injury was covered by the Kansas workers compensation statute.