Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Mary Smith was discharged from her employment with the Estill County Fiscal Court after complaining about working conditions. The Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission found that the Fiscal Court’s discharge of Smith was a violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 338.121(3)(a) because her letter constituted an occupational health “complaint.” The circuit court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by interpreting what action constitutes a “complaint” under the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Act (KOSHA) because only the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Board, the quasi-legislative body under KOSHA, could interpret the meaning of undefined terms. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the final order of the Commission, holding that the Commission reasonably interpreted the word “complaint,” and that interpretation was in accord with the purpose of KOSHA. View "Kentucky Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission v. Estill County Fiscal Court" on Justia Law

Eddie Ray Thomas, Jr. died from a heart attack while attempting to tow a truck from a roadside culvert. Eddie’s estate filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. During the proceedings, the estate offered various testimony supporting the estate’s claim that Eddie’s heart attack was work-related, thus meeting its burden of proving that Eddie’s death was work-related without the presumption provided by Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.680. Eddie’s employer attempted to rebut the statutory presumption with testimony by Dr. Roseman. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Eddie’s death was not work-related, finding that Eddie suffered from pre-existing and active ischemic heart disease and that any anxiety Eddie suffered at the time of his death was not work-related. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter to the ALJ with instructions to award benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dr. Roseman’s opinion was not evidence of substance, and therefore, the presumption stood and the ALJ was required to award benefits. View "Eddie’s Service Center v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Charles Wimberly filed an application for disability retirement benefits with the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KERS). A hearing officer recommended that Wimberly's application be denied and, before KERS could render a final decision, Wimberly filed a second application pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 61.600(2). Following the recommendation of another hearing officer, KERS denied that application. Wimberly sought judicial review; the circuit court reversed KERS. KERS appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review to address the parties' arguments regarding the application of the doctrine of res judicata and to determine whether the consumption of alcohol was or could be a pre-existing condition. Having reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Wimberly" on Justia Law

Dianne Carson first filed an application for retirement disability benefits in November 2007. Based on the recommendation of a hearing officer, the Kentucky Retirement Systems (KERS) denied Carson's claim. Carson did not seek judicial review of KERS's order, choosing instead to file a second application in October 2009. Based on a recommendation of a different hearing officer, KERS again denied Carson's claim. Carson sought judicial review and the circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for KERS to consider all of the medical evidence Carson submitted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. KERS argued that Carson's second application should have been dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata. "If res judicata applied to this action, Carson would have been barred from filing a second application that was based on the same claim as her first application. However, KRS 61.600(2) requires KERS to accept an employee's timely filed "reapplication based on the same claim of incapacity" and to reconsider the claim 'for disability if accompanied by new objective medical evidence.'" This case was remanded for KERS to undertake the correct review of the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Kentycky Retirement Systems v. Carson" on Justia Law

Jason Tudor claimed that he suffered work-related cumulative-trauma back injuries while employed by Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. Toyota’s third party administrator (the TPA) denied Tudor’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits based on the belief that Tudor’s condition was not work-related. Tudor then filed an application for adjustment of injury claim, alleging three cumulative-trauma injuries. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Tudor suffered a series of work-related injuries and awarded Tudor income benefits. The ALJ further found that Toyota had failed to meet its burden of proving that Tudor had not timely filed his claim. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ. The court of appeals affirmed the ALJ’s award of benefits. The Supreme Court vacated the ALJ’s opinion and award and remanded, holding (1) the ALJ’s application of Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Czarnecki was based on a misunderstanding of the record; and (2) the ALJ’s finding that Tudor was entitled to temporary total disability benefits was made prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Trane Commercial Systems v. Tipton, and therefore, the case must be remanded for consideration of the factors set forth in Tipton. View "Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Tudor" on Justia Law

Appellant, a police officer, sustained a work-related injury and sought disability benefits. The Board of Trustees of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Policemen’s and Firefighter’s Retirement Fund (Board) denied Appellant’s application. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Appellant filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision but failed to sign or verify the petition. The Board moved to dismiss Appellant’s appeal, arguing that his petition failed to comply with the requirement of Ky. Rev. Stat. 67A.670(2) that a petition for review be “verified by the petitioner.” The circuit court denied the Board’s motion, finding that Appellant had cured the deficiency of his original pleading and therefore “substantially complied” with the statutory verification requirement. The Board filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to bar the circuit court from reviewing the Board’s decision, concluding that the deficiency in Appellant’s initial pleading deprived the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the writ, holding that a first class, second class, or special writ was not available because the circuit court was not proceeding outside its jurisdiction, there was no showing that “great injustice and irreparable injury” would ensue, and the orderly administration of justice was not imperiled by the circuit court’s ruling. View "Spears v. Hon. Pamela Goodwine" on Justia Law

Janet Owen, a former University of Kentucky (UK) employee, filed a claim for discriminatory employment practices based on a physical disability with the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (KCHR). The KCHR dually filed Owen’s claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The KCHR later dismissed Owen’s claim. The EEOC likewise issued a dismissal and notice of rights, adopting the KCHR’s findings and informing Owen that she had the right to sue under federal law. Rather than seeking judicial review of the KCHR final order or pursuing the EEOC’s federal claim, Owen filed an original action in circuit court under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UK, concluding that because Owen elected to pursue her claim through the administrative process, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 344.270 acts as an election of remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that due to a 1996 amendment to the KCRA, there is nothing remaining in the statute to bar claims filed in circuit court despite final and appealable order dismissing the exact same claim filed in the administrative agency. View "Owen v. University of Kentucky" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits from Defendant, a medical center, for injuries she allegedly sustained during the course of a pre-employment physical examination. Defendant denied Plaintiff’s claim on the ground that she was not an employee at the time of her injury. An administrative law judge and the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals also affirmed, agreeing that Plaintiff was not Defendant’s employee when she submitted for physical examination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kentucky’s Workers’ Compensation Act does not cover an injury sustained during a physical examination performed as a condition precedent to employment. View "Rahla v. Med. Ctr. at Bowling Green" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered a work-related accident while employed by Appellee. Appellant filed for workers’ compensation, but before his claim could be resolved, he was fired for “performance-related issues.” An administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded workers’ compensation but declined to apply a multiplier to Appellant’s award, finding that there was no evidence that Appellant’s cessation of employment was the result of his injury. The Workers’ Compensation Board ultimately concluded that Appellant was not entitled to enhancement by the two multiplier at the time of the ALJ’s decision and that the evidence did not compel a finding that Appellant’s work-related injury led to his termination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, as no finding had been made as to whether Appellant’s conduct at work satisfied the new standard set forth in Chrysalis House, Inc. v. Tackett regarding when the two multiplier may be awarded so as to justify the denial of the application of the two multiplier. View "Fuertes v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Glenn Hampton suffered a work-related injury during his employment with Flav-O-Rich. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Hampton to be permanently totally disabled and awarded him permanent total disability benefits. The Workers' Compensation Board vacated the ALJ’s opinion and remanded, finding that the ALJ’s summary of the evidence and findings of fact were not sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. Hampton filed a petition for review with the court of appeals. The court dismissed the petition as prematurely filed from a non-final Board opinion, concluding that because the Board’s opinion did not divest Hampton of a vested right and did not direct or authorize the ALJ to enter a different award on remand, it was not final and appealable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding under the test from Davis v. Island Creek Coal Co., the Board’s opinion was final and appealable. View "Hampton v. Flav-O-Rich Dairies" on Justia Law