Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Delena Tipton was injured during the course of her employment with Trane Commercial Systems. Trane initially paid Tipton temporary total disability (TTD) income benefits but stopped paying TTD benefits when Tipton returned to work. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Tipton’s release and return to work justified termination of TTD benefits when Tipton returned to work. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Tipton’s return to work did not terminate her entitlement to TTD benefits because Tipton did not returned to the type of work she had performed when she was injured. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the ALJ’s opinion and award, holding that there was ample substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s denial of Tipton’s request for additional TTD benefits. View "Trane Commercial Sys. v. Tipton" on Justia Law

Employee was employed by Employer for three months as a bulldozer operator. On April 16, 2012, Employee filed a workers’ compensation claim against Employer, alleging cumulative trauma and an injury date of February 7, 2012. Before his employment with Employer, Employee had worked as a bulldozer operated for other employers for approximately thirty years. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Employee sustained cumulative trauma injuries that became manifest on February 7, 2012, while he was employed by Employer, and that he was permanently and totally disabled. The Workers’ Compensation Board vacated and remanded, concluding (1) February 7, 2012 could not be the date of manifestation, and (2) Southern Kentucky Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Campbell required apportionment of liability based upon the percentage of Employee’s impairment attributable to the three months he worked for Employer. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reinstated the decision of the ALJ, holding (1) there was a sufficient evidentiary foundation to support the ALJ’s award; (2) the date of manifestation was February 7, 2012, as stipulated by the parties; and (3) Kentucky Southern Concrete was inapplicable. View "Hale v. CDR Operations, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1989, Appellant was injured in the course of her employment with Appellee. Appellant was awarded workers’ compensation benefits, including lifetime medical benefits for treatment of the injury. In 2012, Appellee filed this medical-fee dispute to contest the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment being provided by Appellant’s treating physician, as well as the relatedness of the treatment to the 1989 work injury. An administrative law judge found that the treatment was compensable, and the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence compelled a finding that the treatment at issue in this medical dispute was non-compensable. View "Kingery v. Sumitomo Elec. Wiring" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Campbell County Fiscal Court adopted an ordinance replacing a monthly subscriber fee per landline telephone to fund the emergency 911 service in the County with an annual service fee levied upon each occupied individual residential and commercial unit within the county. Plaintiff, an apartment association, filed a declaratory action alleging that the ordinance was an unconstitutional and invalid exercise of the County’s authority. The trial court affirmed the ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fee imposed by the County to fund the emergency 911 service was a constitutional and statutorily valid exercise of its authority. View "Greater Cincinnati/N. Ky. Apartment Ass’n, Inc v. Campbell County Fiscal Court" on Justia Law

Appellant represented Claimant in a workers’ compensation case. The Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) entered an interlocutory order, which resulted in Claimant receiving temporary total occupational disability benefits. The claim was later returned to the active docket, and the parties reached a settlement. Appellant subsequently filed two motions for approval of attorney fees, requesting approval of $12,000 for work performed in obtaining the lump sum payment and requesting approval of $8,369 for work performed in obtaining the benefits which Claimant recovered from the interlocutory award. The CALJ granted Appellant’s motion for $12,000 but denied the motion for $8,369 in fees, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.320(2)(a) caps attorney fees to a total of $12,000. On appeal, Appellant argued that an interlocutory proceeding in a workers’ compensation case should be considered separate from a claim for income benefits and therefore not subject to the statutory cap on attorneys fees established in section 342.320(2)(a). The Workers’ Compensation Board and Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney fee for the entire proceeding in this matter was subject to the statutory maximum of $12,000 under section 342.320(2)(a). View "Watts v. Danville Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Flanagan’s Ale House applied for a retail liquor drink license to replace its restaurant drink license. The Louisville/Jefferson County Government (Louisville Metro) denied the application, relying on Ky. Rev. Stat. 241.075, which prohibits the issuance of a retail drink license to an applicant located in a combination business and residential area of a “city of the first class or consolidated local government” if another similar establishment is located within 700 feet of the establishment. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC Board) affirmed. Flanagan’s appealed, arguing that section 241.075 was unconstitutional local and special legislation in violation of Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed with Flanagan’s and declared the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 241.075 violates Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. Remanded. View "Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. O'Shea's-Baxter, LLC" on Justia Law

A former teacher, Terum Hopper, filed a wrongful termination action against the Jefferson County Board of Education. The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hopper’s tort claims were barred by governmental immunity and that Hopper was required to pursue the administrative remedies set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 161.790 to challenge the termination of his employment contract. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion as to the governmental immunity claims but denied the motion as to the breach of contract claims, declaring that Hopper was entitled to file suit on these claims rather than pursue administrative remedies. The Board sought a writ prohibiting the lower court from trying Hopper’s breach of contract claims. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and that the Board had an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because Hopper filed an action in the circuit court without first exhausting the administrative remedies provided in section 161.790, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claim. View "Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Hon. Brian C. Edwards" on Justia Law

Appellant worked for Christopher & Banks, a retail clothing store, when she slipped and fell while walking around her car, which was parked in the employee parking lot. Christopher & Banks subsequently denied Appellant’s injury claim, concluding that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur on the store’s operating premises. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The Workers Compensation Board reversed, concluding that the evidence compelled a finding that Christopher & Banks directed its employees to park in either one of two spaces, that Appellant was parked in one of these spaces, and therefore, Appellant’s injury was within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The court of appeals reversed, determining that ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously reversed the opinion of the ALJ, as the ALJ’s findings were supported by evidence of substance and the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. View "Hanik v. Christopher & Banks, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a Kentucky-licensed land surveyor, testified as a trial expert on behalf of defendants in a quiet-title action in circuit court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Alleging that Appellant gave misleading and inaccurate trial testimony during the trial, the Kentucky State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors initiated disciplinary proceedings against Appellant. The Board ultimately suspended Plaintiff’s surveyor’s license, concluding that Plaintiff’s expert witness performance violated professional standards. Appellant sought judicial review. The Supreme Court held (1) a number of the statutes and regulations enforced by the Board against Appellant were impermissibly vague as applied to him; and (2) the Board’s decision to discipline Appellant was supported by substantial evidence. Remanded to the Board for reconsideration of Appellant’s sanction. View "Curd v. Ky. State Bd. of Licensure for Prof'l Eng'rs & Land Surveyors" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Kentucky Board of Nursing placed the Sullivan University System’s (Spencerian) Applied Science in Nursing (ADN) program on probationary status. Spencerian filed suit, alleging that the Board’s decision was erroneous because it retroactively applied newly-enacted 2009 regulatory amendments to Spencerian. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Board. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Board improperly applied the amended administrative regulations to Spencerian’s conduct that predated the amendments. During the pendency of this appeal, Spencerian instituted numerous changes to its ADN program, which resulted in the Board placing the ADN program on full approval status. Therefore, under the circumstances, the Supreme Court dismissed the Board’s appeal as moot and vacated the rulings of the lower courts. View "Commonwealth, Ky. Bd. of Nursing v. Sullivan Univ. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law