Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant represented Claimant in a workers’ compensation case. The Chief Administrative Law Judge (CALJ) entered an interlocutory order, which resulted in Claimant receiving temporary total occupational disability benefits. The claim was later returned to the active docket, and the parties reached a settlement. Appellant subsequently filed two motions for approval of attorney fees, requesting approval of $12,000 for work performed in obtaining the lump sum payment and requesting approval of $8,369 for work performed in obtaining the benefits which Claimant recovered from the interlocutory award. The CALJ granted Appellant’s motion for $12,000 but denied the motion for $8,369 in fees, concluding that Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.320(2)(a) caps attorney fees to a total of $12,000. On appeal, Appellant argued that an interlocutory proceeding in a workers’ compensation case should be considered separate from a claim for income benefits and therefore not subject to the statutory cap on attorneys fees established in section 342.320(2)(a). The Workers’ Compensation Board and Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the attorney fee for the entire proceeding in this matter was subject to the statutory maximum of $12,000 under section 342.320(2)(a). View "Watts v. Danville Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Flanagan’s Ale House applied for a retail liquor drink license to replace its restaurant drink license. The Louisville/Jefferson County Government (Louisville Metro) denied the application, relying on Ky. Rev. Stat. 241.075, which prohibits the issuance of a retail drink license to an applicant located in a combination business and residential area of a “city of the first class or consolidated local government” if another similar establishment is located within 700 feet of the establishment. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC Board) affirmed. Flanagan’s appealed, arguing that section 241.075 was unconstitutional local and special legislation in violation of Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed with Flanagan’s and declared the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 241.075 violates Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. Remanded. View "Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v. O'Shea's-Baxter, LLC" on Justia Law

A former teacher, Terum Hopper, filed a wrongful termination action against the Jefferson County Board of Education. The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hopper’s tort claims were barred by governmental immunity and that Hopper was required to pursue the administrative remedies set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 161.790 to challenge the termination of his employment contract. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion as to the governmental immunity claims but denied the motion as to the breach of contract claims, declaring that Hopper was entitled to file suit on these claims rather than pursue administrative remedies. The Board sought a writ prohibiting the lower court from trying Hopper’s breach of contract claims. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and that the Board had an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because Hopper filed an action in the circuit court without first exhausting the administrative remedies provided in section 161.790, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claim. View "Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Hon. Brian C. Edwards" on Justia Law

Appellant worked for Christopher & Banks, a retail clothing store, when she slipped and fell while walking around her car, which was parked in the employee parking lot. Christopher & Banks subsequently denied Appellant’s injury claim, concluding that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur on the store’s operating premises. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Appellant’s injury was not compensable because it did not occur within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The Workers Compensation Board reversed, concluding that the evidence compelled a finding that Christopher & Banks directed its employees to park in either one of two spaces, that Appellant was parked in one of these spaces, and therefore, Appellant’s injury was within Christopher & Banks’s operating premises. The court of appeals reversed, determining that ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence and that the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously reversed the opinion of the ALJ, as the ALJ’s findings were supported by evidence of substance and the Board engaged in impermissible fact finding. View "Hanik v. Christopher & Banks, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a Kentucky-licensed land surveyor, testified as a trial expert on behalf of defendants in a quiet-title action in circuit court. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Alleging that Appellant gave misleading and inaccurate trial testimony during the trial, the Kentucky State Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors initiated disciplinary proceedings against Appellant. The Board ultimately suspended Plaintiff’s surveyor’s license, concluding that Plaintiff’s expert witness performance violated professional standards. Appellant sought judicial review. The Supreme Court held (1) a number of the statutes and regulations enforced by the Board against Appellant were impermissibly vague as applied to him; and (2) the Board’s decision to discipline Appellant was supported by substantial evidence. Remanded to the Board for reconsideration of Appellant’s sanction. View "Curd v. Ky. State Bd. of Licensure for Prof'l Eng'rs & Land Surveyors" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Kentucky Board of Nursing placed the Sullivan University System’s (Spencerian) Applied Science in Nursing (ADN) program on probationary status. Spencerian filed suit, alleging that the Board’s decision was erroneous because it retroactively applied newly-enacted 2009 regulatory amendments to Spencerian. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Board. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Board improperly applied the amended administrative regulations to Spencerian’s conduct that predated the amendments. During the pendency of this appeal, Spencerian instituted numerous changes to its ADN program, which resulted in the Board placing the ADN program on full approval status. Therefore, under the circumstances, the Supreme Court dismissed the Board’s appeal as moot and vacated the rulings of the lower courts. View "Commonwealth, Ky. Bd. of Nursing v. Sullivan Univ. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Bullitt County Board of Health enacted a Regulation that prohibited tobacco smoke in all enclosed public places, among other places, and placed additional restrictions regarding tobacco use on smoking-regulated businesses and regulated places. Appellants filed a petition for declaration of rights against the Board, arguing that the Board had exceeded its authority by enacting a substantive law without proper enabling legislation. The trial court agreed with Appellants and held that the Regulation was invalid. The court of appeals reversed, determining that the Regulation was valid and a proper exercise of the Board’s statutory authority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the Resolution, and therefore, the Resolution was invalid and unenforceable. View "Bullitt Fiscal Court v. Bullitt County Bd. of Health" on Justia Law

The City of Lebanon sought to annex several hundred acres of nearby property. The owners of the property subject to the annexation, including Appellees, filed a lawsuit against the City to invalidate the annexation ordinance. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City, by intentionally manipulating the annexation boundaries to guarantee a successful annexation, violated Appellees’ constitutional rights. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the boundaries of territory to be annexed must be “natural or regular” and that the boundaries of the proposed annexation in this case did not meet this standard. The Supreme Court reversed and declared the annexation valid, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in applying a “natural or regular” standard; and (2) the City’s annexation fully complied the the statutory requirements and did not violate Appellees’ constitutional rights. View "City of Lebanon v. Goodin" on Justia Law

Mary Bell was a disabled person who drew Social Security Insurance benefits and participated in a federally-funded, community-based program operated by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services. When Thomas Bell, Mary’s father, retired and began to draw his Social Security benefits, Mary became eligible for Old Age, Survivor and Disability Insurance. Consequently, Mary was charged $60 per month for her continued program participation. Thomas filed an administrative appeal on Mary’s behalf. The matter ultimately reached the circuit court, which held that Mary could not be charged to participate in the program. Thereafter, the circuit court (1) awarded attorney’s fees against the Cabinet due to the Cabinet’s “egregious government behavior,” and (2) ordered the Cabinet to disclose the personal information of all other participants in the program. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred by (1) ordering the payment of attorney’s fees solely for egregious conduct without statutory authorization or a contract providing for such fees; and (2) ordering the disclosure of records of all persons participating in the program without the other persons having filed claims and no class action being certified. View "Bell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were the Kentucky Horse Racing Commission, the Kentucky Department of Revenue, and eight horse Kentucky racing associations that wished to expand their businesses to include wagering upon historical horse racing. Appellants filed an action for a declaration of rights concerning the operation of mechanical and electronic devices for wagering on previously run horse races, so-called “historical horse racing.” The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which held (1) the Commission has the statutory authority to license and regulate the operation of pari-mutuel wagering on historic horse racing; (2) under the present statutory scheme, the Department does not have the authority to tax the wagering upon historical horse races; and (3) whether the licensed operation of wagering on historic horse racing violates the gambling provisions of the Kentucky Penal Code is an issue that depends upon facts not in the record, therefore requiring further proceedings in the circuit court. View "Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Family Trust Found. of Ky." on Justia Law