Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Employee's employment was terminated by Employer after Employee refused to sign an agreement acknowledging her repeated tardiness violated Employer's code of conduct. Employee subsequently filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits, which was denied on grounds that Employee's discharge was for work related misconduct. A referee with the division of unemployment insurance reversed the determination. The unemployment insurance commission reversed the referee's decision, concluding that Employee was not qualified to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she was fired for misconduct. The circuit court affirmed, and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the commission's conclusion that Employee was not terminated for tardiness but, rather, for refusing to sign the agreement was clearly erroneous; (2) there was substantial evidence to support the commission's finding that Employee was repeatedly tardy; and (3) therefore, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 341.370(6), the commission did not err in denying unemployment insurance benefits. View "Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Cecil" on Justia Law

Appellee was injured during the course of his employment. When his workers' compensation benefits ceased, Appellee applied for and received unemployment insurance benefits. The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission determined that Kan. Rev. Stat. 341.090, which permits the use of an "extended base period" that captures earnings leading to equitable unemployment benefits, required that the extended base period may include only the four calendar quarters that immediately precede the base period. Pursuant to this extended base period, Appellee was awarded benefits of $149 per week. The circuit court reversed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the extended base period need not be limited to the four quarters that immediately precede the base period. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission properly applied the statute in calculating Appellee's unemployment benefits. View "Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the method for excluding impairment from a non-compensable disability when calculating a worker's permanent disability benefit under the post-1996 version of Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.730(1)(b). The ALJ calculated a benefit based on the claimant's entire post-injury permanent impairment rating and then subtracted an amount equal to a benefit based on his pre-existing active impairment rating. The workers' compensation board reversed, determining that the present version of section 342.730(1)(b) requires the calculation of income benefits to be based only on the permanent impairment rating caused by the injury being compensated. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pre-existing impairment must be excluded when calculating a total disability award under section 342.730(1)(b). View "Tudor v. Indus. Mold & Mach. Co." on Justia Law

Claimant sustained a work-related injury in 2003, for which he was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) benefits followed by 425 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. In 2007 Claimant sustained another injury. After finding the effects of the 2003 injury caused Claimant's 2007 injury, an ALJ increased Claimant's partial disability benefit at reopening and tripled the entire income benefit awarded for his injury. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the finding of increased impairment as well as the finding that Claimant lacked the physical capacity at reopening to perform the type of work performed at the time of his injury; and (2) the combined effects of the impairment present at the time of the initial award and the additional impairment present at reopening entitled Claimant to triple benefits based on the whole of his disability for the balance of the compensable period. View "James T. English Trucking v. Beeler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court in this case granted review to decide whether the City of Florence violated the Open Meetings Act when it agreed in private discussions to settle a pending lawsuit in a zoning matter when the settlement itself was voted on in an open meeting. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Open Meetings Act specifically allows for private discussions of pending or proposed litigation, the City did not violate the Open Meetings Act, where the final, binding vote on the settlement was conducted at a public meeting. View "Cunningham v. Whalen" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned an ALJ's decision to award the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for his work-related shoulder injury from the date he left work, May 10, 2007, until May 8, 2009. The ALJ also awarded permanent income and medical benefits for the injury but denied claims for cervical and lumbar spine injuries. A court of appeals majority reversed, concluding that the opinion and award failed to contain findings adequate to make clear whether the ALJ considered and understood all of the evidence relevant to the date when TTD began. The Supreme Court (1) reversed to the extent that the ALJ made the finding of fact required by Kan. Rev. Stat. 342.0011(11)(a); but (2) affirmed to the extent the Court was unable to determine whether the ALJ simply misstated May 10, 2007 as being the date the claimant testified he stopped working due to the effects of his injury, misunderstood the evidence concerning his reason for missing work on May 10, 2007, or chose May 10, 2007 based on other evidence. Remanded to the ALJ to clarify that portion of the decision. View "Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg." on Justia Law

When calculating the income benefit for he claimant's work-related injury, the ALJ apportioned sixty-three percent of the twenty-one percent permanent impairment rating that existed at maximum medical improvement (MMI) to a pre-existing active condition, which was non-compensable. The court of appeals affirmed the workers' compensation board's decision to vacate the calculation on the ground that the ALJ should have subtracted the pre-existing active impairment rating that existed immediately before the injury from the impairment rating that existed at MMI and based the income benefit on the remainder. The employer appealed, arguing that nothing prevented the ALJ from apportioning the impairment rating at MMI based on permissible inferences drawn from the medical evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board and court of appeals applied the correct methodology for determining the impairment rating upon which to base income benefits.

In this workers' compensation case, an ALJ determined that injuries Claimant sustained in an automobile accident while returning to Kentucky from yearling sales held in New York came within the course and scope of his employment with Defendant, Gaines Gentry Thoroughbreds. The workers' compensation board and court of appeals affirmed. Gaines Gentry appealed, arguing that the ALJ erred by awarding benefits because Claimant's injury was not work-related under the dual purpose, positional risk, or traveling employee doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ reasonably found that Gaines Gentry instructed Claimant to travel to New York in a van with its yearlings in order to attend to them; and (2) the ALJ properly concluded under he circumstances that an accident that occurred while Claimant was returning to Kentucky to resume his usual duties for Gaines Gentry was work-related.

After serving eighteen months as the superintendent of Bourbon County public schools, Appellant Arnold Carter transferred into the position of consultant to the school district pursuant to an "exit strategy." The details of Carter's resignation and consulting contract were discussed and determined in a closed session during a meeting of the Bourbon County Board of Education. Appellee Jamie Smith, a parent and concerned citizen, challenged the Board's actions as violative of Kentucky's Open Meetings Act. The circuit court found Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.801(1)(f) permitted the Board's closed session discussion of Carter's resignation but not its discussion of Carter's consulting contract and consequently voided the consulting contract. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Board violated the Act when it discussed Carter's resignation and consulting contract in closed session; and (2) Carter's consulting contract was voidable as a matter of law and was properly voided by the circuit court.

Appellant Charles Wilson worked at the Central City Water Works Department. During his tenure there, Wilson reported several safety issues to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Kentucky Division of Water. The mayor later terminated Wilson for personal use of his computer at the water plant and "neglect of duties, mismanagement of the water plant, and abuse of authority." The city council affirmed the mayor's decision. Wilson brought a civil action arguing that he was not a terminable "at-will" employee and that he was terminated in retaliation for notifying authorities of the Central City's violation of safety rules and regulations. The trial court granted summary judgment for Central City. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Wilson was an at-will employee and not protected by the Whistleblower Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that cities are not "employers" under the Whistleblower Act, and city employees are therefore not protected by the Act.