Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An administrative law judge ("ALJ") found that claimant's work for defendant's temporary employment agency was sporadic but failed to specify whether KRS 342.140(1)(d) or (1)(e) was used to calculate her average weekly wage. The Workers' Compensation Board reversed and remanded the claim and this appeal was taken from the decision by the court of appeals to affirm. The employer argued that which subsection of KRS 342.140(1) applied was a factual determination to be made by the ALJ; that the ALJ committed harmless error by failing to specify the subsection of KRS 342.140(1) used in the average weekly wage calculation; and that additional proof should not be permitted on remand. Claimant defended the court of appeals' decision but also argued in a cross-appeal that the record compelled a finding under KRS 342.140(1)(e) that her average weekly wage was $320.00. The court held that the ALJ did not commit harmless error by failing to specify the subsection relied upon and that the ALJ must analyze the evidence under KRS 342.140(1)(e) on remand. The court reversed with respect to the decision to reopen for additional proof because claimant argued from the outset that KRS 342.140(1)(e) controlled the calculation. The court also held that the record contained adequate evidence to apply the statute under the present circumstances and did not compel the finding that either party sought.

Claimant alleged a work-related cumulative trauma injury to his neck and was initially awarded workers' compensation benefits on March 28, 2002. Claimant moved to reopen the award after undergoing surgery and the administrative law judge ("ALJ") rendered another award to claimant on July 19, 2004. On March 3, 2009, claimant filed a motion to reopen. At issue was whether the ALJ properly denied as untimely the claimant's motion to reopen in order to correct a mistake of law in his workers' compensation award and denied as unauthorized his motion to reopen under CR 60.01 and CR 60.02 for the correction of a clerical error in the award. The court concluded that, although KRS 342.125(1)(c) permitted an award to be reopened based on a mistake in applying the law as it existed at the time of the award, KRS 342.125(3) limited the period for such a reopening to four years after the original award or order granting or denying benefits. The court also concluded that the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure applied to proceedings before an administrative agency only to the extent provided by regulation and neither Chapter 342 or 803 KAR 25:010 adopted Cr 60.01 or CR 60.02 with respect to workers' compensation proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed a decision in which the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the Appellant's work-related injury was only partially disabling. The appellate court denied Appellant's motion for an enlargement of time in which to file a petition for review. The court rejected Appellant's argument that CR 76.25 permits time for filing a petition for review to be enlarged before it expires. On review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter back to the appellate court, holding that CR 76.25 "serves two functions. It is both the document for invoking the court's jurisdiction to consider an appeal, and the document for stating the petitioner's grounds for seeking appellate relief."

Carol Forte taught elementary school in the Nelson County Public School System. She was killed as she was leaving the school grounds when an unsecured pole gate blown by the wind hit her car and struck her in the head. Her husband Gene first filed a tort claim in the Nelson Circuit Court against the County Board of Education. Being aware of the Board's defense of governmental immunity, Forte filed a "protective" claim with the Board of Claims, raising the same issues in his tort action in the circuit court, asking the Board of Claims to hold its action in abeyance until the circuit court decided on the immunity issue. The Board of Education responded to the claims by arguing that the Board of Claims had sole jurisdiction in the matter, and that the action was time barred and should be dismissed. Forte then filed a new action in the circuit court for review of the Board of Claims order, asking that that order be set aside. Before a response was filed, Forte filed a supplemental memorandum specifically raising the state "saving statute." The Board of Education responded with the same arguments it made before the Board of Claims. The circuit court entered an opinion vacating the Board of Claims order, and remanding the matter back the Board of Claims for a decision on the abeyance. The Board of Education appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. After the appeal was filed, the circuit court granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment on the grounds it had governmental immunity. On review of the record of the lower courts, the Supreme Court found that the Board of Claims did not have jurisdiction over the claim brought before it, and Forte's claim made there was premature. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision on that matter and remanded the case to the circuit court. The Court affirmed the appellate court's affirmation of the motion for summary judgment acknowledging its governmental immunity.

Paul and Pat Nash own twenty-eight acres in Campbell County. Clifford and Toby Torline own thirty-five acres. Both Nash and Torline wished to divide their parcels into tracts of five or more acres each for agricultural uses. Nash and Torline see the five-acre plots as mini-farms, but the County views the plots as residential subdivisions with large lots. The County Clerk petitions the court for guidance as to whether or not he should accept the deeds of the five-acre divisions for recording. The County maintains that two of its ordinances prohibit any division until the property owners prove to the Planning Commission that the divisions were for agricultural purposes. Nash and Torline take exception to having the burden placed on them, and argue that the County must prove the divisions were not exempt from subdivision regulations. The trial court agreed with Nash and Torline, and held that the County's ordinances violated the agricultural supremacy clause and were therefore unconstitutional. The appellate court reversed the lower court and ordered summary judgment on behalf of the County. The Supreme Court accepted discretionary review, affirmed in part the lower court's decision, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the County. The Court found that the five-acre plots were subdivisions that required planning commission approval before recording.